



COL. JOHN W. EMERSON IN HIS STUDY.*

GRANT'S LIFE IN THE WEST AND HIS MISSISSIPPI VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

(A HISTORY.)

BY COL. JOHN W. EMERSON.

(Engravings from drawings and photographs furnished chiefly by Mrs. E. Butler Johnson.)
(Begun in the October, 1896, Midland Monthly.)

BOOK II.

CHAPTER XIX.

GRANT REVISITS ST. LOUIS.

ONE of the regiments which Grant was required to muster was expected to rendezvous at Belleville, Ill., about May 8, 1861, and thither he went to perform that duty. When he arrived all the companies had not assembled, and would not do so for several days.

Grant concluded to make a hasty visit to St. Louis, his old home, only eighteen miles distant, see his wife's parents, near the city, and feel the temperature in that border slave State.

To say that he "found things hot"

*Taken by Photographer W. C. Perkins, of Ironton, Mo., while the Colonel was engaged upon his "Grant in the West."

would be too mild an expression. They were boiling—seething.

St. Louis was a large city, with nearly two hundred thousand people, and perhaps thirty per cent thereof decidedly southern in sentiment. Probably a third or a fourth of this class were as intensely bitter and as "fire-eating" in favor of secession as the same number in any of the southern States. They were utterly intolerant of opinion, and were bold, demonstrative and outspoken against "Lincoln tyranny" and "Lincoln hirelings." From the noise and bluster they made, it would seem to an observer from without, that the city and State were overwhelmingly in favor of secession. But Grant had lived there most of the years in

which this trouble had been brewing and he readily comprehended the situation.

In truth there never was a time when there was not in St. Louis and in the State at large a very decided majority for the the Union.

But this Union majority was composed of the working, thinking, conservative, undemonstrative business portion of the population. It required time for this element to arouse and assert itself; and to comprehend what the excited agitators really meant.

But the fiery, aggressive spirits of Frank P. Blair, B. Gratz Brown, Capt. Nathaniel Lyon and others, kindled the Union spirit into active assertion, and at the time Grant made his visit it was organized and ready to assert itself; and it did make itself heard, and felt.

CHAPTER XX. THE CONSPIRACY TO TAKE MISSOURI OUT OF THE UNION.

It will be profitable to stop here and take a brief survey of the conspiracy as it had thus far developed in Missouri.

Under the president's first call, the quota assigned to Missouri was four regiments. The governor, Claiborne F. Jackson, was intense in his southern sympathies. He had for some time been engaged in secret intrigue with Jefferson Davis, and others connected with the Confederate government, with the purpose of carrying Missouri out of the Union and into the confederacy.

When the President's proclamation reached Governor Jackson he answered it in the most haughty and insulting terms. He denounced the request as "illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman and diabolical." He immediately convened the legislature, in extra session, for the undoubted purpose of taking some

pretended steps whereby Missouri might cast her destiny with the Confederate States. The working out of this conspiracy was found to be beset with many difficulties.

Governor Jackson had proceeded, under cover of the regular militia law of the state, to organize a camp, named after himself, in the western part of the city of St. Louis, apparently as an ordinary camp of instruction. Here the militia of the State were invited, and more than two regiments, and a battery or two, soon assembled. The United States flag floated over the camp, and there were no visible indications of disloyalty. Many Unionists were there

in the ranks and as holiday spectators or participants, ignorant of any disloyal purpose of the leaders; but, as was thoroughly demonstrated afterwards, the whole animating purpose and motive of the leadership were in aid of the scheme of projected secession and the capture of the United States Arsenal at St. Louis.

Governor Jackson had dispatched two commissioners to Jefferson Davis, President of the newly organized "Confederate States of America," to secure aid, and



BRIG.-GEN. NATHANIEL LYON.
A better portrait of Lyon, from an old photo owned by Captain J. S. Clark, of Des Moines, appeared in the August MIDLAND.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL NATHANIEL LYON.

Killed at the battle of Wilson's Creek, near Springfield, Mo., August 10, 1861. With a force of 6,000 he attacked the Confederate Generals Price and McCulloch, over 22,000 strong, and had practically won a victory when he was killed while leading the First Iowa Regiment in a brilliant charge. He was in command at the arsenal, St. Louis, when he captured Camp Jackson, May 10, 1861, and then immediately advanced and took possession of the State Capital. Grant met him as he was preparing to move on Camp Jackson. The sketch is from a painting in the Senate at Jefferson City, Mo.

on the 23d of April, 1861, President Davis returned the following reply:

After learning as well as I could from the gentlemen accredited to me what was most needful for the attack on the arsenal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should be furnished with two 12-pounder howitzers and two 32-pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for each.

These, from the commanding hills, will be effective both against the garrison and to breach the inclosing walls of the place. I concur with you as to the great importance of capturing the arsenal and securing its supplies. We look anxiously and hopefully for the day when the Star of Missouri shall be added to the Constellation of the Confederate States of America.*

So hopefully and confidently had Governor Jackson written President Davis, that Missouri began to be treated as Confederate territory.

Three days after Davis had sent his

* War Records.

reply to Jackson, the Confederate Secretary of War, Walker, wrote to Governor Jackson:

Can you arm and equip one regiment of infantry for service in Virginia, to rendezvous at Richmond? Transportation will be provided by this Government. The regiment to elect its own officers and must enlist for not less than twelve months, unless sooner discharged.*

This missive reached Governor Jackson on the 4th of May, and on the 5th he answered it. The language gives a vivid picture of the progress of the conspiracy:

Yours of the 26th ultimo, *via* Louisville, is received. I have no legal authority to furnish the men you desire. Missouri, you know, is yet under the tyranny of Lincoln's government—so far, at least, as forms go. We are woefully deficient here in arms and cannot furnish them at present; but so far as men are concerned we have plenty of

* War Records.

them ready, willing, and anxious to march at any moment to the defense of the South. Our legislature has just met, and I doubt not will give me all necessary authority over the matter. If you can arm the men they will go whenever wanted, and to any point where they may be the most needed. I send this to Memphis by private hand, being afraid to trust our mails or telegraphs. Let me hear from you by the same means. Missouri can and will put 100,000 men in the field if required. We are using every means to arm our people, and until we are better prepared must move cautiously. I write this in confidence, and with my earnest prayers for your success.*

The "means to arm our people," which Governor Jackson was taking, consisted of preparations in his militia camp to capture the arsenal, and the extraordinary measures which were being sent through the legislature at Jefferson City. A comprehensive military bill, placing extraordinary powers in the hands of the Governor, was enacted, and the money

belonging to the common schools of the State was diverted from its use and applied to advance the Governor's military and secession schemes.

The committee of safety in St. Louis kept a keen eye upon every step of the intrigue, though this correspondence was not then known to them. President Lincoln was duly informed of the increasing danger, and on April 30th caused Secre-

tary of War Cameron, to issue the following celebrated order, directed to Captain Lyon, in command of the arsenal:

The President of the United States directs that you enroll in the military service of the United States, the loyal citizens of St. Louis and vicinity, not exceeding, with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousand in number, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the United States and for the protection of the peaceable inhabitants of Missouri.*

On the back of the order, Gen. Scott indorsed, laconically, "it is revolutionary times, and therefore I do not object to the irregularity of this."

This gave Lyon and Blair a compact little army. Blair was colonel of one of the first regiments organized, but Lyon was of rank, being in the regular army.

CHAPTER XXI. CONSPIRACY DETECTED.

On the 8th of May, the

day on which our Captain Grant arrived in St. Louis from Belleville, Illinois, an event occurred which brought matters to a speedy crisis. Several cannon and ammunition, packed in hogsheads marked "bacon," and boxes of muskets, were landed at the St. Louis levee from a New Orleans steamer; sent by order of Jefferson Davis, and transferred to Camp Jackson.



From an old painting

GOV. CLAIBORNE F. JACKSON,
Of Missouri, who plotted with Jefferson Davis, in 1861, to carry his State over into the Southern Confederacy.

* War Records.

The attempt to conceal the contents of the shipment was not a success. The Committee of Safety learned of it at once. These arms and this war material were brought from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and were a part of those captured in the United States Arsenal there in the previous January, by the seceding Governor of that State. They were, therefore, stolen property of the United States, and connected Camp Jackson unmistakably with the insurrectionary movement.

There never was any hesitancy about

CHAPTER XXII.

CAPTURE OF CAMP JACKSON.

Secession sympathizers were running through the streets with arms; men jumped into carriages, spring wagons and carts, and, lashing the horses into a mad gallop, went streaming out to join in the defense of Camp Jackson. The sidewalks were thronged with frenzied people. The Union men were largely in the well organized regiments now forming in line of march at the arsenal,* pre-



W. C. Perkins, Photographer, Ironton, Mo.

A BIT OF LAWN AT "SYLVAN LAKE HOME,"

Where "Grant's Life" is being written, showing the "Grant Oak," the Grant Monument, and the residence of the author. See outline of Judge Emerson's career, in the Editorial Department of this number.

prompt action where Captain Lyon and Colonel Blair were the actors.

These were the tempestuous conditions in the midst of which Grant found himself on his brief visit to his old home. He spent one day in the country at the Colonel Dent home, and returned into the city on the morning of May 10th and soon learned the startling rumor spreading through the city, that Lyon and Blair were then marshaling their forces for an attack on Camp Jackson. He had never before experienced such wild tumult and excitement.

paring to move. Grant's heart beat with loyal pride at the knowledge that Lyon and Blair were not going to wait to be attacked, but meant to promptly strike and put an end to the treasonable plottings of which they were then only partially informed.

Grant hastened to the arsenal, and conversed a few minutes with Blair and Lyon, as the regiments were taking up their positions in line of march, and wished them success. He did not have

* A view of the arsenal in St. Louis is given in THE MIDLAND MONTHLY of November, 1896.



THE FAMOUS "GRANT OAK"

On Col. John W. Emerson's grounds at Ironton, Mo., under which Colonel Grant received his commission as Brigadier-General, August, 1861, while there in command. The spring flows out beneath the statue of the Angel, to the left of the oak. "Sylvan Lake" is seen through the openings, in the background.

a horse, and it was impossible, in the excitement then prevailing, to obtain one, else he would have joined them as a volunteer aid.

At 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 10th, Lyon's army of six regiments and a battery of artillery were moving rapidly through the streets of St. Louis toward Camp Jackson, and, converging, surrounded the camp on three sides. On the other side Lyon planted his battery on an elevation commanding the camp.

To Captain Lyon's demand for the immediate surrender of the force and all war material, General Frost, who was in command, made no resistance, except a protest that the camp was organized under the laws of the State, and was not hostile to the general government!

How far General Frost was aware of the designs and schemes of Governor Jackson and the other conspirators, the writer has not the evidence to determine.

Before night Camp Jackson was extinguished and the prisoners and war

material were safe inside the walls of the United States Arsenal.

There were, afterwards, riots on the streets; mobs attacked the volunteers; they in turn swept the streets with musketry fire, and there were many killed and wounded.

Thenceforth St. Louis became, and continued throughout the war, the center of Union military and naval activities in the West.

When Lyon and Blair returned to the arsenal with their prisoners, and other captures, Grant again met them and congratulated them.

It was on his way to the arsenal to see Lyon and Blair after the capture that the following incident occurred, which Gen. Grant pleasantly relates in his Memoirs:

"Before the car I was in started," he says, "a dapper little fellow—he would be called a dude at this day—stepped in. He was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives freely to express his contempt for the Union, and for those who had just perpetrated such an out-

rage upon the rights of a free people. He evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy, for he turned to me and said: 'Things have come to a — pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. Where I came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the Union we hang him to the limb of the first tree we come to.' I replied that after all we were not so intolerant in St. Louis as we might be; I had not seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of them who ought to be, however. The young man subsided. He was so crestfallen that I believe if I had ordered him to leave the car he would have gone quietly out, saying to himself, 'More Yankee oppression.'

Grant returned to Illinois and resumed his duties as aid to Governor Yates, mustering the new regiments as fast as their organization was completed. One of these was the Twenty-first Illinois, mustered in at Mattoon. His brief intercourse with the men and officers was pleasant. He gave them instructions and advice which, coming from a West Point graduate and an old regular army officer, was appreciated and remembered. But none of them then suspected how soon they were destined to be bound, together by official ties.



NEAR VIEW OF THE GRANT MONUMENT
On Colonel Emerson's grounds, Ironton, Mo., where General Grant made his headquarters in 1861.

CHAPTER XXIII.

GRANT WRITES TO WASHINGTON.

The mustering was about completed, the machinery of the Adjutant-General's office was running smoothly, and Captain Grant took leave for a few days to return to Galena. He knew that his position on the Governor's staff was out of the line of promotion, and opened no field for military activities. He believed he had ability to be of greater service to his country in an active command. He therefore concluded to make formal application to the War Department at Washington, and wrote the following letter:*

GALENA, ILLS.,
May 24, 1861.
Col. L. Thomas,
Adj't.-Gen., U.S.
A., Washington,
D. C.:

SIR:—Having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including four years at West Point, and feeling it the duty of all who have been educated at the government expense to offer their services

for the support of that government, I have the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. I would say, in view of my present age and length of service, I feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the President, in his judgment, should see fit to entrust one to me.

Since the first call of the President, I have been serving on the staff of the Governor of this State, rendering such aid as I could in the organization of our State militia and am still engaged in that capacity. A letter addressed to me at Springfield, Illinois, will reach me. I am very respectfully, your obedient servant.
U. S. GRANT.

This modest, patriotic letter elicited no answer. It was probably pigeon-holed

*A facsimile of this letter was presented in the November MIDLAND MONTHLY.

by some subordinate clerk and was never even seen by the Adjutant-General or the President, for it was found unfiled among miscellaneous papers, long after the war. Amid the thousands of similar applications then pouring in upon the Department this was not surprising; especially as it bore no endorsement, and no name that would then arrest attention.

Captain Grant, in his self-deprecatory spirit, had felt some misgivings as to his ability to command a regiment; but, having met all the colonels whom he had been mustering into the service and taken mental measure of them, he was encouraged to believe that he was, at least, equal to any of them. He was certainly the most modest and unambitious of men; and in the absence of all efforts in his own behalf, or any solicited intervention of his

friends for his advancement or promotion, it is difficult to doubt that a guiding Hand was directing his destiny.

Strangely, it had not occurred to him to apply to his chief, Governor Yates, for the command of a regiment. If he did think of it, he saw, also, that the men whose claims were most likely to have consideration were those whose activities in public and political life had raised them to a position which commanded attention. Then, too, in his old army life,

he had been accustomed to deal exclusively with the authority of the general government, and this is undoubtedly his reason for applying, of his own volition, to that source. He knew, too, that in applying there, the records in the war office furnished abundant evidence of his gallant deeds in Mexico, of his two brevets, and his subsequent promotions in the regular army.

CHAPTER XXIV.

GRANT VISITS HIS PARENTS, AND TRIES TO SEE MCCLELLAN.

Just then General McClellan was becoming a prominent figure. He was organizing the forces in Ohio, with his headquarters at Cincinnati, making rapid preparations to attack the Confederate forces menacing the Ohio River in West Virginia. Grant knew General McClellan quite well. He had spent a year

with him at West Point, and served with him in the Mexican War; had assisted him personally at one of the heavy batteries at Cerro Gordo. Possibly if he would call upon the young General and revive old acquaintanceship, the latter might offer him a position on his staff where he could soon see active service in the field.

With these possibilities in view, and when the work of formal organization was temporarily completed at Springfield, he made a hurried visit to his



GEN. FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.

Frank P. Blair was the leading spirit in Missouri in combatting the extreme pro-slavery propaganda and, before the War, in urging Emancipation. When the War began, his keen intuition enabled him at once to grasp its full character, and he entered the contest with a zeal born of assurance that he was right. He at once rallied the Union sentiment of St. Louis, and in a few weeks organized two regiments; rallied them around the brilliant and fiery Lyon, of the regular army; captured Camp Jackson, and drove the rebel forces out of the State. He was Colonel, Brigadier and Major General, and, after the War, United States Senator from Missouri. He commanded under Grant during the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns. Grant knew him in St. Louis before the War.

parents at Covington, Kentucky, and took occasion to call at McClellan's headquarters in Cincinnati to pay his respects. But neither then, nor on a subsequent call, was he successful in seeing the redoubtable little General. It has been asserted that McClellan was so encompassed with a multitude of orderlies, aids, and other military personages who indulged in much pomp and ceremony, that it was very difficult for any except his own officers to gain access to him. On this occasion however, the writer is inclined to think that McClellan was absent in Washington.

The plain, strong common sense of Grant revolted at the formalities, the pomp and ceremony which he saw about the headquarters in Cincinnati, and, later, at General Fremont's headquarters in St. Louis. When Grant became master of headquarters incomparably more important, formality and show were discouraged and he was always accessible, even to the private soldier who had a special favor to ask or a grievance to make known. It was this plainness and simplicity (without relaxation of discipline) that made him, during the terrible campaigning of the early years of the war, the idol of the Western army; an army always ready at the tap of the drum to

fight under its leader with a bravery and persistency that knew no defeat.

Meantime the President issued another call—this time for 300,000 men to serve "three years, or during the war."

CHAPTER XXV.

GRANT IS APPOINTED COLONEL.

The first Colonel of the Twenty-first

Illinois regiment proved incompetent. The men were as fine fellows as ever marched to battle,—hardy, self-reliant, brave; but they were in mutiny against a reckless and incompetent commander. And now that there was a prospect of soon marching to war, they demanded a leader who could intelligently command them in battle. They remembered the quiet Captain who had mustered them, a few

weeks before, and they made their wishes known to Governor Yates. His own brief acquaintance with Captain Grant had made a most favorable impression, and he was glad to have the opportunity of appointing as Colonel the only West Point graduate as yet in the now rapidly growing Illinois army.

The appointment was made on the 15th of June, 1861.

Captain Grant, who had gone to Galena a few days previously, was not aware of



MAJ.-GEN. STERLING PRICE;

In command of the Missouri rebel forces under Governor Claiborne F. Jackson. He was very popular in the State with the young Confederate element, and drew thousands of that class with him. They familiarly called him "Pop Price." He was repeatedly driven from the state during the war. In his last invasion, in 1864, his army was almost entirely annihilated before he escaped from the State. He campaigned against General Lyon, Colonel Blair, General Fremont, and finally against Grant in Southeast Missouri. This sketch is given by favor of the Southern Historical Society, St. Louis.

this sudden change in his fortunes until he was informed of his appointment by a dispatch from Springfield. The placidity of his nature did not allow any exhibition of the pleasure he felt upon having his ambition to command a regiment thus suddenly and unexpectedly gratified.

Even when he walked from the store where he received the message up the steep hill to his modest residence and announced to his devoted wife his intended immediate departure, his reference to the glad news of his appointment as Colonel was apparently more by inference or casual allusion than as a direct announcement of any glad tidings. Whatever demonstrations of pleasure followed were from the little wife who loved him dearly and had faith in his ability, and knew his ambition for some command that would give him active service in the field. Possibly, too, she may have indulged in a woman's dreams, and had some feminine intuitions of her husband's destiny.

Taking with him his little son Fred. (now Col. Frederick D. Grant), he hastened to assume command.

The records in the Adjutant-General's office make it appear that he was appointed on the 15th and mustered in as Colonel on the 28th of June, 1861.

The error is accounted for by the fact that the regiment was first mustered for ninety days' service and then again mustered on June 28th for three years or during the war. Strangely, too, his commission bears date of October 23, 1861,—more than four months after he was appointed, and two and a half months after he was appointed Brigadier-General.



MRS. U. S. GRANT, COL. FREDERICK D. GRANT, AND PARTY, Viewing the Grant Monument on Colonel Emerson's grounds at Ironton, Mo., in May, 1894.—Colonel Emerson, the host of Mrs. Grant and Colonel Grant, on the left of Mrs. Grant in the picture.

The writer's efforts to find an explanation of this have been unavailing. The Adjutant-General of the State of Illinois says:

DEAR COLONEL EMERSON: A diligent search through the records in this office furnishes no explanation as to why General Grant's commission as Colonel bears date October 23, 1861. It is well known that he was appointed June 15th, and served as Colonel from that date until he was promoted Brigadier-General.

Col. Frederick D. Grant* writes:

MY DEAR COLONEL EMERSON: I was under the impression that father's commission as Colonel of the Twenty-first Illinois Volunteers was dated June 15th, and I am unable to explain why it is dated October 23d.

*Also see Colonel Grant's recent letter to the editor of this magazine (Editorial Department) in which occurs this historically valuable testimony: "I consider his (Colonel Emerson's) statements with reference to the private life of my father, and his re-entrance into the army at the commencement of our civil war, are more accurate than any which have up to this date appeared."



E. A. COLLINS,

A partner of Jesse R. Grant in the tannery business, and a warm friend of Captain Grant during his residence in Galena. Mr. Collins died several years ago in Shelby County, Iowa.

Colonel Grant should take "rank from June 15th."

The writer is inclined to indulge the conjecture that a commission was issued at the time of appointment and was lost; and that, on the objection of some technical paymaster, a new commission was made out, to supply the record.

Thus equipped, and invested with the command of one of the best regiments in the service, our hero now steps from the quiet, the peace and the obscurity of private life into the publicity, the activities and the tumults of war.

Hitherto we have seen *Grant, the man, the civilian*, the quiet, peaceful and helpful neighbor; the loyal, gentle and loving friend. Henceforth we shall see him *the successful soldier, the consummate General, the invincible leader* in the greatest war of modern history.

The commission provided,* however, that

*See facsimile of the commission in the November MIDLAND MONTHLY.

ful soldier, the consummate General, the invincible leader in the greatest war of modern history.

END OF BOOK II.


Book III (with which Colonel Emerson's "Grant" concludes) will begin in the January number of THE MIDLAND MONTHLY and run well on through the coming year. It opens with a spirited description of Colonel Grant's Missouri campaign, and includes the greater campaigns of 1862-63, which proved General Grant to be the greatest commander in the world's history.—ED.



LIFE.

THERE is no pang can rend the human heart,
 There is no joy the human heart can thrill,
 But it has been of some past life a part,
 A life to joy and pang now strangely still.

Clara Swearingen Goodrich.



HEADQUARTERS OF COL. ULYSSES S. GRANT AT MEXICO, MO.,
Before the Colonel and his regiment (the 21st Illinois) moved south to Ironton, August, 1861.

GRANT'S LIFE IN THE WEST AND HIS MISSISSIPPI VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

(A HISTORY.)

BY COL. JOHN W. EMERSON.

(Engravings from drawings and photographs furnished chiefly by Mrs. E. Butler Johnson.)
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
BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR.

In perusing the story of Grant's "Mississippi Valley Campaigns," the reader will observe a wide departure from the beaten path, in the writer's treatment of the theme. The "historic-narrative" mode, in which authors usually tell their story chiefly in their own language and give it their own coloring, has been partially discarded.

After reading all the accessible "Grant literature,"—histories, essays, and addresses, many of them learned, able and eloquent,—the writer felt that there was lacking in them something of the picture, something of the spirit, the life and action of 1861-2-3, which those who lived and acted in those stirring days so keenly enjoyed. The war events were then of thrilling interest. But in perusing the story of the war, eloquently told by many learned historians, in their own language, the *spirit* had, somehow, vanished and the flavor and relish of the "war days" was gone. I wondered if rehabilitation were possible. The answer partially came to me in this way: In searching through tens of thousands of pages of "War Records," both National and Confederate, and great masses of unpublished official matter, in quest of data for the "Mississippi Valley Campaigns," I found myself again in the very presence of the events, as they were originally transpiring in 1861-2-3. Here were the old letters, dispatches, and reports of the great actors, as they were daily telling the tragic story on the field, clothed in the fire, the zeal, anxieties and sorrows; all the enthusiasm of the hour of victory, the excuses for delays and for defeat. Here were the hot official war documents written at the time by the passionate, scheming Halleck, laying bare his complaints against Buell, his plots against Grant, and his paroxysms of alarm, and of anger. Here was the actual Buell, in all his painful deliberation and immobility, with the failure of the two to cooperate. Here I found the patient, anxious Lincoln, begging and urging Halleck and Buell on in the discouraging winter of 1861-2; and once when they delayed and put him off with excuses which outraged his sense of propriety, finally, in a despairing mood, he indorsed on one of Halleck's answers:

"Here, as everywhere else, nothing can be done. A. LINCOLN."



BATTLE-FLAGS OF GRANT'S OLD REGIMENT.

The 21st Illinois Infantry. This famous regiment of the old commander was in constant and active service at the front in all the campaigns in the Mississippi Valley, and was finally mustered out at San Antonio, Texas, in December, 1865. Its battle-torn flags were sketched at the Adjutant-General's office in Springfield, Illinois.

Here in these documents, fresh from the scene of action, were the letters, dispatches, and reports of Grant, his pleadings for leave to move "on the enemy's works;" what he said and did, how he was held in check, hindered, delayed, abused and insulted by Halleck; his patience, his strategy, and his glorious victories. Then, too, here were disclosed the rivalries, jealousies and ambitions of our commanding generals; the letters, dispatches and reports of Confederate generals, of Jefferson Davis, and the Confederate Secretary of War; in short the war as it progressed from day to day was told by the actors *at the time* in so graphic a manner as to bring out all the comedy and the tragedy of war.

All this is obscured or hidden in a bewildering mass of official forms and detail matter in the war archives, and yet it fascinated my mind with the idea that if it could be separated and the material facts judiciously used as related at the time by the actors, bringing the facts together in due relation in such wise as to clear up the essential narrative, it would present a new and more graphic picture of



IRONTON. PILOT KNOB MOUNTAIN IN THE BACKGROUND.

View north from Grant's headquarters, August, 1861, showing the route by which Colonel Grant and his regiment came.



ARCADIA VALLEY.

Looking south from Grant's headquarters at Ironton, where he first assumed an independent command. Also showing the route of march of his little army as it advanced to attack Hardy at Greenville, Mo., August, 1861.

the campaigns in all their extended relations, than any mere historical narrative which any historian could possibly write.

It is on these lines that the writer has constructed "Grant's Mississippi Valley Campaigns." He has found very much official matter, of commanding interest, which has not hitherto found its place in history. To this he has added much of a personal nature relating to Grant folk-lore running current with his campaigns.

General Grant's Mississippi Valley Campaigns were so essentially a part of the whole war in the West from 1861 to 1863, that the author has striven to give the reader a comprehensive view of the entire field of operations, and of the terrible tragedy of war as it unfolded and was enacted.

The Confederate Records have been freely drawn upon for their story of the events as they occurred, and as told at the time by their leading generals.

The writer inclines to think that the period in General Grant's life between the time he received his commission as Brigadier-General at Ironton, in August, 1861, and the end of his Donelson Campaign in February, 1862, a period of six months, will be found to be here treated more fully, and he trusts more satisfactorily, than has hitherto been attempted. Indeed, it is believed the reader will agree with the writer that no like period of Grant's life was more full of controlling and far-reaching events.

The "Campaigns" begin with Grant's appointment as Colonel of the 21st Illinois Volunteer Infantry, and end at the close of his Chattanooga Campaign, when he left the West, to assume command of all the armies.

The Author.

CHAPTER I.

COLONEL GRANT ORDERED TO QUINCY.

THE material of the Twenty-first Illinois Regiment could not have been better, but its first Colonel had failed to enforce discipline, and order had degenerated into license and riot. Colonel Grant's military education and old army training could not tolerate this. A few kindly admonitions to his subordinate officers, who, as well as the men, were without military experience, and a few peremptory orders issued to both officers and

men, brought immediate reformation. Some regular army punishments had to be imposed upon a few of the reckless; but soon the master's hand had perfect control; and severe drilling, and constant attention to military details had reduced that splendid body of men to as perfect a fighting machine as any in the army.

The regiment had rendezvoused at Springfield, and on July 3d, Colonel Grant received his first military order, detaching his regiment from all other forces, and sending him out from Camp

Yates with it as an independent force. He was to proceed to Quincy, Ill., more than one hundred miles, there to cross the Mississippi River into Missouri.

In those days passenger coaches were not sufficiently abundant on western railroads to be supplied on short notice to transport even a single regiment of 1,200 men; therefore a train of freight cars was backed up to camp to carry the Twenty-first to its destination. The cars were not sufficiently clean to meet the views of some of the fastidious members, and they peremptorily refused to enter them. Here was the first emergency which arose in Grant's independent military career. How would he meet it? Military discipline must be enforced. Would he stop there and punish the disobedient? He must move forward. He quickly decided that he would do both,—he would *move*, and he would enforce discipline also. He issued orders to the regiment to march! It was hot weather, and the roads were dusty; but he had his men well in hand in the ranks, and they must learn, by severe marches, the necessity of absolute obedience. After a few days of hard marching, the men reached the conclusion that their Colonel "meant business," and that obedience was the only smooth life for the soldier.

The men soon took in the meaning of the situation, and when Colonel Grant was within hearing, they would start up the old darkey song:

"Jordan am a hard road to trabel."

But their chief gave no token that he comprehended the significance of the song. He only kept right on, fifteen and twenty miles a day, without the slightest privilege of straggling for any purpose whatever. He remarked to the Adjutant when he heard the song, "Yes, Jordan may be a hard road to travel, so is the road to discipline; both have to be traveled."

CHAPTER II.

GRANT ORDERED TO IRONTON.

After he had crossed the Illinois some distance, Colonel Grant received orders

to return to the river and await a steamer then on its way up that stream to carry his regiment to St. Louis, and to proceed thence to Ironton, Missouri, which point was menaced by Hardee and Jeff. Thompson from the south.

The steamer grounded before reaching the point where Grant was in waiting.

During the delay, drilling was kept up, and the strictest discipline enforced. There never was a murmur of disobedience in the regiment after that first incident. The men would, if ordered, have ridden on a train of stock cars (which was often the soldiers' experience later on in the war), as readily as on a Pullman vestibuled train.

Before the steamer extricated itself, another message came to Colonel Grant informing him that a battalion of Illinois soldiers was surrounded by a superior force of Missouri confederates near Palmyra, Missouri, and directing him to proceed with the greatest possible dispatch to their relief.

This time, there was no refusal on the part of the men to take such cars as were furnished, and in a few hours they were in Quincy, where Colonel Grant learned that the beleaguered force had withdrawn in safety. He afterwards said, "I am inclined to think that both sides got frightened and ran away."

Up to this time his little son, Fred, had accompanied him; but he now feared that the boy's mother would be alarmed and distressed should she learn that he was with the army engaged in actual war, and so the Colonel wrote to Mrs. Grant, explaining the situation. At the same time he put Fred aboard an up river steamer bound for Galena. Colonel Grant was no less surprised than pleased to receive an answer in a few days from Mrs. Grant, written before the son reached home, quite objecting to his decision, and urging that the lad be allowed to accompany his father and share his war experiences. Brave and trustful wife and mother, worthy her warrior husband! We shall see, later on, that the son did accompany his father

through nearly all his subsequent great campaigns in the west.

CHAPTER III.

THE GOVERNOR OF MISSOURI DECLARES WAR.

By this time the whole State of Missouri was in a ferment. Lyon had been created Brigadier-General. Governor Jackson had appointed ten Brigadier-Generals, and one Major-General—Sterling Price—and was rapidly organizing the rebel element into military regiments and brigades.

Governor Jackson caused the railway bridges between St. Louis and the State Capital to be burned, and issued a proclamation of open defiance and war against the Federal Government. He says :

It is my solemn duty to remind you that Missouri is still one of the United States; that the Executive Department of the State Government does not arrogate to itself the power to disturb that relation.

And then with a disregard for logic which would have horrified a Whately or a Mill, he adds:

But it is equally my duty to remind you that your first allegiance is due to your own State, and that you are under no obligation whatever to obey the *unconstitutional* edicts of the military despotism which has enthroned itself at Washington, nor to submit to the infamous and degrading sway of its wicked minions in this State. No brave and true-hearted Missourian will obey one or submit to the other. Rise, then, and drive out ignominiously the invaders who have dared to desecrate the soil which your labors have made fruitful, and which is consecrated by your homes.

Lyon and Blair, divining the purposes of Governor Jackson, determined to strike before his forces could be organized and concentrated. With three regiments and a battery, they moved rapidly from St. Louis, took possession of the State Capital, and pursued the fugitive Governor and his secession State officers west to Boonville, and there attacked and defeated General Price's forces, and sent the Governor and his fleeing retinue scampering southward toward Arkansas.

The only railway then finished across the State of Missouri from east to west was the Hannibal & St. Joseph. This the rebels at once attacked, burned several of its bridges, and otherwise disabled

it. Grant was ordered to take a position on this road, some distance in the interior. Col. John M. Palmer had already preceded him, and Gen. John Pope was in command of that district, with headquarters at the town of Mexico. When the rebel forces near the railroad had been dispersed, and the burned bridges repaired, Colonel Grant was ordered to advance and attack General Harris, who was encamped at the village of Florida, thirty miles south. Grant had wasted no time, had drilled his regiment daily, and had his company officers keep up the most rigid discipline, so that both officers and men felt the utmost confidence in their ability to fight.

CHAPTER IV.

GRANT'S EXPERIENCE WITH MISSOURI "STILLS."

Colonel Grant had, by strict orders, prohibited the introduction of whisky into camp, he having seen that it was one of the chief sources of demoralization in those early days of the war in Missouri.

The United States then exercised no control over distilleries, and under the laws of Missouri distilleries existed in nearly every county, and often several of them in a county. They were allowed to sell in small quantities, on the premises, and in these "good old days when whisky was twenty cents a gallon," the country "still" was a very lively and oftentimes exciting place every Saturday afternoon.

When the army first began to scout through the country for the enemy, *this* "enemy" usually put more men temporarily *hors de combat* than did the rebels in arms. Of course the "stills" soon vanished, for neither army was disposed to pay much for contraband found in lonely and isolated places.

For a long time Colonel Grant was much puzzled to know how his men smuggled whisky into camp. On their return from scouting expeditions he had the men examined, their canteens emptied, and every other precaution taken to exclude it; and yet, soon after the men were in their tents, often some of them would be

taken to the guard-house, too hilarious for the good of the service. How it was brought into camp was a mystery, until one evening while a platoon was returning from a scout in the country, Colonel Grant noticed one of the men as he came past, a little unsteady on his legs, and as he walked along he placed the nipple of his gun to his lips. Grant halted the company, brought them to face and salute; then he stepped up to the men for a closer inspection, and when this man presented his gun, the Colonel saw some liquid dripping from it, and noticed an odor fresh from the still. It did not take long for an old West Pointer to comprehend the situation. He found that nearly half the muskets were full of the "enemy," as the men were wont to jocosely speak of the article on their scouting forays. It was easy to place a small bit of rubber over the nipple, and stop the muzzle with a piece of corn cob, and each old musket would hold enough to demoralize several men.

The offenders were promptly sent to the guard-house, without their evening rations, and the officers were reprimanded. Orders were issued an hour later for that company to start next morning at six o'clock to march ten miles to a mill which they were to reach precisely at ten o'clock, "without any straggling, or entering any house," and "attack the enemy without regard to numbers." The Captain in command was given sealed orders which he was to open on arrival at destination. The secret orders, when opened, directed the force to return by another route, a mile or two longer, and report at headquarters precisely at two o'clock! When the little force, wet with perspiration and covered with dust, drew up exactly on time before Colonel Grant's tent, and his Adjutant went along the line and carefully "inspected arms," and Colonel Grant, with a peculiar twinkle in his eye, asked the Captain if he had "met the enemy," they realized that their hard march of over twenty miles in eight hours, without a ration, meant "discipline" for the breach of yesterday, and

not because their Colonel expected them to find any rebels at the mill.

CHAPTER V.

GRANT MARCHES ON THE ENEMY'S CAMP.

Colonel Grant had not been provided with any transportation since reaching Missouri, and it required several days to press into service enough teams from the surrounding country to carry their supplies for a week's campaign against Harris. Such elaborate preparation was in accord with old army tactics and experience; but, later in the war, with more independent thinking for himself, Grant would have had no waiting for transportation or supplies. He would have filled cartridge boxes, and haversacks with three days' rations, started with his command after dark, and surprised the enemy at daylight next morning!

The Memoirs give such an inimitable description of this, Grant's first independent move in war, and of his feelings on the occasion, that I insert his own account:

Harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. The hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher, until it felt as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to stop and consider what to do; I kept right on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view, I halted. The place where Harris had been encamped was still there, and marks of his recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never before taken, but it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable.

Harris had learned of Grant's preparations to attack him and had retreated before the latter's march began.

CHAPTER VI.

"GRAPEVINE TELEGRAPH" IN MISSOURI.

As the Union and Secession population was everywhere mixed, the rapidity with which the news of army movements, or

intended movements, were carried by night and by day, in all by-ways, by fleet-footed sympathizers on either side, was a constant surprise. This rapid flight of news through forests and over prairies, we then designated the "Grapevine Telegraph."

This first dash of Grant into the nests of the enemy where no Union troops had hitherto appeared, brought out his soldierly qualities. His force was kept in compact order wherever they moved, ready for instant deployment into line of battle. Not a man was allowed to straggle. Not a house was entered. On his advance, the population had fled from their homes. They had been led to believe that the "Lincoln hirelings and the — Dutch" would steal and destroy property, and mistreat women and children. When they returned from their hiding places after Grant's army had passed, and found nothing molested, they were reassured; and, when he returned on the same route, his little army was everywhere welcomed by the citizens.

Harris had gotten forty miles or more away, and was kicked and cuffed about by other Union forces until his own force was disintegrated.

CHAPTER VII.

GRANT IS ORDERED TO MEXICO, MO.

On his return to camp, Colonel Grant was ordered to move his command to the town of Mexico, and was placed in command of that sub-district, under Gen. John Pope who was in command of the District of North Missouri.

Here Grant found himself in command of three or four regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery and several troops of cavalry. None of these were commanded by officers who had had a military education. They were all fresh in the service and knew but little of military duty, but were enthusiastic in their devotion to the cause of the Union. There was very lax discipline, and Grant, after having reduced his own regiment, the 21st Illinois, to good order, found new trouble on his hands. The men at the

Post had not been kept in camp, but went about with their arms, visiting houses, demanding food and drink, or going in and helping themselves. They arrested men they met and forced them to take some sort of oath of allegiance which they administered without hesitation or question as to authority. Men, singly and in groups, were suddenly made to hold up their hands and take the oath wherever they were met by these patriotic and enterprising soldiers. Did any citizen at first protest, he did not argue the question of authority long in front of army muskets when assured that he must either "Swear, fight, or run a foot-race."

It has been said that there was probably more miscellaneous "swearing" done in Missouri during the war than in the whole previous history of the human race! Certainly the poor rebels were made to "swear worse than the Army in Flanders!"

This seemed incongruous to Colonel Grant, to whom an oath was a sacred thing. He promptly issued orders to strictly prohibit the men from leaving camp, interfering with citizens, or appropriating private property to any use whatever. The forces were all kept busy with military exercises, preparing for the actual duties of war, and the people were no longer molested or made afraid. Officers and men were made to understand that it was their mission to enforce, not violate the law; to protect, and not abuse the citizens. A very brief time sufficed to prove that an educated soldier was in command, and a high state of discipline soon pervaded the little army.

While the rebels in North Missouri were being roughly handled and dispersed during the latter days of July and early August, General Hardee, and Gen. Jeff. Thompson were invading Southern Missouri from Arkansas, and menacing Ironton, the southern terminus of the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad. General Frémont, who was then in command of the entire Western Department, found it necessary to send reinforcements thither, and a soldier to command that

important strategic point, and confront the Confederate General, Hardee. The latter's name at that early day carried with it much prestige, being associated with "Hardee's Tactics" then used in all the armies.

CHAPTER VIII.

GRANT PROCEEDS TO IRLINGTON.

On August 7th Colonel Grant was ordered to relinquish his command at Mexico and proceed with his regiment to Irlington, and assume command of Southeast Missouri. Within a few hours after he received the order to move, he was speeding to his new destination as rapidly as steam and wheels could carry him and his men. That night he passed through St. Louis without calling at General Frémont's headquarters, and early on August 8th he and his splendid regiment arrived at Irlington, ninety miles south of St. Louis,

Here was a man who *could move*. He

had shipped his regiment with all its paraphernalia, traveled 110 miles to St. Louis, marched through the city in dead of night, re-shipped on another railway, traveled ninety miles, and was marching his command through the streets of Irlington, within twenty-four hours from the time he received orders to move! It required twenty-two days for General Frémont to move *himself* from New York to St. Louis under the most urgent necessity for rapid action.

Now Colonel Grant was in a new field, a fair distance from department headquarters, and he felt free to think and act for himself. In North Missouri he had to deal with bands of bushwhackers, neither well organized nor well armed; but here he was confronting Hardee, a regular Confederate Major-General, with a considerable army of well disciplined and well armed men, only forty miles distant.

[The February installment begins with Grant's promotion to the rank of Brigadier-General.]

(To be Continued.)



AFTER THE THEATER.

WITH heart exultant in the sweet
True womanhood of Imogen,
I strolled at midnight on the street,
To mingle with my fellow-men.

And soon in temple-shadow passed
The lingering woman's bold salute,
And felt my vision fading fast
Before the presence of the brute.

Ah, would to God it were the truth
I dreamed before the storied stage!
And only feverish eyes of youth
That read amiss the living page!

Selden L. Whitcomb.



GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS WHILE IN COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO.,
 August, 1861. The spring and the "Grant Oak" under which he received his commission as Brigadier-General.
 "He came as Colonel and departed as General, and entered upon his career of victory." It was here he
 drew the outlines of his plan of campaign for opening the Mississippi River.

GRANT'S LIFE IN THE WEST AND HIS MISSISSIPPI VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

(A HISTORY.)

BY COL. JOHN W. EMERSON.

(Engravings from drawings and photographs furnished chiefly by Mrs. E. Butler Johnson.)
 (Begun in the October, 1886, MIDLAND MONTHLY.)

BOOK III.

CHAPTER IX.

GRANT APPOINTED BRIGADIER-GENERAL.

COLONEL GRANT had only fairly settled down in camp, on the afternoon of the 8th day of August, when the passenger train brought the St. Louis newspapers, containing the announcement that President Lincoln had, on the previous day, nominated and sent the name of Col. Ulysses S. Grant to the United States Senate, as Brigadier-General, to rank from May 17, 1861.

The Senate confirmed the appointment on August 9th, on which day his commission bears date. This came to

him a few days later while sitting under a great oak, now known as the "Grant Oak," which overshadows a limpid spring, beside which were his rude headquarters, in the beautiful valley of Arcadia. Here the Ozark Mountains rise in picturesque grandeur, nowhere exceeded for beauty in the interior of the continent.

Here, too, within a few miles, were the great iron works of Pilot Knob and Iron Mountain; also extensive lead mines, all to be protected from possible capture by the Confederates.

Grant's first official act as Brigadier-General was the following order, assuming command of the district:

HEADQUARTERS,
 IRONTON, Mo., August 9, 1861: }
 General Orders }
 No. 1. }

In pursuance of instructions from department headquarters, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Military District of Ironton.* Col. B. Gratz Brown, who is relieved by this order, will hold himself in readiness to move to St. Louis to-morrow with the portion of his regiment now here. On his arrival in St. Louis he will report to Major-General Frémont for orders.

By order of U. S. Grant, brigadier-general,
 commanding.

M. S. HASKIE,
 Post Adjutant.

This is surely sufficiently quiet and undemonstrative to show that General Grant was not excited or unduly elated by his elevation to the position of General. He even ignores the use of capitals in "brigadier-general commanding" Whether this was the oversight of the Post Adjutant who may have written the order, or General Grant's wish, the war records do not disclose. This does not occur again in any order issued by General Grant during the War of the Rebellion; if it does, it has escaped the careful search of the writer through the war records.

CHAPTER X.

GENERAL GRANT'S PLANS FOR HIS BRIGADE.

For two months or more, the Confederates had been maturing plans for the invasion of Missouri, in support of Governor Jackson's secession policy. The Confederate Major-General Polk, in command at Memphis, was pushing his forces up the river. On July 23d, he informed the Confederate Government of his intention to send two armies into Missouri—one of twenty-five thousand men under General McCulloch, against Lyon at Springfield; and another of eighteen thousand under Generals Pillow and Hardee, to march on Ironton. The latter column, he wrote, "are directed to proceed to St. Louis, seize it, and taking possession of the boats at that point, to proceed up the River Missouri, raising the Missourians as they go; and, at such point as may appear most suitable, to detach

*This district then included all southeast Missouri.

a force to cut off Lyon's return from the west. . . If, as I think, I can drive the enemy from Missouri with the force indicated, I will then enter Illinois and take Cairo in the rear on my return."

General Polk was soon awakened from this ambitious dream of conquest. He had already advanced Pillow's command to New Madrid and Hardee's to Greenville. On August 6th, General Frémont reported to the President:

Enemy eighteen thousand between Bird's Point and New Madrid, under Pillow and Jeff Thompson; strong in cavalry and artillery. We are reinforcing and entrenching Ironton.

Colonel Marsh, in command at Cape Girardeau, telegraphed:

Thompson's command is only sixteen miles from me and advancing.

On the very day of Grant's arrival at Ironton, General Frémont telegraphed him to "keep a watchful eye upon the approach of the enemy by way of Fredericktown."

While Grant was thus environed, and the forces of war were gathering to burst upon him, and on the day he assumed command, that other young hero, General Lyon, with a little army of six thousand five hundred men, was about to engage in a death grapple with nearly three times his own number at the celebrated battle of Wilson's Creek, near Springfield, Mo. In the charge that repulsed the enemy, the brilliant Lyon lost his life. This great loss to the Union cause with the withdrawal of Lyon's little army from Springfield to Rolla, gave the rebel cause new impetus in the state.

That evening Grant made his first report to General Frémont, in which he said it was fortunate the place had not been attacked, "for," he added, "many of the officers seem to have so little command over their men, and military duty seems to be done so loosely, that I fear at present our resistance would be in the inverse ratio of the number of troops to resist with. In two days, however, I expect to have a very dif-

*War records.

ferent state of affairs, and to improve it continuously."

The next day, August 10th, he reported to Frémont that he had received reliable information to the effect that Hardee was "still at Greenville, with 2,000 men and six to eight field pieces, with another 1,000 advanced twenty miles toward Ironton; also a third more cavalry, well mounted and equipped." He suggested that cavalry and artillery be sent to him, and remarked that "the twenty-four mounted home guards now here are destitute of suitable arms, and are almost useless in consequence."

"Twenty-four" mounted home guards, poorly armed, was a sorry cavalry force, surely.

CHAPTER XI.

GRANT'S RAPID MOVEMENTS.

Col. B. Gratz Brown, (afterwards Governor of Missouri, and Vice-Presidential candidate in 1872), whom Grant superseded in command at Ironton, was a brilliant and able man; but he was not a trained soldier, and Grant found the condition of discipline at Ironton to be more lax than at Mexico. Colonel Brown's regiment was

only mustered for three months, and the term had expired. Its demoralization had affected the other two regiments (Colonel Bland's, of Missouri, and Colonel Hecker's, of Illinois), so that Grant had stepped into a sort of military chaos; but instantly, as by magic, the master hand again brought order and discipline out of confusion.

On August 12th he had scouts advanced twenty-five miles south towards Hardee, and another force pursuing a rebel band eighteen miles northwest. On the 13th


he reported to Frémont that 3,000 of the enemy, mostly mounted, were at Fredericktown, twenty miles east of him, and that "General Hardee, with 5,000 well armed men, are advancing upon this place." And, although he had only his own Twenty-first, and two other regiments, he made no frantic appeal for reinforcements, but in his own quiet and unperturbed way said to General Frémont: "I express to you the facts and leave it to the General



BRIGADIER-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
At Ironton, in August, 1861. From an old picture.

commanding whether in his judgment more troops should not be sent. With one battery of field artillery, and one additional regiment of infantry, I would feel that this point would be secure beyond any present contingency." That is, this confident and self-reliant young General, with four regiments and a battery, was ready for the attack of Hardee with his eight thousand!

On the 15th Grant's heart was gladdened by the arrival of Colonel Thayer's First Nebraska, and Colonel Lau-



GRANT'S COMMISSION AS BRIGADIER-GENERAL (One-fourth size).

On August 3, 1861, Grant arrived at Ironton, Mo., with his regiment, as Colonel. On the 9th he was commissioned Brigadier-General, and on the 14th his commission was received. He had already organized a campaign against Hardee, and formulated a plan of campaign for opening the Mississippi River.

man's Seventh Iowa regiment. Hardee did not advance upon Ironton as he had threatened to do, and before nightfall Grant determined to advance upon and attack Hardee. He reported to General Frémont in the evening:

"I have ordered the 21st Illinois Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, for-

ward upon the Greenville road, and Colonel Hecker's 24th Illinois Infantry upon the Fredericktown road, to form a junction at Brunot. I will follow to-morrow with artillery and further infantry. . . . A spy reports the rebel force much greater than heretofore represented."

On the 16th, before taking the field south against Hardee, he reported to Frémont:

"The rebel force at Fredericktown numbers 1,500. The column sent out by me yesterday will be upon them to-day by 12 o'clock."*

When Grant's force reached Brunot, twenty-five miles south, he learned that General Hardee had retreated from Greenville, and was retiring toward Arkansas, too far in advance to be overtaken without cavalry.

On the 18th, Grant returned to Ironton and ordered Colonel Marsh with his Seventeenth Illinois Regiment (which arrived after the movement against Hardee began) to move upon,

CHAPTER XII.

GRANT RELIEVED OF COMMAND.

Having set all things in order at Ironton, Grant was ready to mount his horse on the afternoon of the 18th to rejoin his advanced force moving south, when General Prentiss appeared with an order from General Frémont to assume command of the district. In an hour Grant had put the new commander in possession of all his accumulated information, and was ready to proceed to St. Louis.



ONE OF THE "BLOCK-HOUSES" OR FORTS ORDERED BUILT BY GRANT
When in command at Ironton, in 1861, to defend the bridges on the St. Louis & Iron Mountain Railroad, between Ironton and St. Louis. This is a sketch of the last one, which vanished in smoke in 1864.

occupy and hold Fredericktown. And, he adds: "You will permit no pressing of horses or other property by your command. The policy meets my decided disapproval, and must be suppressed."

Not a moment was lost in putting all things in order for pushing forward supplies, munitions and reinforcements for his little army, now ready to proceed against Jeff. Thompson, who was still active a little further to the southeast.

*The citations are all from the records in the War Department.

All who had observed Grant's ceaseless and tireless energy in enforcing discipline, in drilling his force, and in the work of preparation for active hostilities, accomplished within ten days, were greatly displeased at the change.

Why was this change made, the writer asked the Hon. Samuel T. Glover in St. Louis, at the time.

"Why," he answered, "this fellow Grant is a soldier. He didn't make any fuss about what he was doing. He

went to work at once making actual war, and didn't talk. Frémont at St. Louis, and Prentiss at Cairo, have been making war on paper. All their imaginary doings are exploited daily in the newspapers, and they seem to want the people to believe, 'Me — big Chief, welly big Chief.' Here at headquarters men are estimated, not according to their solid merit, but by their powers of *gabbery*, and the noise they can make in the newspapers."

The blunt and emphatic Glover probably gave the true explanation as to why Grant was superseded in the midst of his swift and soldier-like preparations for active hostilities

It will be instructive to inquire whether, during this his first brief independent command at Ironton Grant exhibited any traits indicating military genius. Surely, with chaos all around him on his first coming, little could be expected in so brief a time. But in truth, very much was accomplished. These days of waiting and preparation for aggressive work, were pregnant with mighty events to follow. Every detail of preparation was arranged and provided for. Every company and every regiment was drilled with persistent military energy. Every hour was utilized by officers and men in effective preparation under the eye of a new silent chief who impressed every member of his little army with the conviction that he expected every man to do his duty, and with full faith that this chief knew how, and was ready and alert to do his. By some silent influence the slow, easy, shiftless, go-as-you-please, unmilitary conditions which preceded Grant's advent and command immediately changed and were metamorphosed into order, activity and precision. Heretofore loose squads of soldiers were allowed to wander and prowl around at will, and now and then a dress-parade constituted the soldier's only work. It was safer for citizens to keep themselves and their effects well within doors. Now, however, all was changed as by magic. In-

stinctively all felt that a *soldier*, and not a mere Colonel, or General, had arrived. The loud laugh, the bluster, the swagger of loafing squads, were hushed. Instead you heard the bugle calls, the roll of drums, the sharp command of officers to drilling and marching and wheeling battalions, and the steady tramp of armed men. The mountains echoed the sharp reports of artillery practice, and the terrible infantry fire. Not a straggler was to be seen, but all in earnest preparation in emulation of their chief, who, in some silent, mysterious way, made all—soldier and civilian—feel the truth of the oft reiterated remark, "Grant means business." And he did. He seemed to the writer, who then for the first time saw and studied his daily military work, a man who felt that his country was beleaguered and its defenders were at the point of surrender, and it was necessary to fly to their instant relief.

CHAPTER XIII.

REMINISCENCES OF GRANT AT IRONTON.

In watching Grant's operations, and his sleepless activities in this first independent command, I have often compared him to the tireless onrush of Havelock and his Highlanders sweeping along to the relief of Lucknow. Not that his own personal movements seemed impetuous. On the contrary, they were always deliberate, always characterized by that cool *nonchalance* which made the observer feel that here is a man who *knows*.

There was an entire absence of show or ostentation about Grant at Ironton. He wore a neat, plain suit at first, as I recollect without military buttons or shoulder-straps, and without any other army insignia than a gold cord around his hat. If he had a sword I did not see him wear it. I suppose, however, he had one, because one of his officers told me that on the day after his arrival at the Ironton encampment, he saw Colonel Grant bran-

dishing his sword and chasing a squad of his men out of an adjacent apple orchard with great precipitancy.

I recall an incident of the time, showing his cool confidence in himself. The day before Grant's arrival, the writer had sketched crude plans for some suggested defenses at Ironton, in view of the threatened attack of General Hardee, and had given them to Colonel B. Gratz Brown then in command. The morning after Colonel Grant's arrival, I called with Colonel Brown at Grant's headquarters. Brown handed him my crude plans. Grant looked at them a moment, and, as he folded the papers and deliberately placed them in his pocket, remarked, "They look well; we shall see."

All others were excited about the hourly anticipated attack, but Grant seemed totally unconcerned; as cool and complacent as was Lord Nelson during the battle of Copenhagen, when he insisted upon the formality of melting wax and sealing a letter on the deck of his ship while death was all about him. Grant expressed no urgency about projected defenses. I was puzzled to know why, as Frémont was fortifying every important point. Next morning I called again and ventured to ask concerning them. Refugees from the country south of us were coming in, filling the place with alarming rumors of Hardee's approach. Grant quietly smiled at our alarm, and by way of allaying our fears remarked, "Perhaps General Hardee may need fortifications before we shall."

And thus it happened; for in a few days Grant's well drilled and disciplined battalions were marching out in search of Hardee; and instead of the latter attacking Ironton, he was retreating rapidly towards Arkansas, although his army was numerically much larger than that of Grant.

Referring to Hardee and other officers who had joined the Confederate army, he remarked to the writer: "Our language has no words to adequately

express the dishonor and ingratitude of men who were educated by the Government turning that very education against their country."

These strong words were uttered without show of anger. With him it was purely a matter of principle and patriotism.

Day by day Grant's effective force increased in numbers, and it was many times multiplied in aggressive potentiality by reason of its effective discipline and spirit.

CHAPTER XIV.

GRANT FORMS HIS GREAT PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

Three days had not passed after his coming, until the expulsion of Hardee and Jeff Thompson from the state had grown on Grant's mind into an assured fact.

Busy as he was, his active mind turned swiftly to another problem: when Southeast Missouri should be freed from invasion, how could the enemy's lines be broken and his territory invaded? Without the slightest relaxation of preparation to strike the invaders at the earliest possible moment, he began as early as the third day after arriving at this new independent command, on an old pine table under the great oak in front of his cabin-headquarters at Ironton, to formulate his great Mississippi Valley Campaign, to open the Mississippi River, the final accomplishment of which was to eventually bring him imperishable renown.

The writer's knowledge of the geography and topography of Grant's new district was minute; and in answering his numerous inquiries at his headquarters on the evening of the second day after his coming, and aiding him to correct a very poor map, the only one he had, he asked if I had a map that covered the entire Cairo region,—South-eastern Missouri, Southern Illinois, Western Kentucky, etc. Fortunately I had such a map, and it was brought to him a little later.

As it was unfolded, and we hastily looked it over, he remarked, "Yes, that is better; that is *very* good; I thank you;" and then running his finger along the Ohio and down the Mississippi rivers, he added: "The rebels *must* be driven out," with a very determined emphasis on the word *must*. "The rivers *must* be opened."

Next day, after Grant had finished his day's inspections and activities through every part of his command, and had returned to his headquarters, I called again. Grant was quite alone as I approached, save the headquarters sentinel. He sat peering over the map spread out on the table, his hat well down over his face. He had not taken time to brush from his boots, coat or hat, the dust which had accumulated during the day; but, soon as he had dismounted and thrown his reins to his orderly, he hastened to his map. He greeted me cordially, and after I had related to him some rumors about Hardee's movements which I had heard during the day from fleeing country folk, we both again reverted to the map lying before him. I never knew Grant to indulge in harsh language concerning any one, but he was capable of deepest indignation at any great wrong, and no wrong seemed to him so heinous and so wicked as a wrong to his country and its flag. His feelings were intense on the closing of the Mississippi river against the commerce of the great West. "That great river," he said, "must remain open."

As I sat on a box at the end of the table, I observed a number of marks he had made on the map since I gave it to him the previous evening. The marks consisted of red crosses, and they began at the "Croley Ridge" crossing of the St. Francois river between Missouri and Arkansas, some fifty miles west of Columbus, a crossing that was then made much use of by the Confederates. There was another mark at New Madrid, another at Columbus, and there

were others on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at points where the Confederates were obstructing them. There were also dotted lines overland from the point opposite Cairo to the rear of Columbus, and from Paducah and Smithland in the direction of Forts Henry and Donelson. Two other crosses, a little more conspicuous, were made, one at or near Nashville, and the other at a point where the state line between Alabama and Mississippi touches the Tennessee river. There was a dotted line from Nashville south to Eastport, indicating that his thought was that after the capture of Nashville, a column would be sent across the center of the state to form a junction with the force ascending the Tennessee river.

He evidently expected that a battle would be fought for the possession of Nashville (and it was fought at Donelson), and another on the Tennessee, near Eastport. The fact that his second anticipated battle was fought at Shiloh, a little further north, and that Buell's column did move across the State from Nashville and Columbia to a junction at Shiloh, and that the Confederate army was there concentrated, is a remarkable proof of the comprehensive sagacity and prescience of this remarkable man.

I instantly inferred that the marks indicated objective points where battles would probably be fought or attacks should be made; and being a civilian at the time, I was amazed at such a sudden plunge into the heart of the Confederacy, when we were every hour fearing the Confederates would be upon us far up in Missouri! He noticed my surprise, as I remarked, "General, that looks like business; that is business," running my finger over the map up the Tennessee river to its extreme southern bend to indicate that I comprehended the tremendous import of his marks.

"Possibilities, mere possibilities," he answered, as he arose from his seat, apparently to draw my attention away

from the subject and from the map. Stepping to the spring which bubbled up a few feet from his seat, he dipped up a cup of water, and we drank. Looking at the gentle ripples as the water flowed away over the bright pebbles, he said: "This water runs into the Mississippi, the Mississippi into the sea; and it *must* run with unfettered freedom." There was a quiet earnestness about his manner that made his few words doubly impressive.

Then, resting one hand on the big oak and picking off some bits of bark, he remarked,—"Plans are easily made, but where one has not full control, they are as likely to be upset by one's friends as they are by one's foes; but the first thing to be done is to drive the enemy out of southeast Missouri; then—" and here he stopped suddenly, stepped back to the table, folded the map, picked up several sheets of paper written upon, and started into the house, saying he must finish and send off some important matter.

There is no doubt the marks on the map, and the written sheets related to a plan of campaign of far-reaching consequence, which he had formulated and which was then uppermost in his mind; nothing less than breaking through the

Confederate lines and the opening of the Mississippi River. And this prodigious scheme was incubated in his mind, and formulated, within four days after he had assumed command of his district, and in less than three days after he had been confirmed Brigadier-General! And this, too, while engaged in reducing to order the military chaos of his new command, enforcing discipline, and making all things ready for an early attack upon General Hardee!

His sagacious mind grasped the fact that by breaking through the Confederate lines on the Tennessee and gaining control of that river to its southern bend in northern Mississippi and Alabama, the enemy would be forced to withdraw from Kentucky and Tennessee, and retire

down the Mississippi, and the hope was present with him then that so soon as he could free his district of Southeast Missouri from the presence of Hardee and Jeff. Thompson, he would be permitted to enter upon the execution of his enlarged plans.

The reader will bear in mind, too, that Grant had conceived this plan three months before General Halleck came to the Western Department (Nov.



MAJ.-GEN. JOHN C. FREMONT,
As he appeared at the time of his interview with Grant in St. Louis, in 1861. From a crayon in possession of Mrs. Jesse Benton-Fremont.

11, following), -hence no suggestion could have then been received from *that* source, as some writers have suggested. It is now certain that Grant, in the very first days of his command as Brigadier-General, originated this plan of campaign.*

Grant had not as yet selected his permanent staff, but an officer who was temporarily on duty at his headquarters at Ironton, told the writer at the time (on calling when Grant was absent) that "the General spends every minute of his spare time over maps and making plans."

After Grant had been superseded and had departed for St. Louis, the Assistant Post Adjutant at Ironton said to me, "I copied a great plan of campaign which General Grant sent to Congressman Washburne to lay before the President. If he were allowed to carry it out, it would break the back of the Confederacy; but now I suppose it all goes for nothing. It was a great plan."†

*General Sherman, in his *Memoirs* (vol. 1, p. 220) says that in a conversation he had with General Halleck in January, 1862, in St. Louis, Halleck asked, "Where is the rebel line?" Cullum, his chief of staff, drew a pencil line through Bowling Green, Forts Donelson, Henry, and Columbus. "That is their line," said Halleck. "Now, where is the place to break it?" Cullum or I answered, "*Naturally* in the center." Halleck then drew a line at right angles near the center, which corresponded nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River, and added, "That is the true line of operations." I have always given Halleck credit for that movement, which was skillful and extremely rich in military results. It was the first real success in our Civil War.

When Sherman wrote this, in 1874, he did not know that Grant had formulated these plans in August, 1861, months before Halleck came to the Western Department *nearly six months before Halleck's conversation with Sherman* in St. Louis! Nor did Sherman then know that those plans of Grant had been sent to Washington in August, 1861, and were approved by the President, and that Grant was ordered back to the command of the district of Southeast Missouri for the very purpose of carrying them out. Indeed, as the plans were deemed important by President Lincoln, it is more than likely that he mentioned them to Halleck in sending that officer to assume command of the Western Department; so that what Halleck said to Sherman and Cullum, in January 1862, was no more than what he had learned from the President of Grant's plan. And we know with what persistency Grant adhered to his plans when once determined upon and were not changed by superior authority.

†I think it was Lieutenant Steele of the Twenty-first Illinois Infantry, and afterwards Adjutant.

General Grant left Ironton greatly depressed and disappointed. He felt that Frémont was doing him great injustice, and the service an injury. He had made rapid progress in preparation, and was actually advancing on the enemy when he was relieved.

Col. John M. Thayer of the First Nebraska Regiment, (later General, and, after the war, Governor of Nebraska, and United States Senator from that state,) who was a personal and intimate friend of Grant, and who had reached Ironton with his regiment only a few days before, accompanied Grant to St. Louis to interview Frémont, and if possible, have Grant restored to his command at Ironton.

In writing of the events of August, 1861, General Thayer says: "Why Grant was thus summarily displaced by another he could not divine. Nothing had occurred to mar the friendly relations between him and Frémont. He felt severely the humiliation of being thus recalled from his command, for which there was no apparent justification; and he was thoroughly cast down and dejected by the wholly unexpected change in his military position

" . . . While preparing to move against Hardee and drive him out of that section or capture him, he was also preparing, when he had disposed of Hardee, to move across to the Mississippi, and establish himself at Cairo, thus making that the base of future operations. I learned that at the very time of which I am writing, Grant had in his mind the plans of campaigns on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, and down the Mississippi to Vicksburg, which he subsequently carried through. The fact of his being taken away from that theater of war added largely to his chagrin and disappointment.

"We went to St. Louis that night, and Grant was silent nearly the whole of the way. Next morning he called upon General Frémont, who proposed to send him to Jefferson City. On his return to me at the Planters' House,

he said, 'I do not want to go to Jefferson City. I do not want to go any further into Missouri. But of course I must obey orders.' Reflecting a few minutes he added: 'I wish I could get leave of absence to visit Galena.' I advised him to apply for leave. He did so and it was granted. His family lived in Galena. But little did I realize the vast consequence to him and to his country of that visit. Foreseeing that the great events of the war must inevitably take place east of the Mississippi River, he knew if he went further into Missouri he might be sidetracked for six months or a year and thus lose the important opportunity of his life. He would be taken away from the great theater of war; he would be absent from the fields where vast conflicts were to take place and brilliant victories were to be won, and would have no part or lot in them."

"He returned from Galena and went to Jefferson City.

"His trip to Galena had produced results. In about ten days after arriving at Jefferson City, he received orders to repair to St. Louis without delay to receive special instructions. Reaching that city, he found his special instructions were to proceed to Ironton and assume command of the district of Southeast Missouri, enlarged to embrace Southern Illinois and Western Kentucky.

"Grant was thus restored to his old command from which he had been so abruptly removed a few weeks before. He now found himself on the right road to Cairo, a point he had been so anxious to reach and which was to be the starting point of the grand campaign which he had already planned and was so soon to inaugurate. . . .

"I found that his real purpose in

going to Galena was to secure the influence of Mr. Washburne in helping him on the way to Cairo, and he did not ask in vain; for in a brief space of time the order went from Washington to Fremont to place Grant in command of the district of Southeast Missouri, which included Cairo.

"Sometime after the war I heard the following statement from Montgomery Blair, who was Postmaster-General under Mr. Lincoln: 'One day in Cabinet meeting, Lincoln turned to the Secretary of War and said: 'Did we not receive a communication from a man by the name of Grant laying out a plan of campaign down the Mississippi?' The Secretary said he believed such a paper had been received. The paper was produced and read in Cabinet meeting. It made a strong impression on all the members, Lincoln remarking that it had, at the time it was received, impressed him favorably, but in the multiplicity of cares it had been forgotten until now he had just received a communication from Congressman Washburne, of Illinois, calling his attention to it and to General Grant and suggesting that he be sent to Cairo. Lincoln then said, 'Mr. Secretary, send an order to General Fremont to put Grant in command of the district of Southeast Missouri.'

"The desire of Grant's heart was now accomplished. He was in the position to commence that series of campaigns, which, as they were unfolded, attracted the attention and admiration of the civilized world."*

Governor Thayer's high standing places the truth of this corroborative statement above all cavil or doubt.

*Grant at Pilot Knob, by General Thayer, in McClure's, October, 1895.

(To be continued.)

GRANT'S LIFE IN THE WEST AND HIS MISSISSIPPI VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

(A HISTORY.)

BY COL. JOHN W. EMERSON.

(Engravings from drawings and photographs furnished chiefly by Mrs. E. Butler Johnson.)
(Begun in the October, 1896, MIDLAND MONTHLY.)

BOOK III.

CHAPTER XV.

A FEW years after the close of the war, the writer, having heard the same facts,—related by General Thayer,*—(and himself having personal knowledge of most of the events at the time they transpired in 1861,) desired nevertheless to learn what knowledge others might possess of the fact that Grant had formed his great plans during the first days of his official career as General; with this purpose, and knowing that Gen. Frank P. Blair had a most intimate knowledge of all matters military then relating to Missouri, I inquired of him whether he had ever heard his brother Montgomery Blair, — Lincoln's Postmaster-General — or Mr. Lincoln himself, speak of Grant's early plans. General Blair replied:

"I do not think I ever had occasion to speak with the President about Grant's plans, as to when they were formed; but I had occasion to vindicate Grant several times when his enemies were trying to ruin him after Donelson and Shiloh. The d—d whelps would have destroyed the fair fame of even their Savior! But Mr. Lincoln had too much good sense to be influenced by them. He believed in Grant, because Grant would fight.

"But I heard Montgomery [meaning his brother] speak several times about Grant's early plans. After Grant had broken through the rebel lines at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh,

*"Grant at Pilot Knob," by General Thayer, in *McClellan* October, 1865.

Montgomery remarked to me frequently, and always with surprise and admiration, as to how precisely Grant's operations were conforming to the plan he had sent to the President through Mr. Washburn. Every time Grant would fight and gain a point, Montgomery was sure to say to me: 'That fellow Grant is sticking to his text; that's exactly according to his plan I heard read last summer.' I know the plans were sent from Ironton for the campaign.

"No, sir, there is no doubt about the plans, and that Grant formed them as soon as he became Brigadier-General, almost precisely as he afterwards executed them. What surprised me when I first heard of it was that the fellow had the audacity and the foresight to conceive such plans at a time when we, in Missouri, were hustling to keep the rebels from overrunning our state and Southern Illinois. But he did, though, and carried them out, too."

Hon. E. B. Washburn had long been an eminent member of congress from the Galena district, and had gained commanding influence and the sobriquet, "the Father of the House." He had recommended the appointment of Grant as Brigadier-General. As American Minister to France during the Franco-German war he also added lustre to the American name by his wise statesmanship, and prudent diplomacy.

He had become possessed of an oil painting of the Hon. Edward Hempstead, the first representative in congress from the territory of Missouri,

and he had signified a desire to present the historic painting to the State of Missouri. Arrangements were made to receive the eminent gentleman at the state capitol of Missouri, February 3, 1881, during the session of the legislature, where the presentation was formally made in the hall of the house of representatives. A reception followed at the Governor's mansion. During a conversation with Mr. Washburn on that occasion, the writer, desirous of obtain-

public function to recall and discuss the historical facts, he promised that soon after returning home he would write me briefly his memory as to what occurred. A few days later he wrote me as follows:

GALENA, Ills., February 7, 1881.

MY DEAR JUDGE EMERSON:—Referring to our conversation at Jefferson City recently on the subject of General Grant's plan of campaign in August, 1861, I can say that within a few days,—not more than a week,—after he was appointed Brigadier-General, I received from him a plan of campaign to be submitted to the President. I did so at once,



GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS IN CAPE GIRARDEAU, MO., IN 1861.
The court-house on the hill to the right was the Provost-Marshal's office.

ing that gentleman's knowledge touching Grant's plans for future military operations when he became Brigadier-General, asked Mr. Washburn for his recollection of them. He answered that he remembered very distinctly Grant sending him plans of a campaign immediately after he was appointed Brigadier-General, to be laid before the President; also about intervening, soon after, to have Grant given authority to execute the plans. And, there not being favorable opportunity at the

with words of commendation, for it impressed me greatly as the conception of a daring soldier of comprehensive views.

Without stating particulars, the plan proposed breaking the Confederate lines on the rivers and advancing through Kentucky and Tennessee.

The boldness of the project gave me still greater confidence in Grant, and I was indignant to learn from him two weeks later that General Fremont had removed him from that district and sent him to Jefferson City. I protested to the President, and urged Grant's restoration, and that he be instructed to pursue his previous plan. Mr. Lincoln remembered the plan and approved it, remarking that he was glad to find a man who was ready to fight.

That evening the President directed Cameron, Secretary of War, to request General Fremont, who commanded the Department



From the collection of the Library of Congress.

PRESIDENT AND MRS. GRANT, AND THEIR ELDEST SON, FREDERICK D. GRANT.

of the West, headquarters at St. Louis, to restore Grant to the district of southeast Missouri, as it was then called. I do not think any order was made by Mr. Lincoln. He preferred to make the request, and have Fremont make the order. Thereupon General Grant was immediately recalled from Jefferson City and sent south.

Yours truly, E. B. WASHBURN.

CHAPTER XVI.

GRANT TAKES COMMAND AT JEFFERSON CITY.

On August 22d General Grant assumed command at the state capital; his dis-

trict embraced a large portion of the central and western parts of the State. General Price and other confederates were threatening the large towns in Central Missouri. When General Grant reached his new command he found conditions immeasurably worse than they had been at Mexico and at Iron-ton. There were a few thousand troops, but in a state of great demoralization. They were commanded by volunteer officers without military experience,

and were scattered in small fragmentary detachments without military discipline or coherency. Many were fresh volunteers, and without uniforms or arms. The country adjacent to Jefferson City was overrun with rebel "bushwhackers" and guerrillas, who robbed and killed Unionists; and the latter were fleeing from their homes to the towns held by the Union Army, with such clothing and household goods as could be hastily carried off; with their families in wagons, on horseback, and on foot. All were glad to escape to a haven of safety; many of them were in want and destitution.

Grant found the city filled with these people, who aided to increase the general terror and chaotic condition.

To reduce all these elements to order, provide for the suffering and starving Union refugees, and to bring into regular and effective organization all the mixed and semi-military force (composed of regular three years' volunteers, six months' men to serve in Missouri, home guards, state militia, and the like), to effectively discipline, arm, clothe and drill it into a compact military machine, was a task well performed, if accomplished in months. But it did not take Grant months; it did not take him weeks. He put men and officers actively at work; systematized everything; incited emulation amongst the officers as to who could produce the best drilled and best disciplined force, and dissipated all discontent amongst the men, resulting from lack of military order. In less than a week Jefferson City was transformed into a model of order. Every approach to the city was guarded by watchful and well drilled forces, and Grant had a disciplined little army ready for offensive operations against the enemy. No longer were the citizens and soldiers in terror of an attack by Price or the other Confederate forces, but all faces were turned with confidence to this new commander who could so soon transform a disorganized semi-

mob of earnest men into a compact army, and they expected him to lead it out and attack the enemies of the State and of the Union.

How this quiet, calm, unassuming man could so speedily bring about this marvelous transformation was a phenomenon which the most observant onlookers were never quite able to understand. They only knew that the feat was performed before their eyes, as it had been done by him at Mexico and at Ironton a few weeks before.

As soon as this was accomplished he was ready to put his force in motion. Large sums of money were in the banks at Boonville, Lexington and Chillicothe, and the transfer of this to St. Louis could only be safely entrusted to a strong military force. Besides this, there were rebel forces, regular and irregular, to be attacked and dispersed in that direction. To accomplish both objects, Grant, one week after his advent, put the force which he had so speedily organized in motion westward.

Frémont had been urgent as to the construction of fortifications. Grant's theory was to attack the enemy instead of acting on the defensive. The second dispatch which he sent to General Frémont, on the next day after his arrival, states that "Drill and discipline are more necessary for the men than fortifications. Another difficulty in the way of fortifying is that I have no engineer officer to direct it; no time to attend to it myself, and very little disposition to gain a 'Pillar of Notoriety' for a branch of the service that I have forgotten all about."^{*}

It was not his theory of suppressing the rebellion, to spend millions in fortifying interior points and *defending* them; but to organize an effective army and fight the enemy wherever he could be found.

Washburn's protest had been successful; Frémont complied with the request of the President, and, on August 28th, as General Grant was ready to start on his

^{*}War Records.

campaigns to the west (part of his force had already started), Col. Jefferson C. Davis appeared with an order from Frémont directing Grant to report forthwith at department headquarters in St. Louis for special orders.

His work of organization at Jefferson City, and the movements set in motion by him, soon after resulted in the capture by the union troops near Lexington, of more than two thousand recruits who were on their way to join

of Southeast Missouri. At the same time, Frémont, in an order issued to General Prentiss at Ironton, said:

"When you were ordered to go to Ironton and take the place of General Grant, who was transferred to Jefferson City, it was under the impression that his appointment was of a later date than your own. By the official list it appears, however, that he is your senior in rank. He will therefore, upon effecting a junction with your troops, take command of the whole expedition."^{*}

Grant hastened to Ironton by rail, expedited the movement of troops to-



From an old drawing.

GRANT EMBARKING AFTER THE BATTLE OF BELMONT—THE LAST MAN ON BOARD.

Price in Southern Missouri, and more than a thousand horses, several hundred wagons, and a large quantity of army supplies; and in the general dispersion of other bodies of confederates being recruited in Northern Missouri.

CHAPTER XVII.


GRANT RETURNS TO SOUTHEAST MISSOURI.

The same evening on which he was relieved, General Grant reported to General Frémont in St. Louis, and was restored to his old command of the district


ward Jackson and Greenville and Bloomfield, returned to St. Louis the same night and took steamer for Cape Girardeau where we find him in command on August 30th, organizing an expedition, the several detachments of which were to move from Ironton, Jackson, and Cape Girardeau, and concentrate in the interior and attack Jeff. Thompson's forces reported to be at Bloomfield or Sikeston.

On September 1st, he issued an order placing Col. M. L. Smith, Eighth Missouri volunteers, in command of the post

^{*}War Records.



THE BATTLE OF BELMONT—GRANT'S FIRST BATTLE, NOVEMBER 7, 1861. CAPTURE AND BURNING OF THE CONFEDERATE CAMP.



of Cape Girardeau, inspected the fortifications then under construction, and the forces there assembled; corrected many irregularities; set the troops drilling, hurried forward supplies and ammunition to Jackson, where the troops from Ironton were to assemble under Prentiss, and sent off a dispatch to General McClernand at Cairo, informing him that he had just learned that Hardee was in Arkansas, and that the enemy had retreated from Benton and Commerce with their artillery; ordering Colonel Wallace to push out from Bird's Point to Charleston, Mo., and informing him also that he would, as soon as General Prentiss' column reached Jackson, "assume command of all the troops cooperating from this point to Cairo, and" would "move down the river at once." He added that "If Colonel Waagner's instructions are not different from mine, Belmont should have been taken possession of and held."

On September 2d, General Prentiss arrived. Grant immediately ordered

him to hasten forward with his force to Commerce and Benton, and thence to Sikeston, but Prentiss refused to obey, insisting that he was Grant's senior. Grant was unyielding, knowing that he ranked Prentiss; and, declining to arrest Prentiss, the latter placed himself under arrest and started for St. Louis.

CHAPTER XVIII.

GRANT REACHES CAIRO.

Grant at once placed Colonel Cook in command of Prentiss' brigade, issued the necessary orders to govern his movements, sent 30,000 rations to Jackson, and hastened to Cairo, where we find him, at four o'clock on the same day, reporting to General Frémont a brief history of his action!

On the 3d, Frémont notified Grant that the enemy was at Sikeston 16,000 strong with artillery and cavalry; and Grant, after inspecting the works under construction, and the scattered forces in and around Cairo (not waiting to make an order assuming command),

issued his first order from his new headquarters at Cairo, with his face and his thoughts southward.

H'DQRS DIST. OF SOUTHEASTERN MISSOURI, }
CAIRO, September 3, 1861. }

COL. G. WAAGNER: The movements from Jackson having been detained, you will retain possession of Belmont until otherwise directed. The movement upon Charleston being deferred, you may make such reconnoissance as is safe, and report to me at this place.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

He reported to General Frémont the military conditions in his district, and on the morning of September 4th he issued his order assuming command at Cairo. The event being of the highest historical importance, I give the order in full:

H'DQRS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI, }
CAIRO, Ill., September 4, 1861. }

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3. By virtue of directions from headquarters, Department of the West, Cairo will be included in the Southeast Missouri district, and the undersigned therefore assumes command.

Brig. Gen. J. A. McClernand, United States volunteers, being senior officer of the post of Cairo, is assigned to duty as commander, and will assume his duties as soon as practicable.

Bird's Point and Mound City will be considered as parts of the command at Cairo. Headquarters of the military district of Southeast Missouri will be at this place until otherwise directed.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

On the same evening, after gathering all possible information as to the position and intended movements of the enemy in Kentucky and Southeast Missouri, he reported to General Frémont that:

On the strength of reconnoissances made by Colonel Waagner I telegraphed this evening that troops artillery, cavalry, and infantry --can be spared from here by sending those from Jackson promptly to take possession of Columbus heights, and New Madrid will fall within five days after. *This should be done tomorrow night.*

Respectfully, Your Obedient Servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

The italics are my own, as the words show how quick Grant was to perceive the strong and important points, immediately upon taking command at this vital new center of operations.

Amidst the events that were pressing upon him; the organization of forces, the planting of batteries, the movement of gunboats, the expeditions into the

swamp regions west of the river against Jeff Thompson, the procuring of supplies, and receiving the reports of spies, scouts and refugees, Grant found time to prepare for offensive movements.

On the 5th of September he wrote to the Speaker of the Kentucky Legislature as follows:

CAIRO, Ill., September 5, 1861.

I regret to inform you that confederate forces in considerable numbers have invaded the territory of Kentucky, and are occupying and fortifying strong positions at Hickman and Chalk Bluffs.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General U. S. Army.
SPEAKER HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Frankfort, Ky.

CHAPTER XIX.

GRANT CAPTURES PADUCAH.

The ink was scarcely dry on this communication when his thoughts turned again to aggressive military movements. He wrote to General Frémont:

All information to-day has been telegraphed fully. *I am now nearly ready for Paducah, should not telegram arrive from you preventing the movement on the strength of the information telegraphed.*

In a few hours from that writing his force was on board steamboats, whose destination no man but himself,—not even the captains of the boats,—then knew, and at 6 o'clock next morning he landed his force and entered Paducah, as the advance force of the enemy (who were moving in to occupy it) retreated hastily before his army.

It is here worthy of note that Grant's first order issued at Ironton on assuming command August 9, 1861, was signed by "M. S. Hasie, Post Adjutant;" and the next one of his orders signed by an aide or an adjutant was issued on September 5th, directing the destruction of small boats on the Kentucky shore. This was signed by "Wm. S. Hillyer, A. D. C. and A. A. G., by order of Brigadier-General Grant."

All of the many scores of orders, reports, messages, and communications from him between August 9th and September 5th, and during all these operations, were written and signed by Grant.

Surely this shows as remarkable industry, as it does most unusual attention to details in a General in command, and furnishes an insight into the rapidity with which Grant worked when responsibility rested upon him. And it will also help to account for many things which have hitherto surprised us in his later brilliant career.

In an industrious search in the War Records, the writer has not found any parallel to this in the career of any other General in the army.

The author has thought it profitable to detail with some minuteness the events which occurred during the first three weeks of Grant's command of a district. Here was the first opportunity he had ever enjoyed of independent command; of exercising or exhibiting any genius for war. However much Grant's critics may affect to think that in his great achievements during later campaigns he was influenced and aided by the able Generals around him, he certainly was not thus far aided or influenced by any of the totally untrained officers of his command. Thus far he had been surrounded by unskilled, undisciplined material. All this had to be moulded into order, instructed, and converted into a fighting machine; and it had to be done quickly. How did he accomplish this task?

In studying Grant during these, to him, most trying and important weeks, what picture does he present to our imagination? what impressions do the events make upon our minds as to his ability? Do we discover *indicia* of the genius which shone out so luminously a few months and years later as to gain the applause of the whole world?

Let us summarize briefly. On August 7, 1861, Grant, as Colonel, was in command at Mexico, Mo. On that day he was ordered to the command of the district at Ironton. Within thirty hours he moved his regiment, with all its equipage, 200 miles, over two railroads, with a break of several miles to be marched between connections, and

before evening on August 8th, he was marching his regiment through Ironton to its encampment.

On the 7th he was nominated Brigadier-General, and confirmed and commissioned on the 9th.

He reorganized his force, disciplined and drilled it; reduced a condition of chaos to perfect order; had out expeditions scouting the country; watched the movements of the enemy in all parts of his large district; organized his force to attack Hardee and Jeff. Thompson, and began his advance, forcing Hardee from the state. He had conceived, formulated and sent on to Washington his great plan of campaign for opening the Mississippi River and breaking through the confederate lines. All this within *nine days*,—between August 9th and the 18th,—when he was relieved and ordered to Jefferson City.

On August 22d he was in command at Jefferson City, having in the meantime appealed to Washburn to help him back to Southeast Missouri.

At Jefferson City he instantly changed chaos into order; organized disintegrated elements into a vigorous little army; reached all parts of his district with orders, and started his force westward on a campaign to Lexington, Boonville and Chillicothe—all within six days! Then on August 28th, he was ordered to report to St. Louis.

Within the next three days he had been at St. Louis with Frémont, and at Ironton, to push an expedition into the interior against Thompson; had returned to St. Louis, and had gone to Cape Girardeau; and on August 30th, was in command there, pushing the construction of fortifications, improving discipline, and organizing an expedition against Generals Pillow and Thompson; had disposed of the insubordination of Prentiss, and sent minute reports of all the conditions to General Frémont,—all within three days! and on the afternoon of September 2d, he was forty miles distant without railroad connection in the midst of rapid work at Cairo!

On September 3d, after a busy day of inspections, he met officers from Bird's Point, from Cairo outposts, from the gunboats, from Mound City, questioning them, and instructing them. On the very first day of his activity, and before he had taken time to issue an order assuming command, he issued orders relating to the occupation of Belmont, twenty miles south. On the fourth he assumed formal command; he met scouts and spies, learned the movements of the enemy, reported elaborately to General Frémont; issued orders as to movements on the Missouri side; urged Frémont to take possession of Columbus Heights "to-morrow;" organized an expedition to take possession of Paducah; wrote to the Kentucky Legislature as to the occupancy of their soil by the Confederates, and on that very night,—all within three days from his arrival,—he started with his force to capture, and early next morning did capture, Paducah, the first strategic and important point for him to possess in the prosecution of his great plan of campaign!

And, now, here we find our young General, with all these activities accomplished within a little over *three weeks*, and master of the situation at the great central strategic point of Cairo!

I submit to the student and to the thoughtful reader of history the question whether we have not here, in these three weeks, at the very inception of Grant's career as General, the hope and the promise of all his subsequent military achievements?

General Frémont promptly rebuked Grant for informing the Kentucky Legislature that the Confederate army had invaded the State. "Brigade and other commanders," he said, "are not to correspond with State or other high authorities. All such subjects are to be submitted to the Major-General commanding the department."

A few days later Grant sent Gen. C. F. Smith with a portion of his command

to occupy Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland; thus securing the command of this and the Tennessee,—two rivers navigable quite into the heart of the Confederacy.

In the meantime the Confederates under Major-General Polk, with some twelve thousand men, and heavy artillery, had taken possession of, and was fortifying, Columbus, a formidable height completely commanding the Mississippi River, only twenty miles south of Cairo. On the 4th Grant had urgently suggested to Frémont that this position ought to be occupied "to-morrow." But Frémont would not consent to the move. Again, on the 10th of September, he wrote Frémont that: "If it was discretionary with me, with a little addition to my present force, I would take Columbus." But Frémont took no notice of Grant's importunities; he was kept strictly subordinate and allowed to make no important move,—Frémont apparently fearing to have Grant come in contact with the enemy outside of intrenchments.

Under these severe limitations placed upon his movements and discretion, Grant busied himself in the completion of defensive works about Cairo, Bird's Point, and on the Kentucky shore, and in the thorough organization and discipline of his forces.

The Confederates took advantage of the delays and strongly fortified their lines at Cumberland Gap, Bowling Green, Fort Donelson, Fort Henry, and Columbus. General Buell was making little progress in movements from Louisville southward. His department reached west to the Cumberland River. Frémont's attention seemed largely absorbed in the organization of a formidable expedition into southwest Missouri against Generals Price and McCulloch. He acted as if he feared it would be a dangerous experiment to allow Grant to do any important independent fighting.

Under this restraint and under these limitations upon his freedom of movement, Grant spent two months of valua-

ble time, not striking the enemy a blow, all the time admonished not to attack the enemy south of him. He was to make reconnaissances, feints, and demonstrations, but not to fight.

True, the time was not wholly lost, for he pushed the work of organizing and drilling his men; and at the end of this time he found himself in command of a well disciplined army of nearly 11,000 men. But this force was widely scattered over his large district, at Iron-ton, Cape Girardeau, Bird's Point, Paducah, Smithland, Cairo, etc.*

Grant, always patient and even-tempered, keenly felt the restraint, while a bold and defiant enemy was only twenty miles away. His men, too, had become restless and were anxious to fight. The enemy had converted the heights at Columbus into a citadel, bristling with cannon of long range completely commanding the river, and the low-lying village of Belmont on the west side; the southern press calling it the "Gibraltar of America."

CHAPTER XX.

GRANT PREPARES TO ADVANCE ON BELMONT.

But now a change was at hand. General Frémont having gone from St. Louis into Southwest Missouri, became alarmed at reports that Price and McCulloch were about to be reinforced by Confederate troops from Columbus. It was important that this should be prevented, and to this end Frémont's Assistant Adjutant-General at St. Louis issued the following order:

St. Louis, November 1, 1861.

Gen. Grant, Commanding at Cairo:

You are hereby directed to hold your whole command ready to march at an hour's notice.

You are also directed to make demonstrations with your troops along both sides of the river toward Charleston, Norfolk and Blandville, and to keep your columns constantly moving back and against these places, without, however, attacking the enemy. Very respectfully, etc.,

CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

*Grant's returns to the War Department on October 31, 1861, show the aggregate force in his entire district to be 11,161 of all arms.

On the next day, November 2, 1861, General Frémont was relieved of the command of the Western Department, and General Hunter placed in command. Hunter was with the army at Springfield, Mo., and in the confusion which resulted from the change and the very anomalous conditions existing under the Frémont régime, Grant had a few days to breathe with more freedom from restraint. It would be strange if, with the order to "make demonstrations on both sides of the river," he could not run against the enemy, by chance as it were, and have a fight even though his orders were "not to attack the enemy!"

At the same time General Smith was ordered to make demonstrations from Paducah against Columbus, but not to approach it.

On November 2d, another order came to Grant from Frémont's Adjutant at St. Louis, to send a force to drive out Jeff. Thompson, who was reported to be in Missouri with 3,000 men. On the 3d, Grant dispatched Colonel Oglesby with three regiments and a section of artillery to catch, if he could, that foxy, lightfooted vagrant of the swamps. If he could not find Thompson, he was to demonstrate toward New Madrid.

On November 6th, he sent Col. W. H. L. Wallace, with his regiment, to support Colonel Oglesby, having heard that Polk was sending forces across to Belmont, presumably to march into the interior and cut off Oglesby's command.

Grant hastened, therefore, to concentrate such force as he could, and move down the river toward Columbus. Detachments from the brigades of General McClernand and Colonel Dougherty, two companies of cavalry, and a battery of light artillery; a total force of 3,114 men and officers, embarked on steamers, convoyed by two gunboats; and, on the evening of the 6th, dropped down the river toward Columbus, near enough to apprise the enemy of the demonstration and thus stop the further movement of troops to the west.

The expedition tied up to the Kentucky shore during the night, and a reconnoissance was made on land toward Columbus, until the enemy's pickets were touched.

This, with a like demonstration by Smith, from Paducah towards the rear of Columbus, satisfied General Polk that a direct attack on that place was meditated.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.

At 2 o'clock in the morning of November 7th, it was reported to Grant, on board the steamer, that Polk had sent additional forces across to the Missouri or Belmont side of the river, and Grant promptly determined to convert his demonstration into an attack on the forces thus detached by Polk, and he issued what we may term his first order of battle, as follows:

ON BOARD STEAMER BELLE MEMPHIS. }
November 7, 1861, 2 o'clock A. M. {
SPECIAL ORDER. The troops composing the present expedition will move promptly at six o'clock this morning from this place. The gunboats will take the advance and be followed by the First Brigade, under command of Brig.-Gen. John A. McClernand composed of the troops from Cairo and Fort Holt. The Second Brigade, comprising the remainder of the troops of the expedition, commanded by Col. Henry Dougherty, will follow. The entire force will debark at the lowest point on the Missouri shore where a landing can be effected in security from the rebel batteries. The point of debarkation will be designated by Captain Walkie, commanding the naval forces.

JOHN A. RAWLINS,*
Assistant Adjutant-General.
By order of Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant.

Promptly at six o'clock the flotilla, (composed of two gunboats and three transports), moved down, and the force debarked at Hunter's Point on the Missouri side about four miles above, and just out of range of the heavy guns at Columbus.

Grant promptly formed his little army. He posted a battalion of 600 men in a dry slough near the boats to protect and cover the landing, and with the remaining 2,500 brave men anxious to meet the enemy, moved toward Bel-

*This is the first order I have found in the War Department issued by Grant to which the name of his famous Chief of Staff, Rawlins, is attached.

mont. Throwing out two companies from each regiment as skirmishers well in advance, they came in sharp collision with the enemy a mile from the place of debarkation, and the entire force were soon engaging the enemy.

The topography of the battlefield was a Mississippi River bottom, subject to overflow at high water, and was cut up with a number of sloughs, bayous, wash-outs and ponds. Excepting two or three small cornfields, the whole country was densely timbered with huge sycamore, swamp oak, and other lowland timber. Grape and other vines grew over the bottoms, hung down from the trees, and with fallen timber and masses of driftwood, made an entanglement difficult for an army to penetrate, and a most advantageous position for the occupying force to defend. There was but one narrow wagon road, with two trails winding their tortuous ways through this forest, to the Confederate encampment directly under the guns of Columbus Heights.

It was on this vantage ground of his own choosing that the Confederates elected to meet Grant and demonstrate (what one heard so often during the early days of the war in the South) that "one Southerner could lick half a dozen Yankees."

Pillow, a political General, who had seen service in the Mexican War, a man of immense pretensions, was in immediate command of the Confederate forces confronting Grant, consisting of about 3,500 men, a battalion of cavalry and a splendid battery of artillery, during the early part of the engagement. Against this formidable force, backed up by more than 10,000 additional men and powerful batteries of artillery across the river, Grant led his little army of 2,500!

If we consider the natural advantages of the position occupied by the enemy, and the many obstacles which Grant's force had to encounter and overcome, it would have been an unequal contest if Grant had been able to attack with as

large a force as Pillow commanded, but when we see him moving upon an enemy numerically much greater than his own, and attacking him in so favorable a position for defense, and this, too, at a time when other Generals seemed to be afraid to get too close to the enemy, induces one to stop and say, "Well, it was strange! and yet not surprising, because it was Grant." Nor should we forget that this enemy was as courageous and brave as any in the world.

From the time Grant's force came in collision with the advance of the enemy, on the morning of that memorable 7th of November, they pressed on, keeping up a steady fire along the line, routing the enemy from one cover after another, pressing close upon him through slough and field, and vines and thickets, over fallen timber and driftwood; on, steadily on, until the slashed timber and sharpened abattis surrounding the Confederate encampment were encountered. Everywhere along the lines Grant rode in the thickest of the storm of bullets, giving directions and encouraging his men and officers.

A battle in a forest of this kind is a very exciting and trying ordeal. The crash of arms reverberating through the forest; swift puffs of smoke darting savagely out from trees and bushes as far as the eye can see; the groans of wounded men mingled with the courageous commands of officers and the cheers of men charging on the enemy; the bullets striking the trees with quick, sullen thud; the bark and twigs filling the air, and the smoke slowly rising and half hiding the specter objects, dead and living everywhere! In the midst of the rush, the passion, the crash of arms, the artillery at a little distance, and wherever an opening could be found, sending its shot and shell screeching and exploding in the tops of trees, cutting off branches, tearing trunks into splinters, and raining down upon the heads of the men who are thus creeping, fighting, and charging through the forest, a ceaseless storm

of falling tree-tops, threatening to crush the reckless soldiers who defy all dangers, and fight madly on!

Grant's horse was shot under him. General McClernand, second in command, lost three horses. Nearly every other field officer was dismounted in the same way. The fighting was close, persistent, desperate; but there was no slacking, no wavering, no hesitation on the part of Grant's little army. They had come to "clean out the rebel encampment at Belmont."

When they reached the abattis around the Confederate encampment, the fighting became still more fierce and desperate. All the Confederate artillery was brought into action, and an additional regiment of infantry that was sent by Polk to reinforce Pillow, came upon the scene of conflict, and the battle raged with desperate fury. Grant's forces steadily pushed on and on, and poured a stream of fire upon the enemy and forced him to steadily recoil,—little by little at first, then more rapidly,—until, after four hours of continuous and terrific fighting, Grant charged through all obstructions, and sent Pillow's broken and thoroughly demoralized and beaten force pell-mell through his camp, and down over the river bank, where it hid for protection from the bullets of Grant's triumphant pursuers.

In this final charge, Grant captured all Pillow's artillery; all his camp and camp supplies, and burned them as he had no means of carrying them off. The captured battery of artillery was taken some distance, but most of the artillery horses had been killed, and only two of the guns could be carried off as trophies to Cairo.

The water in the river was very low at the time, leaving the banks twenty to thirty feet high, and when the retreating Confederates went over the bank in a general rout, they completely disappeared, and there was not a live enemy visible to the victors on the west side of the river.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the flush and excitement of so decided a victory, the victors themselves should, for the moment, give themselves over to some demoralization. Instead of pressing upon the enemy then hiding behind the bank out of sight, and sending the whole of them to the rear as prisoners, the National forces forgot that so valuable a prize was so near, and to be had upon a prompt demand, and gave themselves up to the excitement of victory, to cheering, to speech-making, to plundering and finally burning the camp.

Grant made every effort to induce the excited victors to resume order, and obey orders. These conditions existed for some time, during which the defeated enemy, finding that they were not disturbed, quietly moved along under cover of the bank, several hundred yards, up to the steamboat landing, where Grant discovered that Polk was making an effort to land several steamboat loads of fresh troops from Columbus, and also that the defeated force was reorganizing. This brought the new, as well as the old, reorganized force of the enemy, between Grant and his boats. The alarm was given and this had the desired effect on his men. They instantly resumed their places in the ranks with refilled cartridge boxes, ready to again try conclusions with the fresh contingent of Polk's army.

A member of Grant's staff, from civil life, who had just observed the large reinforcements landing from Columbus, rode up to Grant, and said in much excitement, "We are surrounded!"

"If that is so," answered Grant, "we must cut our way out, as we cut our way in. We have whipped them once, and I think we can whip them again."

This word ran along the lines, the men cheered as they were wheeled into position and moved rapidly upon the enemy that was trying to gain Grant's rear; and after a sharp combat again drove the entire force out of his way, and back to the river bank. This time

the Confederate force was led by General Cheatham, who had crossed with three regiments of fresh troops from his division, making about 6,000 under his command, including Pillow's defeated force.

As soon as the Confederate camp was set on fire, and Polk saw that the National forces were in possession, he ordered the field batteries on the Kentucky shore, and all the heavy guns in the forts on Columbus Heights, to open upon Grant, and he in person with two additional regiments, a battery and two companies of cavalry, crossed over to reinforce Cheatham and Pillow. This augmented his force in Belmont to nearly 8,000, including a battalion of cavalry and two field batteries.

As Belmont is on low land, completely under the guns on Columbus Heights, Grant never had any intention of trying to hold it. His object was to chastise the force on the Missouri side, break up the camp, and so menace Columbus as to induce Polk to hold his force and not send any of it to reinforce Price in Southwest Missouri.

As soon, therefore, as this task was accomplished and the guns from Columbus opened upon him, he was ready to retire to his boats, and the second battle was fought to brush the enemy from his line of march back to his landing.

Although the enemy had been so largely reinforced, they were very cautious in coming in collision with Grant a third time, and Grant retired with his command in perfect order, and was not molested for an hour or more during his reëmbarkation.

At the beginning of the battle with General Cheatham in the afternoon, Grant could have had little more than two thousand men in ranks, and it was with this force that he attacked and drove Cheatham's and Pillow's combined forces back to the river, under the guns of their heavy batteries.

General Polk crossed the river with reinforcements,—two regiments, a bat-

tery and cavalry,—after Cheatham and Pillow had the second conflict with Grant, and instead of pursuing Grant as they afterwards asserted they did, their force was as far from Grant as it could possibly get. General Polk, in his official report, says:

On landing I was met by Generals Pillow and Cheatham, whom I directed, with the regiments of Cheatham's command and portions of others [which he had taken over with him] to press the enemy to his boats.

This shows that Pillow and Cheatham were not after Grant during an hour or more after the last engagement, but were waiting on the bank of the river for further reinforcements under Polk. These did not reach Grant's landing place for an hour or more, and until after he had re-embarked his force, and was waiting to bring in his wounded and stragglers.

When Polk's fresh reinforcements approached the vicinity of Grant's boats, their fire wounded only two of his troops and one sailor, and killed none. The enemy lost a large number by the fire of the gunboats, the infantry and field battery on the transports.

Captain H. Walke, who commanded the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, which convoyed Grant's three transports, says in his official report, as to the re-embarkation:

After nearly all the troops had re-embarked and were about ready to start, a sudden attack was made upon the transport vessels by an apparently large re-inforcement of the rebels. Our boats being in good position we opened fire with our grape, cannister, and five-second shells, and completely routed them—we learn with great slaughter. After silencing the enemy we continued our fire with the broadside guns.

Colonel Preston Smith, Confederate commander of the 154th Tennessee Infantry, who came up to attack Grant after he had embarked, says in his report:

The fire was kept up on both sides with very little cessation for about one hour. [Grant surely was in no haste to get away.] Then the boats moved out under cover of the gunboats, and as the latter ascended the river, their position giving them better range, and they opened with shell, grape, and cannister, sweeping the ground occupied by my command, killing one, and wounding twelve others of my command. As they continued to play on us the command was ordered to fall back to a field on the right.*

*Confederate War Records.

This was the third time the enemy had precipitately retired from Grant's fire. The other Confederate forces that came within range were forced to retreat with loss.

Thus it will be seen that in this first splendid (but unappreciated) battle of Grant, which began about nine o'clock in the morning, his little army of 2,500 men in action was in hot conflict for nearly four hours in the forenoon; then, after a short respite following the capture of the enemy's encampment, in another hot conflict with General Cheatham's reinforcements and routed them; then again, after re-embarking, for another hour repelling the Confederate attack at the landing, altogether making fully *six hours* of fighting. In addition, they marched fully ten miles, advancing and retiring through entangled thickets; killed, wounded and captured 641 of the enemy;* captured his entire battery and carried off two of his guns and spiked the others; burned and destroyed his camp; defeated and utterly routed, first General Pillow's 3,500; second General Cheatham reinforced to about 6,000; and in the third conflict at the landing when General Polk had about 8,000 men on the Belmont side of the river, forced them again to "fall back to a field on the right;" and Grant returned to Cairo by nightfall with his cheering and enthusiastic command, having lost but 85 killed, 301 wounded, and 99 missing,—a total of 485 men and officers!

This was General Grant's first battle, and the first battle of his men. I think I am justified in asking whether there was any braver or finer bit of military work done during the war?

CHAPTER XXII.

LATER CONFEDERATE ADMISSIONS.

The first published Confederate reports of this battle were full of extravagances and pretentious claims of victory because Grant retired from a field which

*"Our loss in killed was 108; wounded 419; missing 117. Total, 641."—General Polk's Report, War Records.

he had no intention of holding. Fortunately for the truth of history, a fierce quarrel ensued soon after, between Generals Polk and Pillow, and out of it came many surprising admissions by both in regard to this battle. This rich find I unexpectedly came upon in delving into the Confederate War records; and so far as I know these facts have not been hitherto published or referred to by any historian of the war. The fact that these documents were not written by Generals Polk and Pillow, or sent to President Davis and the Confederate Secretary of War until many months after their first boastful reports had been published South and North, and not until they were called for by President Davis in explanation of the quarrel, accounts for their sleeping unnoticed, so long.

Brief extracts from these Confederate reports will illustrate the desperate character of the battle of Belmont, and the bravery and energy of Grant's fighting. They also show how completely his claim to victory is sustained by the later and somewhat confidential reports of these two chief Confederate officers and their subordinates.

Some time in January, 1862 (date not given in the war records), General Pillow, owing to this quarrel, sent his resignation to the Confederate Secretary of War. Thereupon Judah P. Benjamin, then War Secretary, requested General Pillow to explain the cause of his resignation. On January 16, 1862, Pillow answered in a long and circumstantial account of his grievances against Polk. On January 30, 1862, Jefferson Davis indorsed on this explanation and supplemental report of General Pillow, as direction to the Confederate Secretary of War:

"To correct errors, both of fact and military discipline, it may be proper to communicate a copy of the paper to General Polk, J. D."

General Polk responded as follows:

HQs. GRAND DIV. ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
HUMBOLDT, March 12, 1862. }
HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS, President C. S. }
America: SIR: I have not had an hour I }
could call my own since I received from the

War Department a copy of the very extraordinary letter addressed to it by General Pillow [January 16, 1862], giving what he styles his reasons for resigning his appointment as Brigadier; and I have collected from the Colonels under his command at the battle of Belmont written proofs of the most flagrant misstatements of facts and events that could well be imagined; and so of other things. So soon as I can find time from my absorbing public duties to attend to my private, I will present this matter in the shape of a reply to his aspersions.

I have the honor to be,

Your Obedient Servant,
J. POLK,
Major-General commanding.*

General Polk proceeded methodically to collect his proofs to disprove Pillow's charges. He addressed a series of written questions to each of General Pillow's field officers, and also to his own staff officers who had been sent by Polk from Columbus across the river to Belmont during the battle. These questions, with slight variations to the different officers, ran thus:

First.—Were you ordered to charge the enemy with the bayonet during the day of the battle of the 7th of November? If so, did your regiment reach the enemy's position, or did it stop short?

Second.—Were you ordered to make more than one charge?

Third.—Did you get out of ammunition during the battle? If so, were you informed there was ammunition on the river bank at your disposal, and by whom?

Fourth.—How many rounds had you then fired?

Fifth.—Did your regiment cross over to Belmont during the battle to reinforce General Pillow? If so, at what time did it reach him?

There were other questions intended to show how well Pillow was reinforced and supported by General Polk during the battle, but these will suffice.

After accumulating his proofs, General Polk, on July 22, 1862, sent to Hon. G. W. Randolph, Confederate Secretary of War, a very voluminous report, accompanied by the replies of the field and staff officers. In explaining his delay he says:

"My answer to this letter of General Pillow should have been sent forward long ago. The occasion of the delay is that it was received just before the evacuation of Columbus and while I was engaged in the duties growing out of that movement. Since then the heavy pressure of succeeding events, following each other so rapidly, has prevented my attending to any duties that might be postponed.

With this explanation of these belated Confederate reports before him, the

*These and all the subsequent extracts are from the Confederate War records.

reader will be interested in perusing extracts from them, and learning what the Confederate leaders could say of this battle when for the time forgetting the enemy and talking about themselves.

General Pillow, in his letter complaining to the Confederate Secretary of War of Polk's failure to reinforce him at Belmont, says of the battle:

On the 7th of November General Polk ordered me to cross the river with four regiments of my division, to meet the enemy, then landed and advancing upon the position of Colonel Tappan's regiment at Belmont. These, with Captain Beltzhoover's battery, and Lieutenant Colonel Miller's battalion of cavalry were deemed sufficient to resist the column reported to have landed. There was an adequate number of steamers at the landing.

This is an admission that he had five full regiments, one full battery of field artillery, and a battalion of cavalry, when the battle opened.

General Pillow proceeds in his complaint:

After four hours' hard fighting and after a loss of quite one-fourth of the force engaged, to save my command from total destruction I at last ordered the line to fall back to the river bank. There I met with Colonel Walker's regiment, the first support sent me.

This made six regiments of infantry in Pillow's command in the first battle.

Pillow again proceeds:

This bloody battle was within three-fourths of a mile from the main army; the river interposing I could not fall back upon it for support. There was not less than 10,000 well-armed, and well-disciplined men looking on the conflict from the opposite shore, and this force was within a strong and well-constructed line of defensive works. Such a sacrifice cannot be excused by alleged fears of attack on the Columbus side with the force there in hand.

Here, we find an admission of 10,000 men on the Columbus side, and certainly over 5,000 on the Belmont side, only three-fourths of a mile apart, with plenty of steamers to cross their forces at pleasure.

General Pillow, complaining of not being properly supported by General Polk, again says:

Finding it impossible longer to maintain my position without reinforcements, I ordered the whole line to fall back to the river bank. In this movement my line was more or less broken, and my corps mingled to-

gether, so that when we reached the river bank it had the appearance of a mass of men rather than an organized corps. I met Colonel Walker's regiment coming to my support, and ordered him to advance his regiment promptly to check the advance of the enemy. He met the enemy in the open field and held him in check until his line of fire and artillery had cut down a large portion of the regiment, when it was forced back under the bank of the river. When the enemy's force reached the bank of the river he was met by the fire of Captain Smith's battery from the opposite side of the river, which, being well directed, together with that of the heavy guns from the works above Columbus, made him recoil from the front.

Here we have the picture drawn by the Confederate commander of a thoroughly routed army. Not only was Pillow's original army of five regiments (his artillery) captured and cavalry driven in a confused mob under the river bank, but the fresh regiment of reinforcements was "cut to pieces and driven back" with the crowd. Not a shot was Pillow's army now firing, so thoroughly was it beaten. It was lying at Grant's feet and at his mercy, until, as Pillow says, "the fire of Captain Smith's battery on the opposite side of the river, together with the heavy guns in the works above Columbus, made him recoil from the front."

General Polk, answering General Pillow's charges, tells the Confederate Secretary of War that Pillow did not handle his forces well, did not make proper disposition of them. He says:

It was not difficult to account for the *speedy and disastrous termination of the fight, or the mortifying scenes witnessed on the river bank at 12 M.*, as described by Captain Trask.

Captain Trask's account of it, referred to by General Polk, is as follows:*

We crossed the river under a heavy fire from the enemy's cannon, they having at this time driven in our forces, planted their guns on the bank of the river, and they were otherwise engaged in burning our tents and destroying our camp with no one that we could perceive at the time engaging them except the batteries from the Columbus side.

Upon landing at 12 M., on the Belmont side 400 yards above the position occupied by the enemy, we found the landing obstructed by our disorganized forces, who endeavored to board and take possession of our boat, and at the same time crying: "Don't land!" "Don't land!" "We are whipped!" "Go back!"

By this time all Pillow's artillery was in Grant's possession, and it looks

* Captain Trask was one of General Polk's staff officers.

very much as if General Pillow, was most thoroughly beaten. But lest I be considered partial I will quote what General Polk says further to the Confederate Secretary of war, as to General Pillow and the battle:

"I am not concerned to reopen the question of the justness of the opinion then expressed," [referring to his first report of the battle.] "*of the disaster itself I said no more than I thought necessary, willing for the sake of the cause especially as we had triumphed, to throw a veil over all errors committed. Yet nothing is better known than that General Pillow was badly beaten on that occasion, and that he was rescued from annihilation by the cross-fire of the fixed and field batteries, and by the timely aid of Colonel Marks and General Cheatham.*"

Surely this should set at rest forever who was victor at Belmont. But I will add a few sentences from the official report of Major Henry Winslow, aid-de-camp on the staff of General Polk:

About 12 m., I was ordered by you (General Polk) to cross the river and ascertain the progress of the battle. On arriving on the Missouri shore I found our troops retreating in disorder up the river, the enemy having driven them back. I asked an officer the cause of this and he said that the men were out of ammunition. I directed him to supply himself from boxes lying under the bank. I found upon examination of the cartridge boxes, however, that they had a good supply. Finding that the confusion was becoming worse, and the men inclined to rush upon the transports, I endeavored by expostulation and entreaties to halt them, but in vain. I told General Pillow of your (General Polk's) wish to know how the battle was going, to which he replied the men were falling back, and that he wished to make a flank movement upon the enemy. I told him there was plenty of ammunition on the bank of the river, and asked him if the men could not be got to try the cold steel, to which he replied he had tried that, but could not get the men to stand it.

I recrossed the river at 2 o'clock and stated to you that my opinion was that the battle was lost unless more reinforcements were sent across; that the troops were in retreat and appeared to have lost all confidence in their officers, and that I thought your (General Polk's) presence alone would restore order.

This, then, was the demoralized condition of the Confederate force an hour and a half after General Cheatham crossed the river at 12:30 and after Grant had driven him, also, back to the river.

That Grant's victory was complete and brilliant stands thus proven.

If there had been no further reinforcements crossing from Columbus, no batteries on the Columbus heights,—more than thirty guns in all—sweeping

the battlefield won by Grant,—if the Confederate Army at Belmont had stood there alone and un-supplanted by the 10,000 men still on the Columbus side, can there be a shadow of doubt but that Grant would have marched back with every man of that Confederate Army prisoners? It was alone the powerful batteries on the Kentucky shore which made it impossible for Grant to pick up and march off the army that had virtually surrendered; had ceased firing and lay panic-stricken under the river bank. He was only prevented carrying off all the enemy's field artillery on the Missouri side by want of horses to handle all the guns to his boats. He had defeated the army of the enemy under the heavy guns of his powerful fortress, and when these guns (which he could not reach), swept the battlefield, he simply withdrew, as completely the victor as if he had encamped upon the field a week or a month; for it was never again occupied by the enemy as a camp.

General Polk further says:

I directed Captain Smith's Mississippi battery to move to the river bank opposite the field of conflict and to open upon the enemy's position. I also directed Maj. A. P. Stewart in command of the heavy guns in the fort, to open upon the same position. This joint fire was so terrific as to dislodge the enemy, silence his battery and cause him to take up his line of march for his boats.

With what desperate energy Grant's light field guns must have been served to produce the impression upon the enemy that he had a heavy battery! And with what fury his 2,500 men must have attacked the enemy to have produced the impression that he had an army of 7,000 or 8,000 men!

In General Polk's defense of himself to the Confederate Secretary of War against General Pillow's complaints we also get at the truth as to the reinforcements sent over to aid Pillow, not so fully stated in his original boastful reports. He again says:

"Between 9 and 10 A. M., I caused the Second Regiment Tennessee, Col. J. Knox Walker commanding to be sent over to Brigadier-General Pillow, commanding the troops in Belmont, and it arrived on the battle-field

between 10 and 11 o'clock. . . . Immediately after this I sent the Fifteenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers over to Belmont, and it passed over between 10 and 11 o'clock. We have thus a second regiment.

"The Eleventh Louisiana Regiment came up in double quick, and was landed at Belmont between 11:15 and 11:30 o'clock, and engaged the enemy a few minutes before 12. This is the *third* reinforcing regiment. Others, as the 154th Tennessee and Blythe's two Mississippi Regiments, were taken over by myself; a little delay ensued, owing to the fierceness of the fire of the enemy on our transports. . . . The first check experienced by the enemy was produced by a cross-fire of artillery which I had directed from a light battery placed on the river bank opposite his own battery, and from the heavy batteries of the fort. This fire, which was very heavy and destructive, drove him from the field and started him for his boats."

Here we have the emphatic testimony of the commanders of the Confederate forces, never before published so far as the writer is aware, stating in the most unmistakable terms that at least *three* regiments reinforced Pillow's army before 11:30 A. M., making his force *eight* regiments of infantry, besides his cavalry and battery of artillery. The first battle did not close until after 12. And yet these reinforcements were swept away, defeated, routed, by Grant's triumphant onset.

In his first report, dated three days after the battle, General Polk even there admits that, although Grant's forces had withdrawn from the "destructive fire of the heavy batteries" some distance out in the bottoms, yet "General Cheatham thought it prudent to halt his column and bring up his brigade, and he returned to the river bank for that purpose, where he met me, bringing with me Colonel Smith's brigade of fresh troops, who had now arrived, and I ordered the pursuit with the whole force."

Here we have the admission that, with an army reinforced by three fresh regiments before 11:30 A. M., "General Cheatham thought it *prudent* to halt," and return to the river bank and await the arrival of General Polk with three additional regiments, two field batteries, and a battalion of cavalry! It was only then, after Grant was quietly reëmbarking miles away, two hours later, that a "pursuit" was ordered, was deemed "prudent!"

The Confederate Army on the Belmont side of the river did not stop Grant. Nothing stopped him until he reached the river, and until, as General Polk tells us, "The first check experienced by the enemy was produced by a cross-fire of artillery on the opposite bank, and the heavy batteries of the fort."

It is seldom, indeed, that the historian is able to present such testimonials to the skill and bravery of a commander from the pens of his enemies. Great thanks to the quarrel between the principal actors on the Confederate side, whereby the official statements were made which are now brought to light!

In the thick of the fight Grant's second horse got entangled in vines and fell over a log. He was supposed to be shot, but in a moment he was on his feet again. Grant mounted and went dashing down the line, with the brush cut by missiles from the tops of the trees falling around him. On another occasion he was being pulled from his horse by a swinging grapevine, when the vine was cut by a minie ball, the ends falling apart, enabling him to ride on.

Grant was the last man to embark on his boats. He was riding hither and thither to see that all the wounded and stragglers were on board. In an adjacent cornfield he discovered the Confederates moving up not fifty yards distant. He started, at first slowly, then more rapidly to the landing where the boats were just moving off; but when Grant reached the river he was recognized; the vessel stopped; a plank was thrown ashore, and, the bank being very steep and high, his horse put his forefeet over the bank, and with his hindfeet well under him, slid down to the plank, and trotted onto the boat without hesitancy.

By this time the bullets of the enemy were riddling the smoke-stacks of the steamers; but as soon as they swung out in the stream where the men on the decks, the field guns, and the gunboats could bring their fire to bear on

the enemy, the latter were forced to withdraw out of range.

On going aboard the steamer, Grant went at once to the Captain's room on the upper deck, and lay down on a lounge for a few moments' rest. He then arose and went on deck. He had but just left the lounge when a minie ball passed through the head of the lounge and lodged in the foot exactly where he had been lying.

General Pillow was never cured of his Mexican War extravagances, and in view of the sound thrashing received from Grant at Belmont, Pillow perpetrates a capital joke in his *first* official report made two days after the battle. He says:

"In such a conflict of arms, *illustrating so fully the superior mettle of the Southern soldier,*" etc.

Again he says:

"The enemy were a day and a half removing and burying their dead and wounded from their boats in Cairo. . . I think the enemy's loss could not be less than 2,000 men."

The Confederates, at the time, considered Belmont a great battle.

Gen. A. S. Johnston, in general command of the Confederate Western Department, issued general orders at Bowling Green, Ky., in which he said it was "a hard contested field. . . . It was no ordinary shock of arms. It was a long and trying contest."

The Confederate Congress, on receipt of the first report of the battle, passed resolutions on December 6th, laudatory of the courage and skill of Generals Polk, Pillow, and Cheatham, and thanking them for "the glorious

victory achieved at Belmont, in the State of Missouri, on the 7th of November, . . . over an enemy greatly superior to their own in numbers and appointments."

President Davis telegraphed General Polk, two days after the battle: "Our countrymen must long remember gratefully to reward the activity, the skill, the courage and devotion of the army at Belmont."

Whether President Davis or the Confederate Congress would have congratulated them a few months later, after the facts were laid before them,—the result of the quarrel between Polk and Pillow,—is more than doubtful.

On the Union side, while the battle of Belmont was not as great, considered from the standpoint of numbers, nor so conclusive in its results as some of Grant's later great battles, yet when we consider the desperate energy and persistence of the fighting; Grant's able plan of attack; the brilliant handling of his force; the complete destruction of everything within his reach; the thorough rout of the enemy; the orderly retirement from the powerful batteries at Columbus under the eyes of an enemy on both sides of the river some fifteen thousand strong, carrying off one hundred and seventy-five prisoners and two guns of the enemy after a conflict of six hours; and this with only two thousand five hundred men engaged against a brave enemy of more than four thousand, six thousand, and eight thousand at different periods of the combat, we must surely class the victory at Belmont with the brilliant achievements in Grant's career.

(To be continued.)



GRANT'S LIFE IN THE WEST AND HIS MISSISSIPPI VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

(A HISTORY.)

BY COL. JOHN W. EMERSON.

(Engravings from drawings and photographs furnished chiefly by Mrs. E. Butler Johnson.)
(Begun in the October, 1896, MIDLAND MONTHLY.)

BOOK III.

CHAPTER XXIII.

ANOMALOUS CONDITIONS IN THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT.

GENERAL FREMONT had held Grant in check with a firm and imperious hand. While the Government at Washington was taking cautious steps to remove Frémont and install his successor, and restraint was somewhat slack for a few days, Grant took advantage of the conditions to strike the blow at Belmont.

General Frémont had administered the affairs of the Western Department very much as if he were President. He made contracts, appointed and commissioned officers without much reference to the authorities at Washington; and President Lincoln, General Scott, and the War Department became greatly alarmed. Frémont was appointed to the command July 3, 1861, assumed command July 25th, and on October 1st he sent Hon. John A. Gurley to Washington to urge the President to send funds. In the written application Mr. Gurley says:

"To the question, 'how much money shall I ask for in Washington?' Colonel Woods answered, 'twelve million dollars.'"

Colonel Woods was Quartermaster under Frémont.

The cliques and clans by which Frémont was soon surrounded, and the political cabals in which he allowed himself to become involved soon wrought his ruin. The Blairs, who had been his

most zealous adherents, lost confidence in his ability and his management, and they were not noted in those days for their reticence. The President's nights were made sleepless with the burden of complaints. In his own forceful way Mr. Lincoln spoke thus of his troubles:

I thought well of Frémont. Even now I think well of his impulses. I only think he is the prey of wicked and designing men, and I think he has absolutely no military capacity. At last, at my suggestion, Montgomery Blair went to Missouri to look, and talk, over matters. He went as a friend of Frémont. He passed, on the way, Mrs. Frémont coming to see me. She sought an audience with me at midnight, and tasked me so violently with many things that I had to exercise all the awkward tact I have to avoid quarrelling with her. She surprised me by asking why their enemy, Montgomery Blair, had been sent to Missouri. She more than once intimated that if General Frémont should decide to try conclusions with me, he could set up for himself.*

So violent had become the complaints to the War Department as to the chaotic conditions existing at St. Louis, that Mr. Lincoln directed General Scott to issue the following order:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY. }
WASHINGTON, October 24, 1861. }

GENERAL ORDERS No. 18: Major-General Frémont, of the United States Army, the present Commander of the Western Department, of the same, will, on receipt of this order, call Major General Hunter, of the United States Volunteers, to relieve him temporarily in that command, when he (Major-General Frémont) will report to General Headquarters, by letter, for further orders.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

By command:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The President, Generals Scott and McClellan (the latter now Commander-in-chief), became so much alarmed that

*Nicolay and Hay: Life of Lincoln.

the following order was sent by telegraph:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
November, 6, 1861.

BRIG.-GEN. S. R. CURTIS; The General-in-Chief directs that you take at once the control of affairs in and around Saint Louis. Look to the safety of the Arsenal. Take charge of the telegraph station. Act promptly under these orders till you receive orders from General Hunter. Report frequently.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

So anomalous were the conditions in General Frémont's Department that the President and War Department had fears there might be trouble in removing him. This fear caused them to use caution in framing the order and making it read that General Hunter would "relieve him temporarily," which expression, it was supposed, would somewhat soften the tone of the mandate to the retiring General.

This order was delivered to Frémont November 3d, near Springfield, in the interior of Missouri; and on the same day General Hunter, who was near, assumed command. The army was then advancing to drive Price and McCulloch from the State.

It was not until November 7th, the day on which Grant fought the battle of Belmont, that Frémont emerged from the interior, and General Hunter got his first message through to Rolla, happily all too late to interfere with Grant's fight. But it would seem that General Curtis, who was put in command at St. Louis until General Hunter should arrive from the interior, was rather alarmed at Grant's battle,

for he telegraphed the War Department on November 9th, two days after, saying:

Yesterday Colonel Fiala sent report of General Grant's movement on Belmont, as ordered by Frémont. Captain McKeever telegraphs from Cincinnati to General Frémont that General Grant had no orders from Frémont to attack Belmont or Columbus.


While Grant was not reprimanded, he was given to understand that he was



Designer and builder of the new Ironclad Mississippi River fleet, 1861.

not expected to do any more fighting without orders from his superiors.

Generals Scott and McClellan had a very high estimate of the ability of Major-General Halleck, who had been some time near Headquarters at Washington, and decided Mr. Lincoln to appoint him to the command of the Western Department.



FIRST TYPE OF GUNBOATS ON THE OHIO AND MISSISSIPPI RIVERS, 1861.
Tyler, Lexington, and Conestoga, equipped at Cincinnati, and commanded by Captain Rodgers, U. S. N.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, November 9, 1861. }
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 97:

3. The Department of the Missouri, to in-

clude the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that por-
tion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland
River, to be commanded by Major-General
H. W. Halleck, United States Army.
By order:

JULIUS P. GARESCHÉ,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

After a delay of ten days, when haste was of pressing importance, General Halleck arrived at St. Louis and assumed command on November 19th.

On appointing General Halleck, McClellan wrote him, among other things, the following:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., November
11, 1861.

MAJ.-GEN. H. W. HALLECK,
U. S. A., Commanding Depart-
ment of the Missouri: *General*
—In assigning you to the com-
mand of the Department of
the Missouri, it is probably
unnecessary for me to state
that I have intrusted to you a
duty which requires the ut-
most tact and decision. You
have not merely the ordinary
duties of a military command-
er to perform, but the far
more difficult task of reduc-
ing chaos to order . . .
and of reducing to a point of
economy, consistent with the
interests and necessities of
the State, a system of reck-
less expenditure and fraud,
perhaps unheard of before in
the history of the world.

You will find in your De-
partment many general and



CAPTAIN PORTER, U. S. N.,

Under whose direction the first three gunboats, Lexington, Conestoga, and Tyler, were fitted out and armed at Cincinnati in 1861, and by him run down to Cairo. He co-operated with Grant at the Battle of Belmont, and until Captain Foote appeared in 1862 with his new fleet of ironclads.

staff officers holding illegal commissions not recognized or approved by the President or Secretary of War. You will at once notify these gentlemen of the nullity of their appointments. . . . If any of them give the slightest trouble you will at once arrest them and send them, under guard, out of the limits of your Department. . . . You will please cause competent and reliable staff officers to examine all existing contracts immediately, and suspend all payments upon them until you receive the report in each case. . . .

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, commanding U. S. Army.

That the coming of so exacting and imperious a character as Halleck should cause consternation among the army contractors who had profited by the loose methods of the Frémont *regime*, may be readily conjectured.

But if the President and the War Department at Washington had been in anxious trouble before, they were not long allowed to indulge in repose; for, before General Halleck had the affairs of his department well in hand, he began to frighten them by keeping the wires hot with frantic appeals for help,—help in every conceivable thing from a tent pin to enlarged armies and armaments. A study of the War Records for the next few months gives the student the impression that Halleck was strangely nervous, excitable, in fact an alarmist.

Amidst all this, it is refreshing to run to the quiet, self-composure, and confidence of Grant, who never "lost his head," and never was excited or deceived by exaggerated reports as to the strength of the enemy. While Halleck in Missouri, and Buell in Kentucky were pleading for help, for more time, for better organization and stronger armies, Grant was always ready to *fight*. He knew that the enemy was in greater need of time than were the National forces.

Halleck and Buell seemed to act on the theory that it was not safe to advance without a perfectly drilled and disciplined army, equipped to perfection; apparently not reflecting that the delay also brought the enemy into the same improved condition.

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CHAPTER XXIV.

NAVAL PREPARATIONS ON THE WESTERN WATERS.

Early in the summer of 1861, when it became manifest that there would be serious war, Attorney-General Bates of the administration, a citizen of St. Louis, wrote Captain James B. Eads, also of St. Louis, asking his opinion as to the feasibility of using gunboats on the Western rivers. Eads at once replied affirmatively. He had long been connected with the removal of obstructions in the rivers, and was one of the most skillful and eminent engineers in the country. Captain John Rodgers of the Navy, was detailed from the East to come to St. Louis and superintend the work of creating a navy on the rivers.

In June he came to Cincinnati, and there purchased and converted three light-draft steamers into gunboats,—viz.: the Conestoga, the Tyler, and the Lexington. These were not "iron-clads," but simply protected by oak bulwarks against musketry. The change was accomplished in a few weeks, and the boats were armed with guns of the heaviest caliber, and were primarily intended for use on the Ohio when in the early days of the revolt the Confederates seemed determined to make the Ohio river the dividing line.

In July, Captain Eads conceived the idea of iron-clads, and so favorably were his plans received in Washington that on August 7th a contract was awarded him by the War Department to construct seven new iron-clad gunboats, after plans which he had designed and Captain Rodgers approved.

The contract provided that these boats were to be completed and delivered at Cairo by October 5th, under a forfeiture of \$200 a day on each boat for all delay after that date.

Nothing like this was probably ever before attempted in the history of naval warfare. To manufacture and bring together from distant points, iron

plating, ponderous and powerful machinery, all the timbers, and the multitude of other naval materials, to build and equip seven powerful vessels and iron-clad them, and have them under steam in less than *sixty days*, was a bold and courageous undertaking. Such vessels were "something new under the sun," about which no one had ever had any knowledge or experience.

They were formidable vessels, 175 feet long and 51 feet beam. They could run ten to fifteen miles an hour, and each boat carried thirteen nine and ten-inch rifled guns.

The "Benton," a still more powerful vessel, nearly 200 feet long and 75 feet beam, followed the others somewhat later, and this became Commodore Foote's flag-ship. It carried eighteen heavy guns. The cuts show the designs and the contrast between the earlier and the later gun-boats. These, and others that were built later, became a part of the history of every battle fought near the rivers in the West from Belmont to Vicksburg. They were omnipresent on every river where they could float, and the daring sailors, with their great guns throwing shells for miles, were a terror to the enemy throughout the war.

CHAPTER XXV.

DELAYS, ALARMS AND SLOW MOVEMENTS OF HALLECK AND BUELL.

GRANT RESTRAINED AND INSULTED. PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S WRATH.

On November 13th, four days after Halleck was assigned to his command, General Sherman was relieved of command in Kentucky, and General D. C. Buell succeeded him in command of the Department of the Ohio, including Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky east of the Cumberland River, with headquarters at Louisville. Sherman was ordered to St. Louis, and the lying stories set afloat as to his being insane (because he told Secretary Cameron that it would require two hundred thousand men to

crush the rebellion in the West) kept him idle for months. Time proved that the others were the crazy ones, for more than twice two hundred thousand men were ultimately required in the West, and three times that number in the East.

Price and McCulloch had been driven out of Missouri by Frémont and Hunter, and the army of the southwest had retired to Rolla, Sedalia and Jefferson City for the winter when Halleck arrived late in November. He had fully fifty thousand men in Missouri, one-third of whom could have been spared to reinforce Grant at Cairo, and with that additional force and permission he could have captured Columbus any time in November or December.

But Halleck was not ready, he had no men, no arms, no material (!) so to speak, and he urged delay. Grant must wait; and the golden days and weeks and months went by, until President Lincoln's patience was exhausted. In extenuation it must be remembered that Halleck met conditions in Missouri well calculated to irritate him and delay forward movements. Up to the end of December Grant's returns in the War Department show that he had but 14,374 men at Cairo, Bird's Point, Mound City, Fort Holt, Shawneetown and Cape Girardeau. Halleck was making alarming appeals for more men and more material, frightened lest Price should drive him out of the State, while in truth a column of 15,000 to 20,000 men could at any time have defeated him.

General Buell was organizing a great army in Kentucky, to move on to Nashville and East Tennessee. He, too, was not ready. Although at the end of 1861 he had more than 50,000 men, he could not advance. He was short of transportation, of artillery, of arms, and of men! The enemy was in front with 60,000 to 80,000 men, he said. In truth the enemy had less than 30,000 in his front and these were no better prepared for battle than were his own army.

On November 25th General McClellan wrote Buell, saying:

I am still firmly impressed with the great necessity of making the movement on Eastern Tennessee with the least possible delay.

No reply coming from General Buell, McClellan sent him the following dispatch:

NOVEMBER 27, 1861.

Brig.-Gen. D. C. Buell:

What is the reason for concentration of troops at Louisville? I urge movement at once on Eastern Tennessee.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

On the same day General Buell answered McClellan, but he made no allusion to a forward movement.

November 29th McClellan wrote him:

It seems to me from the little local knowledge I possess, that you might make two movements, one on Eastern Tennessee, say with fifteen thousand men, and a strong attack on Nashville with, say, fifty thousand men.

December 3, 1861, McClellan again wrote:

I must still urge the occupation of Eastern Tennessee as an immediate duty.

I have ordered one regular, and one excellent volunteer battery to join you. To-day I ordered ten thousand excellent arms to be sent to you. I have directed all your requisitions to be filled at once.

General Buell wrote eloquently to McClellan, suggesting plausible plans, but was not ready to execute them. On December 10th he closed a long letter by saying:

It may seem rather wordy for me to say that early action is of the greatest importance when I am myself unable to appoint a day.

On December 23d General Buell reported to the Adjutant-General at Washington, saying:

Our returns show an aggregate of some seventy thousand—about fifty-seven thousand ready for duty.

December 26th, General Grant wrote General Buell:

I enclose you herewith an order defining the limits of my command. The object is that you may know its extent, and to express to you a desire to cooperate with you as far as practicable.

His district at this date, in addition to Southeast Missouri, included all of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.

Still Buell, whose district joined

Grant on the east, did not move, nor did he answer Grant's communication.

On December 29th, he wrote McClellan, saying:

It startles me to think how much time has elapsed since my arrival, and to find myself still in Louisville.

Although Grant was anxious to move, and restless under restraints imposed by General Halleck, he kept his temper and his small force well under control. While thus waiting he sent, late in December, his Adjutant to St. Louis to personally inform General Halleck of the importance of early movements. A few seconds' interview sent the Adjutant out of Halleck's presence, frightened at his own temerity in making so daring a venture, and bearing back to his anxious and waiting chief the admonition that it was their "business at Cairo to wait for orders, and not to make suggestions."

The end of the year approached, and the commanders of the armies seemed paralyzed, from the Potomac to Missouri. McClellan was sick. The country was impatient that five hundred thousand men should remain idle in camp and strike no blow.

President Lincoln was overwhelmed with the agitation. The Union men of East Tennessee were madly clamorous for the advance of the National forces.

At last the long-suffering and patient Lincoln interfered. He began thus:

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 31, 1861.

General Halleck, St. Louis, Mo.:

General McClellan sick. Are General Buell and yourself in concert? When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reinforced from Columbus? A simultaneous movement by you on Columbus might prevent it.

A. LINCOLN,

Similar dispatch to Buell same date.

Again, to Halleck:

WASHINGTON CITY, January 1, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, St. Louis, Mo.:

General McClellan should not yet be disturbed with business. I think General Buell and yourself should be in communication and concert at once. I write you to-night and also telegraph and write him.

A. LINCOLN.

Buell answered:

LOUISVILLE, January 1, 1862.

President Lincoln:

I have already telegraphed General Halleck with a view of arranging a concert of action

between us, and am momentarily expecting his answer.

D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General.

Halleck to the President:

ST. LOUIS, Mo., January 1, 1862.
To His Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, President.
I have never received a word from General Buell. I am not ready to cooperate with him. Hope to do so in a few weeks. Have written fully on this subject to Major-General McClellan. Too much haste will ruin everything.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

During the last days of December the waiting became oppressive to General Grant and Flag Officer Foote, who were always in cordial accord as to plans and purposes. They had many private consultations as to future operations. They were both impressed with the conviction that if Halleck would send a few of the regiments that were idle in Missouri, a bold stroke would sweep the enemy from Columbus, and from the banks of the Cumberland and the Tennessee. An officer, a confidant of Grant and Foote, on his way to Washington, but spending a few days on business at Cairo, was admitted to two of these conferences held at late hours, and he was so impressed with Grant's suggestions as to what might be done by prompt movements, that he lost no time in hurrying to General McClellan and explaining the views and wishes of Grant and Foote. Without a moment's delay General McClellan sent the following message to Halleck:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, }
WASHINGTON, January 3, 1862. }
Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck:
GENERAL—It is of the greatest importance that the rebel troops in Western Kentucky be prevented from moving to the support of the force in front of General Buell. To accomplish this an expedition should be sent up the Cumberland River to act in concert with General Buell's command.
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

Then the President took a hand at urging Buell again:

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1862.
General Buell:
Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? Please tell me the progress and condition of the movement in that direction.
Answer.
A. LINCOLN.

To this General Buell answered on the 5th: "Arms can only go forward for East Tennessee under the protec-

tion of our army(?) . . . Our transportation and other preparations are still incomplete. . . . As earnestly as I wish to accomplish it, my judgment has been from the first decidedly against it."

This telegram was at once taken by the President to General McClellan, who was still ill, and read to him with such earnest and anxious comments as showed how deeply he was pained at the delay. General McClellan sent Buell the following:

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1862.
Brig.-Gen. D. C. Buell, Louisville, Ky.:
MY DEAR GENERAL— . . . Two hundred wagons from Philadelphia have been ordered to you. . . .
I was extremely sorry to learn from your telegram to the President that you had from the beginning attached little or no importance to a movement into East Tennessee. I had not so understood your views, and it develops a radical difference between your views and my own, which I deeply regret.
Halleck, from his own account, will not soon be in a condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland. Why not make the movement independently of, and without waiting for him?
I regret that I have not the strength to write a fuller or more intelligent letter.
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

And the President also wrote:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
WASHINGTON, January 6, 1862. }
Brigadier-General Buell:
DEAR SIR—Your dispatch of yesterday has been received, and it disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to General McClellan, who says he will write you to-day.
A. LINCOLN.

While General McClellan was writing from Washington to General Buell, General Halleck was writing from St. Louis to the President as follows:

HEADQUARTERS' DEPT OF THE MISSOURI, }
ST. LOUIS, January 6, 1862. }
To His Excellency the President:
I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green, while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster at Bull Run. . . .

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

On the back of which the President made the following despairing endorsement:

The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done.
A. LINCOLN.
January 10, 1862.

On the same 6th of January, Halleck wrote Buell, telling him that Grant did not have more than 15,000 men in his entire district; that it required 5,000 to garrison the forts about Cairo, leaving not over 10,000 men for offensive operations, "while the enemy has over 22,000 men at Columbus." . . . "Under these circumstances it would be madness

for me to attempt any serious operations." . . . "It seems to me that if you deem such co-operation necessary to your success your movement on Bowling Green should be delayed."

Is it wonder that the patient Lincoln should endorse in a regretful and sorrowful vein,—“as everywhere else, nothing can be done?”

(To be continued.)

PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL GRANT.

BY MAJOR HOYT SHERMAN.*

MY TIME and opportunity for gaining knowledge of the private life of General Grant were limited to a few months in the early period of the War—before he demonstrated his wonderful power in handling great bodies of men, and securing victories over adversaries that have become famous in the great battles of history—even before he had attained a local reputation as a military commander. Years before, he had abandoned military life to take up civil pursuits, and, with a persistence characteristic of the man, had tried one after another occupation, his principal ambition then being only the support of his family, and failed in all. Such experience with most men would have resulted in a soured disposition and a feeling of disappointment tending to discourage all future effort. Not so with General Grant. On the first indication of the rebellion in the Southern States, with the education and experience of the past to commend him, he offered his services to the War Department, only to be ignored. He then went to Springfield and tendered his services to the Governor of Illinois. Fortunately, just at that time his knowledge of military organization and instruction was greatly needed. He first aided in details of formation of companies and regiments, and was soon given command of a regiment, the Twenty-first Illinois. Immediately following that, with a large list of leading military and public men, he was

appointed a Brigadier-General, and given command of the Military District of Cairo, composed of Southern Illinois, Southeastern Missouri and Western Kentucky, the charge of which he assumed at once.

In the fall of 1861, the town of Cairo, Illinois, was the center of a great military camp of rendezvous and instruction. In the town proper were the camps of three regiments of infantry and several companies of artillery, and a battalion of cavalry. Across the Missouri River, at Bird's Point, were four regiments of infantry. Across the Ohio River, at Camp Holt, was one regiment of infantry, and at Paducah, a short distance up the Ohio River, were three regiments of infantry and a small force of cavalry. All of this force of men were under command of General Grant, with headquarters at Cairo. All were comparatively new to the military service, and all were receiving that efficient instruction under his immediate direction, that enabled him in the following months to perform the wonderful marches, endure the great fatigues and gain the splendid victories that come only to well trained and disciplined troops under competent command. It was a great military school, under personal control and inspection of one man, who alone knew fully the work they would be compelled to perform, and the great physical fatigue they would have to endure.

* Youngest brother of Gen. W. T. Sherman.

I reached Cairo on the first of November, 1861, assigned, with another paymaster, to pay troops under General Grant's command, and at his direction. I reported on arrival to him, and found his headquarters in an old disused banking house, situated on the levee, occupying the first floor. His staff consisted only of Captain Rawlins, Adjutant-General, two aids-de-camp, and a sergeant. The two upper floors were used by his family, who were with him at Cairo.

Without waiting for a quartermaster, whose duty it was to find an office for me, Grant at once directed that his headquarters be removed to the front room on the second floor, and gave me and my colleague the banking office with its vault and counters, for use in the safe keeping and disbursement of the large sums of public money in our hands. That action, of little importance in itself, was characteristic of the man and his old-time military education, showing a desire that all branches of the government work within his immediate command should have every convenience needed for discharge of duty, as well as enforcing economy in saving rent.

My business took me up into headquarters frequently, and I always found it a place of business, and free from all "the pomp and circumstance" of war. Rawlins and his orderly, acting as clerk, were busy examining and tabulating reports, making out requisitions and performing other duties, while General Grant, sitting at one of the windows overlooking the flotilla of gun-boats in the river, and the Kentucky shore beyond, with cigar in mouth, was always absorbed in meditation, probably blocking out in his own mind, the grand movements of the campaign, which afterward culminated in great victories. When interrupted to decide questions or give instructions, he never seemed annoyed, but often joined in conversation about little details of military affairs around him, and thus showed how well informed he was as to events, great and small, happening in camp and barracks, on which he might be called at any time to act.

It was about this time that I noticed one great distinguishing trait of character in his simplicity of dress and life. While some others around, at camp and barracks, indulged in all the finery that military regulations allowed, General Grant was always dressed simply and plainly—a common blue army blouse, no belt or sword, no chapeau or plumed hat, nothing to indicate rank and authority but the simple regulation shoulder-straps, and surrounded by no retinue of aids and sergeants to add to his military importance, and make it difficult for persons having business with him to reach his presence.

From my office, situated as it was immediately below his home as well as office quarters, I had occasional glimpses of his domestic life, and could not help being impressed with the affectionate care manifested by him toward his family, and the fondness and solicitude displayed by them in return. As in everything else he was not demonstrative, but there was a homelike simplicity in his domestic affairs that appealed strongly to one's feelings. I well remember the lonesome Sundays spent in the quiet of my office, hearing the old-fashioned Sunday-school airs, sung by his children, coming down from his quarters above, stirring up thoughts and memories of home far away.

Early on the morning of November 7, 1861, taking five regiments, he embarked on transports, preceded by the gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, dropped down the river a few miles above and opposite to Columbus, Kentucky, a well fortified point in command of Bishop Polk, and disembarked his troops at Belmont, a small hamlet in Missouri, a short distance from which was an encampment of irregular Confederate hard riders, whose principal business was to loot from farm houses and shoot down pickets on the outer line of camp at Bird's Point. Grant's forces dropped down on that camp like a thunder-bolt, wiping it out of existence in a few moments. Most of the troopers took to the woods, so familiar to them, while a few were taken pris-

oners. The Federal troops then stopped to rest awhile.

Meantime Polk, with his heavy guns, had opened on the two gun-boats, and sent an occasional shot to the place where our soldiers were supposed to be, never harming anyone, the real purpose of his artillery work being to cover the crossing of the river (in a small ferry) by Confederate infantry, and to intercept the return of our troops to the transports. When our forces reached their lines there was a sharp skirmish, and they were brushed aside with a loss of about 100 killed to each of the opposing forces.

While this battle was of little importance in itself, it demonstrated the fact that such fortifications as that at Columbus could be best taken by movements on the rear. Only three months afterward, when Forts Henry and Donelson fell, Columbus was secured to the Union without the loss of a life or firing of a gun. It demonstrated to new and raw troops, for the first time under fire, that they had for a commander a man cool and collected, ready for any emergency, who, with his inevitable cigar, was to be found where danger was thickest, giving orders in conversational tone, and without the semblance of excitement at any time. It also demonstrated to the force under him that he looked closely after their welfare and the especial comfort of the wounded. One of the first official orders after the return to Cairo was that every attention be given by the medical officers to the wounded, and that the paymasters should see that their pay was ready, even if the regiments to which they belonged were not then paid.

During that day's battle the report of every heavy gun was heard as well at Cairo as at Columbus, and great anxiety was felt by all. The family of the General all day within sound of the guns, knew that he would be in the front, and the thickest of the fight, subject to all the dangers of shot and shell; yet their confidence in him must have been perfect and complete, for during all that terrible time there was no indication by any member of that family

circle of the trying ordeal of anxiety and care through which it passed on that November day.

After Belmont there was a long pause in active operations, waiting, as it afterward developed, for the completion of Commodore Foote's fleet of iron-clads. For three long winter months no aggressive move was made. The morning report and the daily drill, never delayed because of bad weather, demonstrated that when the time came for action, soldiers could be so instructed as to become veterans, even without active service against an enemy. It was General Grant's military education that brought about this steady drill and its consequent benefits.

Briefly stated, my observation of General Grant, made in those three months before he acquired any military fame whatever, satisfied me that his coolness, self-poise and confidence in himself, in the quiet routine of headquarters work, or amidst the rush and danger of battle, were such that he could study out movements and problems under the most trying of positions. He always looked after the welfare of all under his immediate command, from private to general, and in that way secured the esteem and love of all. His affection for his family, which showed itself in so many ways, won for him the respect and admiration of all with whom he came in contact. Without political ambition, or any of the petty efforts for promotion that injured the standing of so many of our leading generals, he exhibited a character that fitted him well to command, during the trying period following his first battle, and he never permitted personal ambition to interfere with his duty to his country.

The one great virtue that marked General Grant's character as superior to others, was that in proportion to his increased responsibility and care came increased ability to act—increased power to meet the emergency, whatever it might be, whether as a soldier or a statesman, and always ending with victory and success for the country he loved so well.



GRANT'S FORTIFICATIONS AT EXTREME POINT, CAIRO, OCTOBER, 1861.

GRANT'S LIFE IN THE WEST AND HIS MISSISSIPPI VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

(A HISTORY.)

BY COL. JOHN W. EMERSON.

(Engravings from drawings and photographs furnished chiefly by Mrs. E. Butler Johnson.)
(Begun in the October, 1896, MIDLAND MONTHLY.)

BOOK III.

CHAPTER XXI.

GENERAL GRANT VISITS HALLECK TO URGE A FORWARD MOVEMENT. THE REMARKABLE INTERVIEW.

DURING these delays Grant made an elaborate report to Halleck of the situation in his front, and closed his letter with this modest request:

If it meets with the approval of the General commanding the Department, I would be pleased to visit Headquarters on business connected with this command.

On several occasions recently, Commodore Foote had urged Grant to visit General Halleck, saying, "the good of the service requires you to take the chances of a rebuff. If Halleck should happen to be in a complacent mood, he may listen to your suggestions, and the

plans we have talked about; if he should be on his ear, his wrath will hardly be so hot as to dry up the Mississippi River before you can yet back to Cairo! Go, General, go, and see if we cannot do something here besides playing war in this slow and peaceful fashion."

After much delay, Grant, full of misgivings as to the amiability of the reception he might receive, visited General Halleck. In his Memoirs, General Grant tells us in his own modest way what happened. He says: "Leave was granted me, but not graciously. I had known General Halleck but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at West Point or during the Mexican War. I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the object of my visit with less

clearness than I might have done, and I had not uttered many sentences before I was cut short, as if my plan was preposterous. I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen."

An officer who was present at the interview, afterwards related to the author precisely what did occur between Halleck and Grant on that occasion, as follows:

"General Halleck, rising, shook hands with Grant rather stiffly; then nervously and quickly seated himself, turned to his desk and began folding papers, and said: 'General Grant, you will state briefly the nature of the business connected with your command, which brought you to headquarters.'

"General Grant: took a map from his pocket and unfolded it before Halleck as well as he could, and said: 'There are 16,000 to 20,000 Confederates at Columbus, and as many more at Forts Henry and Donelson on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. If you will give me a moving column of 25,000 men, with the aid of the fleet, I will capture Columbus and the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland in ten days. The forts at Cairo will not need'—

"General Halleck [interrupting]: 'Is there anything connected with the good of your command you wish to discuss?'

"General Grant [running his finger



MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLERNAND,
Of Illinois, one of the "fighting generals" of the West. He served brilliantly under Grant at Belmont, Donaldson, Shiloh, and in all the battles preceding the final capture of Vicksburg.

over the map]: 'Yes, this move on the Cumberland and Tennessee is of the greatest interest to my command and to the cause, and'—

"General Halleck [interrupting again, rising from his seat, waved the map aside, and said]: 'All this, General



CAIRO, ILL., IN 1861.

Grant, relates to the business of the General commanding the Department; when he wishes to consult you on that subject he will notify you; and picking up a package of papers he walked stiffly into another room. General Grant folded his map, walked out and returned to Cairo."

When Foote learned what had occurred in St. Louis he was very wroth, but Grant was patient, even-tempered, and pushed his work of organization to the utmost, giving no sign of the indignation which he must have felt.

It was suggested to Grant that if the positions of the enemy on the Tennessee and Cumberland were captured Columbus would have to be evacuated; but he answered: "Better attack and capture the entire force where they are. Why allow them to withdraw and follow and fight them in the interior of Mississippi or Alabama under greater disadvantages?"*

It was never a pleasure to Grant to hear of the enemy's retreat. That only meant another fight, another day. When the enemy could be captured outright, that was an end to their belligerency.

The President was growing inexpressibly anxious that the National forces should move forward, and on the 7th of January sent dispatches to Halleck and Buell as follows:

Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you and General Halleck can be ready to move southward in concert. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite.

A. LINCOLN.

General Halleck answered the President on the same evening, saying:

I have asked General Buell to designate a day for a demonstration to assist him. It is all I can do till I get arms. I have no arms. I have sent two unarmed regiments to make the *feint*.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

*Grant's wise judgment in this matter was confirmed by General Beauregard when he was sent to the defense of Columbus a few days after the fall of Fort Donelson. He wrote the Confederate Secretary of War saying: "Columbus, with its present defensive resources, must meet the fate of Fort Donelson, with loss of entire army, as all ways of retreat by rail and river can be cut off, . . . a hazard contrary to the art of war."

Under this pressure Halleck wrote Grant to "make a demonstration on Mayfield, and threaten Camp Beauregard. . . . Make a great fuss about moving all your forces towards Nashville." And in his fear and caution he added: "Be very careful, however, to avoid a battle; we are not ready for that; but cut off detached parties and give your men a little experience in skirmishing."

These cautions rather amused General Grant. He smiled when he read the dispatch, and remarked: "I wonder if General Halleck would object to another 'skirmish' like Belmont? I suppose, though, it would hardly do to 'skirmish' hard enough to take in Columbus."

At once Grant made preparations for a demonstration against the enemy.

CHAPTER XXVII.

GRANT'S RAPID HANDLING AN ARMY IN THE FIELD—HALLECK'S DELAYS AND INTERFERENCES.

Within an hour from the time General Grant received Halleck's instructions to make a "*feint*" on Mayfield and Murray, to be "very careful, however, to avoid a battle," he had issued orders to Smith and McClernand, who were to command the two contingents. His acts were as methodical as they were expeditious. The weather was stormy, and the roads would have seemed impassable to a less energetic officer, but Grant made no hint at delay. To Commodore Foote he wrote:

Full directions have been given for the movement of troops on the expedition just fitting out. It will commence this evening by the advance under General McClernand taking a position at Fort Jefferson. Be kind enough to direct such of the gunboats as you may think it expedient to send, to accompany the transports.

He ordered General McClernand to "proceed to Fort Jefferson and encamp for the night."

To the artillery and cavalry like prompt orders were issued, and all were put in motion before night, to advance into the interior of West Kentucky.

But scarcely had Grant's small force commenced to move, when General Halleck began to interfere and seek further delay. He telegraphed Buell:

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE MISSOURI,
St. LOUIS, January 10, 1862. }
Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, Louisville, Ky.:
Troops at Cairo and Paducah are ready for a demonstration on Mayfield, Murray and Dover. . . . Fix a day when you wish the demonstration, but put it off as long as possible.
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

And he sent this message to Grant:

St. LOUIS, January 10, 1862.
Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, Cairo, Ill.:
Reinforcements are delayed, and arms. Delay your movement until I telegraph. . . .
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

For four days Grant's forces, thus started on their demonstration, were halted amid rain and mud.

Meantime General McClellan, under pressure of President Lincoln, wrote General Halleck this sharp and spirited letter:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, }
WASHINGTON, Jan. 13, 1862. }
Major-General H. W. Halleck:
GENERAL: . . . I do not think you had read my letter of the 3d with much care when you sent the telegraphic reply. . . . If you can spare no troops it is only necessary to say so, and I must look elsewhere for the means of accomplishing the objects in view. . . . I have now to request that you will send to me a statement of the numbers, positions, and conditions of the troops in your department.

I am, very truly yours,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding U. S. Army.

At the same time the irate General-in-Chief wrote General Buell:

Your telegram asking for six more batteries is received. I have taken measures to have them sent you at once, and will order two more to-morrow*. . . . It is absolutely necessary to make the advance on East Tennessee at once. . . . Halleck is not yet in a condition to afford you support. . . . Meigs has sent you 400 wagons for which requisition was made. . . . It is no time to stand on trifles. . . . Ohio can now give you five or six new regiments that are as good as the mass of the troops opposed to you. In haste, yours truly,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding U. S. Army.

While this polite war of words was progressing between President Lincoln and General McClellan on one side, and Generals Halleck and Buell on the other, General Grant gave orders to his forces to advance on the proposed demonstration. His orders to his officers at this early stage of his career, bear all the *evidence* of the mature officer, skilled

*This gave General Buell 148 guns and an army about 75,000 strong.

in the arts of war. A few of them will be studied with interest:

CAIRO, January 14, 1862.
Col. John Cook, Commanding Forces at Fort Holt, Ky.:
Your command will march to-morrow to Blandville, leaving Fort Jefferson at 10 o'clock A. M.
U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

To General McClernand he wrote:

Encamp at or near Blandville to-night. To-morrow march with your entire command from seven to ten miles, to Mayfield, through Lovelaceville. Next morning start two regiments of infantry and all the cavalry, but four companies, to join General Smith at Mayfield. At the same time send out a good portion of the cavalry you retain on a reconnaissance towards Columbus. In the afternoon, say starting at 12 M., you will return again to Blandville. You will there find additional forces and will receive directions for future movements. . . . U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

To Gen. E. A. Paine he wrote:

To-morrow march your command to Blandville, leaving one regiment of infantry and one squadron of cavalry at Ft. Jefferson to guard the road to Elliott's Mill. Have all the approaches from Columbus watched, so as to avoid all chance of surprise. You will receive further instructions at Blandville.
U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

General Grant's insistence upon discipline, and his high sense of justice and regard for the rights of citizens, though many of them were hostile in sentiment, is well illustrated by some extracts from his general orders issued to guide his officers and men in their treatment of citizens in the country through which they were to march. He says:

Disrepute having been brought upon our brave soldiers by the bad conduct of some of their numbers when marching through territory occupied by sympathizers of the enemy, showing a total disregard of the rights of citizens, and being guilty of the wanton destruction of private property, the general commanding desires and *intends* to enforce a change in this respect.

Interpreting confiscation acts by troops themselves has a demoralizing effect, weakens them in exact proportion to the demoralization, and makes open and armed enemies of many who, from the opposite treatment, would become friends, or at most non-combatants.

It is ordered, therefore, that the severest punishment be inflicted upon every soldier who is guilty of taking or destroying private property, and any commissioned officer guilty of like conduct, or of countenancing it, shall be deprived of his sword and expelled from the camp, not to be permitted to return.

We see here depicted the honest, upright character of Grant, as he made his first advance into what was then considered the enemy's territory.

Having thus seen how our young

general, by his field orders, prepared for his advance into hostile territory, under the admonition of his severe chief at St. Louis to "be very careful to avoid a battle," the reader will prefer to read a portion of his own report of his conduct of this first important reconnoissance in force, with detachments numbering in the aggregate more than 10,000 men.

Under date of January 17th, Grant wrote Halleck:

On Tuesday General McClelland moved to near Blandville with over 6,000 men. On Wednesday his position was occupied by General Paine with a force of 2,000. General McClelland moving with his brigade toward Milburn; Fort Jefferson and Elliott's Mill being occupied during this time by two infantry regiments, and some cavalry and artillery. The bridge at Coath's Mill was also guarded by one regiment.

On this day (Wednesday) I visited all the different commands, except the one at Elliott's Mill, and returned for the night to Coath's Mill. Reconnoissances were made by our troops to within one and one-half miles of Columbus, and to below the town along the railroad. All was quiet, and as yet no skirmish has occurred.

Yesterday I made a reconnoissance of about thirty-five miles, taking my staff and one company of cavalry with me. To-day I have reconnoitered the roads south of the creek. Having ridden hard during the day, and finding that I should be late returning, I sent a note to Captain Porter, of the navy, requesting him to drop down to Puntney's Bend to bring myself and escort up to Fort Jefferson. On turning the point a rebel gunboat was discovered, and a cavalry force of probably 100 men on shore. I got in probably twenty minutes after the rebel cavalry had fled. To-morrow I shall visit all points occupied by my forces and next day commence a movement back to my old quarters.*

General Grant was not pleased with this mere "demonstration." When settled back in camp, he said in tones very quiet but very positive: "This sloshing about in the mud, rain, sleet and snow for a week, without striking the enemy, only exposing men to great hardship and suffering in mid-winter, is not war. If I had been permitted to

*All citations in these campaigns are from the War Records, unless other authority is mentioned.



CAPTAIN FOOTE, U. S. N.,

Under whose directions the celebrated ironclad fleet of gunboats was built at St. Louis and Mound City, 1861-2, and who commanded the fleet in the capture of Fort Henry, the attack on Fort Donelson, and at Vicksburg. Captain Foote was a loyal friend of, and cordial co-operator with, General Grant in all his Mississippi River campaigns, and was a fearless fighter.

fight, I could have made a spirited demonstration with one regiment against the rear of Columbus and with the fleet on the river, and while this was in progress thrown all my force against and captured and destroyed Camp Beauregard. This would have been a 'demonstration' with an object and a reward."

The movement, however, gave Grant's little army a foretaste of the hardships of a mid-winter campaign in which they were destined soon to engage, in a climate alternating with sudden changes in winter, between the frigid northland and the warm, sunny south, without the good qualities of either.

Grant had directed General Smith to move east from Mayfield towards the Tennessee River, where gunboats and transports had been sent with supplies. On reaching the river, Smith went up

in the gunboat Lexington to within two and one-half miles of Fort Henry, and after a careful observation reported to General Grant on the 22d of January: "I think two iron-clad gunboats would make short work of Fort Henry. There are 2,000 to 3,000 men there. The hill on the west bank sixty feet high commands the fort."

General Grant immediately forwarded this report to General Halleck, but received no response. What Halleck's plans were, if he had any up to this time, were not disclosed. Grant knew that General Halleck's forces in Missouri had increased enormously and now that he saw his way so clearly to carry out his long cherished plans of cutting through the enemy's lines in Kentucky and Tennessee, he was extremely anxious to move forward, at the same time concealing with utmost composure his righteous wrath at the restraint which was holding him back.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

GRANT'S STRATAGEMS TO GET PERMISSION TO MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY—PROOF THAT HALLECK WAS NOT THE ORIGINATOR OF THE TENNESSEE AND CUMBERLAND RIVER CAMPAIGNS.

Several quiet stratagems had been resorted to by Grant from time to time since the battle of Belmont to influence Halleck to allow him to attack the enemy; but General Halleck was not ready. Grant must wait. Col. Charles Whittlesey, who had heard from the President of the plans which Grant had sent from Ironton in the previous August, came West, and a few days after the battle of Belmont in November had a long interview with General Grant, when the whole subject was discussed with Grant's maps before them. Colonel Whittlesey was fully won over to Grant's views, and promised to do what he could to influence Halleck and Buell to aid in his proposed movements. Colonel Whittlesey kept his promise, and on the 20th day of November, 1861, the day after

Halleck assumed command at St. Louis, wrote him as follows:

CINCINNATI, Ohio, Nov. 20, 1861.

Major General Halleck, St. Louis:

Sir—Will you allow me to suggest the consideration of a great movement by land and water up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers?

First.—Would it not allow of water transportation half way to Nashville?

Second.—Would it not necessitate the evacuation of Columbus by threatening their railway communication?

Third.—Would it not necessitate the retreat of General Buckner from Bowling Green by threatening his railway lines?

Fourth.—Is it not the most passable route into Tennessee?

Yours respectfully, etc.,

CHARLES WHITTLESEY,
Colonel and Chief of Engineer Department.*

He wrote the same in substance to Buell and to McClellan, though the latter had long before learned from President Lincoln of the plans which Grant had proposed. As early as January 3, 1862, McClellan telegraphed General Halleck as follows:

It is of the greatest importance that the rebel troops in Western Kentucky be prevented from moving to the support of the force in front of General Buell. To accomplish this, an expedition should be sent up the Cumberland River to act in concert with General Buell's command. . . . As our success in Kentucky depends in a great measure on our preventing reinforcements from joining Johnston and Buckner, not a moment's time should be lost in preparing these expeditions. . . .

Very respectfully,
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

Under the same date, Buell wrote Halleck:

I do not under estimate the difficulties in Missouri, but I think it not extravagant to say that the great power of the rebellion in the West is arrayed on a front, the flanks of which are Columbus and Bowling Green, and the center about where the railroad between those points crosses the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, including Nashville and the fortified points below. It is, I have no doubt, within bounds to estimate the force of the enemy on that line at 80,000 men.

To these appeals General Halleck wrote the President on January 6th:

I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

To Buell he wrote the same day:

* War records.

... I know nothing of any plan of campaign, never having received any information on the subject.

H. W. HALLECK.
Major-General.

A strangely delusive memory must have been General Halleck's at this time, for he forgot that the plan had been urged on him by Grant, and the records show that it had been specifically and expressly pressed upon his attention by Colonel Whittlesey, by General McClellan and by General Buell!

At least it demonstrates that General Halleck *did not* originate the plan of campaign, and as late as January 6th did not have any plan of campaign.

Grant kept his force under constant drill, and his little army of 15,000 men was reduced to a splendid fighting machine.

As soon as he forwarded General Smith's report of his reconnaissance of Fort Henry to General Halleck, Grant and Foote had further consultations, and they agreed that they would once more risk another rebuff, and would again telegraph and write Halleck, urging an immediate move on Fort Henry.

General Grant was not the least deterred by the "80,000 men" that Generals Buell and Halleck estimated to be on the line from Bowling Green to Columbus, but was ready at an hour's notice to attack its strongholds in the center with his 15,000, when he could obtain permission to advance.

On January 26th Grant telegraphed

to Halleck: "With permission, I will take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large camp there."

Commodore Foote telegraphed:

CAIRO, January 28, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, St Louis, Mo.:

Commanding-General Grant and myself are of opinion that Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, can be carried with four iron-clad gunboats and troops to permanently occupy.

Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready?

A. H. FOOTE,
Flag Officer.

No answer coming from Halleck, Grant could not restrain his impatience. He ventured to write General Halleck more at length, and still more urgently on the following day, January 29th, as follows:

In view of the large force now concentrating in this district, and the present feasibility of the plan, I would respectfully suggest the propriety of subduing Fort Henry, near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, and holding the position. If this is not done soon there is

but little doubt that the defenses on both the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers will be materially strengthened. From Fort Henry it will be easy to operate either on the Cumberland (only twelve miles distant), Memphis or Columbus. It will, besides have a moral effect on our troops to advance thence towards the rebel states. The advantages of this move are as perceptible to the general commanding as to myself, therefore, further statements are unnecessary.

Under all this pressure General Halleck yielded, and on January 30th telegraphed Grant to "take and hold Fort Henry."

At the same time he telegraphed General Buell who commanded all the territory east of the Cumberland: "I have ordered an advance of our troops



COL. JOHN M. THAYER,
Of the First Nebraska Volunteers. With Grant at Iron-
ton in 1861; author of "Grant at Pilot Knob," and other
War Papers; later in the war a General, and years after
governor of Nebraska.



THE NEW IRONCLAD FLEET, BUILT AT ST. LOUIS AND MOUND CITY IN THE FALL OF 1861 AND JANUARY, 1862. COMMANDED BY COMMODORE FOOTE, U. S. N.

on Fort Henry. It will be made *immediately*."

Buell answered instantly: "Please

let me know your plan and force and the time."

A strange answer to so plain a message, surely. Halleck

next day, January 31st, answered Buell:

"Movement already ordered to take and hold Fort Henry and cut railroad between Columbus and Dover. Grant's force 15,000."

To which Buell again telegraphed at once: "Do you consider cooperation essential? It would be several days before I could seriously engage the enemy." Quite clearly intimating that it might be wise to delay Grant until he (Buell) was ready to move! With more than 70,000 men and 150 guns he was still unable to move!

Halleck had courage to answer General Buell next day: "Coöperation not essential!"


How this affected General Buell can only be inferred by an extract from a long letter which he wrote to Gen-



Drawn from "Collection of Confederate Generals," Richmond, Va.

LIEUT.-GEN. LEONIDAS POLK, C. S. A.,

In command of the Confederate army at Columbus and Belmont during Grant's first battle of Belmont. Polk was a graduate of West Point, became a clergyman and a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church; was appointed General by Jefferson Davis at the breaking out of the war, and was killed by a shell from Sherman's batteries at Kennesaw Mountains, Ga., in 1864.



OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER—MAP OF COUNTRY INCLUDED IN GRANT'S CAMPAIGN OF 1861-2.

eral McClellan after its receipt. Buell says:

While you were sick, by direction of the President, I proposed to Halleck some concert of action between us. He answered: "I can do nothing; name a day for a demonstration." Night before last I received a dispatch from him saying: "I have ordered an advance on Forts Henry and Dover. It will be made immediately." I protest against such prompt proceedings, as though I had nothing to do but command "commence firing" when he starts off!

Such were the strange and anomalous conditions existing at Buell's and Halleck's headquarters at Louisville and St. Louis and in their departments, when the restraints which held Grant in check were loosened and he received the glad tidings that he was free to "move upon the enemy's works."

CHAPTER XXIX.

WHEN THE GLAD NEWS, "TAKE AND HOLD FORT HENRY," REACHED GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS!

When General Halleck's message to Grant to "take and hold Fort Henry" was read, Grant's headquarters in

Cairo were instantly in commotion. The staff officers stopped work at their desks as suddenly as if a one hundred-pound "bomb" had landed in their midst. They all sprang to their feet and cheered. Rawlins kicked over some chairs and pummelled the wall with his fists. The others threw up their hats and kicked them around the room, ending with an attempt to dance a "Highland fling." Grant smiled; then suggested that it was not necessary to make so loud a noise as to apprise the enemy down at Columbus of the good news.

After congratulations and handshakings all around, a few minutes sufficed for Grant to put his staff at work on preparations for the new move. Every tongue was to remain silent as to intentions. Grant's eyes were seen to flash more brightly and his whole being seemed animated with impulses that put everything about him in motion, though he gave no sign of excitement.

Halleck's message came late on January 30th, but his written instructions did not reach Grant until February 1st. Much work was done by Grant and his staff before they slept. The next day, January 31st, was a day of great activity. Grant's little army was scattered at Cape Girardeau, Bird's Point, Cairo, Mound City, Fort Jefferson, Paducah and Smithland. It had to be concentrated and organized for active work in the field, instead of the post and garrison duty it had been performing. Grant had to determine what force he would take, and what force he would leave to protect each position he now occupied. Ammunition, quartermaster and commissary stores had to be provided, and all the tools and implements needed by an army in its advance over streams, through forests and water, to besiege and assault an enemy. Much, very much, had to be done, and done in a way to conceal the fact that any movement was intended.

Grant sent Gen. C. F. Smith, at Paducah, an elaborate dispatch, saying:

On Monday next I expect to start from Smithland, Paducah and this place (Cairo) some 15,000 men for Fort Henry to take and occupy that position. Full instructions will be received from General Halleck to-morrow morning. If possible, the troops and community should be kept from knowing anything of the design.

Grant wrote Halleck in the afternoon, saying:

I am quietly making preparations for the move without, as yet, having created a suspicion even that a movement is to be made. I expect to start Sunday evening, taking 15,000 men. I will move by steamer as far as practicable, taking but little cavalry and but little transportation, expecting that to be forwarded afterwards. I shall go in person, taking with me either General McClelland or General Smith.

There was no complaint, and no suggestion by Grant anywhere, that he ought to have a larger force, though he knew he was moving on the very center of the enemy's lines—lines that were held, as Buell and Halleck had insisted, by 60,000 men.

On the 2d of February, the next day after he received Halleck's written instructions, Grant was ready to start. He telegraphed Halleck:

CAIRO, February 2, 1862.

Major-General Halleck:

I leave at Cairo and defenses eight regiments, six companies of cavalry, two companies of artillery and the sick of the entire command. More troops should be here soon if a change of commanders is expected at Columbus.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.

The suggestion of more troops for Cairo had reference to the expected arrival of General Beauregard at Columbus, who, Grant thought, might be more dangerously enterprising than General Polk had been.

And now that our hero was ready to cut loose, to some extent, from the "tether" which had so long restrained him, and commence a campaign that was destined to surprise the world, the reader will be glad to read Grant's own words to his men; the sentiments of the thoughtful, high-toned and honorable soldier:

GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 7.


CAIRO, Feb. 2, 1862.

- On the expedition now about starting, the following orders will be observed:
1. No firing, except when ordered by proper authority, will be allowed.
 2. Plundering and disturbing private property is positively prohibited.
 3. Company officers will see that all their men are kept within camp, except when on duty.
 4. Rolls will be called evening and morning and every man accounted for, and absentees reported to regimental commanders.
 5. Company commanders will have special care that rations and ammunition are not wasted or destroyed by carelessness.
 6. Troops will take with them three days' rations and forage, all camp and garrison equipage, and not to exceed four teams to each regiment.
 7. Regimental commanders will be held strictly accountable for the acts of their regiments, and will in turn hold company commanders accountable for the conduct of their companies.

JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

By order of Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant, Commanding.

The sentiments of the brave and sagacious warrior were scarcely dry when all were afloat, the signal was given, and, leaving postal routes and telegraph stations behind them, and with a confidence and courage that knew no fear, Grant's little army plunged out of sight (and out of the hearing of twenty millions of people who would be waiting with anxious hopes and many forebodings), to strike a blow at the enemy's



GRANT CAPTURES PADUCAH SIX HOURS IN ADVANCE OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE CONFEDERATE FORCES—THE GUNBOAT LEXINGTON IN THE FOREGROUND—OCCUPIED SEPTEMBER 6, 1861.

center, and begin the execution of the plan which he had formulated in writing six months before at Ironton, and within a week from the date of his commission as Brigadier-General. Mark Grant's amazing swiftness; within three days from the receipt of his first orders he was off with his army of fifteen thousand men!

As the fleet of transports went sweeping along, General Grant seemed anxious, and more than usually silent. He walked the deck, and on several occasions carefully observed the river behind them with his field glass. He continued his observations for some time after passing the last telegraph station, and then, when he felt himself safe, beyond recall by telegraph or by dispatch-boat, the anxiety imprinted upon his face, changed into an expression of satisfaction.

Rawlins said to the writer afterwards, that "Grant seemed a new man. He stepped briskly up to me and enthusiastically clapped his hand on my shoulder, a thing he had never done before, and said: 'Now we seem to be safe, beyond recall by either electricity or steam. I am glad. I am thankful.

We will succeed, Rawlins; we must succeed. If we cut the enemy's spinal column up here in Tennessee, Buell will not have much trouble with the head up his way, *when he gets ready to move next summer*, and the tail over at Columbus will not do much signalling.' And we each spontaneously seized the other's hand in a cordial grasp that expressed a silent and determined purpose to strike swiftly, and to *succeed or perish* in a courageous attempt."

CHAPTER XXX.

HALLECK AND BUELL FRIGHTENED. THE FARCICAL SIDE OF WAR.

While Grant and his army were hid from sight and hearing in the forests of the lower Tennessee and Cumberland, let us briefly look around and see what the other actors were doing and saying on this theater of war.

General Halleck, a man of great scientific attainments and brilliant intellect, was nervous, impatient, easily excited, always in haste except in attacking the enemy. Here his "science" and his excessive caution, made him too slow to accomplish brilliant results. Now that he had permitted Grant to

move, he seemed to become alarmed lest he would be crushed. He appealed in every direction for help to reinforce Grant, and his appeals soon brought abundant help.

General Buell, who had been accumulating a vast army during the fall and winter, was also a brilliant officer, a soldier of the old school, wise in plans and the science of "strategy," a good organizer, a good fighter when he "got there," but too slow and deliberate in his movements to achieve success in the face of an enemy active and resourceful. It is related of President Lincoln that when his patience was worn out with delays, at this period of the war, he remarked to McClellan: "I believe it would require as great moral and intellectual force to get a move on Buell as his army will be able to exert physically when, if ever, he gets it in motion."

Grant, out of sight and out of reach, General Halleck grew anxious and nervous, and his telegraph wires began to grow warm. To Buell he wired:

St. Louis, February 5, 1862.
Brigadier-General Buell, Louisville:
 Our advance column is moving up the Tennessee. Can't you make a diversion in our favor by threatening Bowling Green?
 H. W. HALLECK,
 Major-General.

Buell answered:

General Halleck:
 My position does not admit of diversion. My moves must be real ones. It must probably be twelve days before we can be in front of Bowling Green.
 D. C. BUELL,
 Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Then Halleck appealed to McClellan thus:

St. Louis, February 5, 1862.
Major-General McClellan:
 It is reported that 10,000 men have left Bowling Green by railroad to reinforce Fort Henry. Can't you send me some infantry regiments from Ohio?

H. W. HALLECK,
 Major-General.

McClellan, late at night, telegraphed Buell:

Halleck telegraphs, 10,000 men left Bowling Green to reinforce Fort Henry. Can you not assist by a demonstration in direction of Bowling Green?
 GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
 Major-General, Commanding.

Buell answered McClellan at midnight:

Bowling Green is secure from any immediate apprehension of attack. No demonstration, therefore, is practicable.
 D. C. BUELL,
 Brigadier-General.

To General Halleck, General Buell telegraphed:

LOUISVILLE, February 5, 1862.
Major-General Halleck, St. Louis:
 I will reinforce your column by a brigade if you find that you absolutely require it; otherwise I have use for it. Do I understand you are moving up the Tennessee only? You must not fail.
 D. C. BUELL,
 Brigadier-General.

Is it surprising that Mr. Lincoln should speak satirically of General Buell's *inertia*? The coolness of his foregoing message must have tried the temper of the excitable Halleck. In the face of the intelligence that 10,000 Confederates had been withdrawn from Bowling Green, and were being pushed forward to overwhelm Grant, he could only offer to spare a brigade, although he had now an army of 70,000 to 80,000 men! He could not make a demonstration towards Bowling Green to hold the enemy there, although his forces were within less than a day's cavalry march of that place, and 10,000 men had been withdrawn from its defense! Nor is it strange that Grant should have said to Rawlins on the steamboat, referring to Buell's tardiness,—"*When Buell gets ready to move next summer.*"

Three telegrams from McClellan, on February 6th, urged Buell to hasten to aid Halleck, and at 6:30 P. M., General Buell telegraphed Halleck:

Besides the brigade, I can send you eight regiments from Indiana and Ohio. . . . All these regiments are raw.

At 6:30 P. M., February 6th, General Halleck telegraphed General McClellan:

Fort Henry is largely reinforced both from Bowling Green and Columbus. . . . Unless I get more forces I may fail to take it, but the attack must help General Buell to move forward. . . . I was not ready for the move.
 H. W. HALLECK.

At 10 P. M. on February 6th, General Halleck again wired McClellan:

If you will give me, in addition to what I have in this department, 10,000 men, I will take and hold Fort Henry, cut the enemy's line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000,

and I will threaten Nashville and cut off railroad communication, so as to force the enemy to abandon Bowling Green without a battle.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

At 12 o'clock on the night of the 6th, General Buell telegraphed General McClellan:

This whole move, right in its strategical bearing, but commenced by General Halleck without appreciation, preparation or concert, has now become of vast magnitude. I was myself thinking of a change of line to support it when I received your dispatch. It will have to be made in the face of 50,000 to 60,000 men, and is hazardous. I will answer definitely in the morning.

D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General.

We have here a most graphic picture of this interesting war drama. Grant had disappeared into the enemy's country, and it will be noted how studiously his name was ignored in all the dispatches of Halleck, Buell and McClellan for several days, while Grant was thus out of sight. In reading them one would not suspect that Grant was in the campaign, or had an existence. "Our advance is moving up the Tennessee." "Unless I get more forces I may fail to take Fort Henry." "If you will give me 10,000 additional men I will take Fort Henry, etc.," says General Halleck during the very time Grant and Foote were thundering at the Confederate stronghold!

Buell to McClellan: "I am communicating with Halleck." "I will send him (Halleck) a brigade." And to Halleck: "I will reinforce your column." "You must not fall, etc."

One would infer that Halleck was at the front in person instead of Grant. Halleck had little less, and probably more, than 75,000 men in his department, — Buell, with as many near and in the adjacent district — and yet Grant, satisfied, silent and without a murmur, was sent off with a meager force of 15,000 men into the "lion's den," as it were, and his name dropped from official literature for the time!

Thus the war progressed in a carnival of words between Generals Halleck and Buell, while unknown to them, as yet, the real war was progressing under

Grant and Foote with cannon and missile.

Curious it is to note, as one now has to smile at the fact, that at the very time Halleck sent his doleful dispatch to McClellan (6:30 P. M., February 6th), saying, "I may fail to take Fort Henry;" and at the very time when Buell sent his equally doleful message to McClellan (12 P. M., February 6th), saying, "This whole move . . . commenced by General Halleck, without appreciation, preparation or concert . . . in the face of 50,000, if not 60,000, men . . . is dangerous, etc.," Grant and Foote had, *eight hours before*, after a terrific bombardment, captured Fort Henry, and the National flag was floating over its battlements!

It was nearly twenty-four hours after the capture before Halleck, or Buell, or the world knew of this first fatal break in the well defended lines of the Confederacy.

Grant was not terrified, or held back a moment by any dread or fear of the fifty or sixty thousand men of the enemy that Buell reported on that line, but without a moment's delay, attacked it.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE BOMBARDMENT AND CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

The credit for the bombardment of the fort was due Commodore Foote. His fleet of gunboats pushed up to within five hundred yards of the fort, and poured into the works for nearly two hours a storm of shot and shell, tearing down its embankments, dismounting its guns, killing and wounding many of its defenders, until the white flag was hoisted, and the fierce battle ended.

The enemy had fought bravely and desperately.

General Grant's force had landed below the fort and as near it as possible, and began the march to the rear of the fort at 11 o'clock, intending to invest and attack it on the land side; but the river had risen, and the bottom

lands were flooded; sloughs and depressions were not fordable and must be bridged and new roads cut ten miles on a circuitous route through the forest, so that, notwithstanding almost superhuman efforts, Grant's force did not reach the high lands in position to invest the fort until after it had surrendered to Commodore Foote.

General Tilghman, who was in command of the fort, anticipating his inability to hold it, on learning that Grant's army was landing, sent away all the infantry and cavalry (who retreated towards Fort Donelson), retaining only a sufficient force to serve the guns.

Grant immediately sent forward his cavalry in pursuit of the retreating Confederates, and captured all their artillery, some wagons and prisoners. He at once entered and took possession of the fort.

Grant's modest way of telling what he did is illustrated by his report of this first important capture of the war.

When he entered the fort on the afternoon of that memorable 6th of February, he wrote to General Halleck's chief of staff, who was then at St. Louis, saying:

Enclosed I send you my orders for the attack upon Fort Henry.

Owing to dispatches received from Major-General Halleck, to the effect that the enemy were rapidly re-enforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not all up at eleven o'clock last night, when my orders were written; therefore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than eleven o'clock to-day to commence the investment. The gunboats started at the same hour to commence the attack, and engaged the enemy at not over 600 yards.

The gunboats have proved themselves well able to resist a severe cannonading. All the iron-clads received more or less shots—the flag-ship some twenty-eight—without any serious damage to any except the Essex. This vessel received one shot in her boilers that exploded them and disabled her, killing and wounding thirty-two men, Captain Porter among the wounded.

*I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th.**

The orders issued by Grant for the attack on Fort Henry, to which his report refers, speak the methodical sol-

*The italics are mine, and are used to emphasize the calm assurance of this "man of destiny."

dier. He directed General McClelland to "take a position on the roads from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and Dover. It will be the special duty of this command to prevent all reinforcements to Fort Henry, or escape from it. Also, to be held in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm, promptly, on the receipt of orders."

General Smith was ordered to land two brigades on the west side of the river, "and take and occupy the heights commanding Fort Henry. . . . The troops will all move with two days' rations of bread and meat in their haversacks."

CHAPTER XXXII

THE CONFEDERATE ACCOUNT OF THE FALL OF FORT HENRY.

A few brief extracts from the reports of the Confederate officers concerning this important action will be of interest. General Lloyed Tilghman, who commanded at Fort Henry, in his report to the Confederate war office, on the day following the surrender (February 7th), said:

Through the courtesy of Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding Federal forces, I am permitted to communicate with you in relation to the result of the action between the force under my command at Fort Henry and the Federal gunboats on yesterday.

At 11:40 o'clock on yesterday morning the enemy engaged the fort with seven gunboats. . . . I promptly returned the fire with eleven guns bearing on the river. The action was maintained with great bravery by the force under my command until 1:50 P. M., at which time I had but five guns left fit for service. At 1:55 P. M., finding it impossible to maintain the fort, and wishing to spare the lives of the gallant men under my command, I surrendered the fort. . . . The surrender of Fort Henry included [the officers and men] and all the munitions of war in and about the fort. I communicate this result with deep regret, but feel that I performed my whole duty in the defense of my post. I take great pleasure in acknowledging the courtesy and consideration shown by Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant and Commander Foote and the officers under their command.

In a more elaborate report made by General Tilghman after he was exchanged and returned to Richmond in August, 1862, he says:

The retreat of the main body of my army was effected in good order, though involving the loss of twenty prisoners. The rear of the army was overtaken at a distance of three miles from Fort Henry. . . . Several pieces of artillery were also lost.

The entire absence of transportation rendered the removal of the camp equipage of the regiments impossible. This may be regarded as fortunate, as the roads were utterly impassable, not only from the rains but the backwater of the Tennessee.

General Grant did not seem to find the roads "utterly impassable!"

Colonel Haynes, Confederate chief of artillery at Fort Henry, in his report said:

The firing continued for nearly two hours without intermission, the enemy having about sixteen guns to our nine. [Eleven or thirteen.] In the midst of the battle our 32-pounder rifled gun exploded, killing and disabling every man at the piece, as well as others at the neighboring guns. The shells of the enemy soon set fire in and outside of the fort, which we had not the power to extinguish. Their heavy shot tore away the cheeks of several of our embrasures, throwing the sandbags upon the banquettes and exposing our men to the direct shot of the enemy.

Colonel Heimen, who commanded the first brigade of General Tilghman's

division on the retreat from Fort Henry, said in his report:

. . . I found it a physical impossibility to save the light artillery. About three miles from the fort our rear was attacked by the enemy's cavalry. . . Major Lee of the Fifteenth Arkansas, and Captain Leach of the Alabama, battalion were surrounded and made prisoners.

It is thus seen, from this Confederate testimony, that Grant was not idle or slow in the pursuit: and that the enemy's defeat and escape involved the total loss of all his material and paraphernalia of war.

If Foote's attack had been delayed until Grant's forces had worked their way through and around the flood and reached the rear of the fort, doubtless the entire Confederate army would have been captured.

[The taking of Fort Donelson will be described in the June number of THE MIDLAND.]

(To be Continued.)

THE FLOWER OF JOY.


A DENSE, wet mist of pallid blue
 Chills day by day the songless air;
 No rift of azure flecks the sky's dull hue;
 The rain-fringed boughs are bare.

But down the wood-walk's dripping way,
 Where dead leaves break the swift March shower,
 In nun-like garb of softest silvery gray,
 There springs a close-shut flower.

With bended head it dreams, awake,
 Amidst the silence, cold and gloom,
 Of that near hour when its pent bud shall break
 In lustrous, star-like bloom.

O burdened heart, may it not be
 That in this chill, this lightless hour
 Of pain, of loss, there somewhere springs for thee
 Joy's tremulous, gold-eyed flower!

Julia W. Albright.



GRANT'S CAMPAIGN, 1862—THE IRONCLAD FLEET IN THE BATTLE AT FORT DONELSON.

GRANT'S LIFE IN THE WEST AND HIS MISSISSIPPI VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

(A HISTORY.)

BY COL. JOHN W. EMERSON.

(Engravings from drawings and photographs furnished chiefly by Mrs. E. Butler Johnson.)
(Begun in the October, 1896, MIDLAND MONTHLY.)

BOOK III.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE DONELSON CAMPAIGN.

NOW that this first step in the great Fort Donelson campaign was successfully accomplished, what were Grant's environments? In what way were Halleck, Buell and Grant engaged? We see Halleck at St. Louis and Buell at Louisville, carrying on paper campaigns, while Grant, with a mere handful of men, compared to the great armies lying practically idle, was waging active war in Tennessee. Buell was telling McClellan, "I hope General Grant will not require further reinforcements."

We find Halleck, when he relapses from his vigorous appeals for help, engaged, as the war records show, in a scheme to supersede Grant.

On the 8th of February, two days after the capture of Fort Henry, and while Grant was struggling to extricate his force and supplies from the

fast rising waters around Fort Henry, and hastening preparations to advance on Fort Donelson, General Halleck addressed the Secretary of War thus:

If Brig.-Gen. E. A. Hitchcock could be made major-general of volunteers and assigned to this department it would satisfy and reconcile all differences. If it can be done, there should be no delay, as an experienced officer of high rank is wanted immediately on the Tennessee.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

The same day, in a letter addressed to General McClellan, General Halleck urged the creation of "A Western Division," which he, himself, would command, including his present department, Buell's department, and a new department to be called the Department of the Mississippi, to include West Tennessee.

He wrote: "General Hitchcock, if you can get him appointed, could take the new Department of the Mississippi. If General Hitchcock cannot be appointed, General Sherman could take the Department of the Mississippi."

It is probable that Sherman died in ignorance of the fact that Halleck was, at this time, using his name in a scheme to supersede Grant.

Halleck had urged Buell, after the fall of Fort Henry to reinforce him, to bring his army to the Cumberland and the Tennessee and *take command in the field*.

He said to Buell: "I had no idea of commencing the movement before the 15th or 20th. Grant's force is small—only 15,000. Hope you will help us all you can."

McClellan also telegraphed Buell the same evening: "Why not take the line of the Tennessee with your command?"


But Buell had no intention of losing his independence by voluntarily coming under Halleck who was of superior rank; and thus it occurred in the early days of the war that rival commanders in separate and independent districts, from motives that were, perhaps, quite human, often failed to combine or cooperate in the most important movements.

While Halleck was thus scheming to supersede Grant, the latter was devis-

ing schemes to get at the enemy, and the rapidity with which he brought on the great crisis diverted Halleck's attention, and Grant was allowed to work out his plan for the time.

Grant dispatched the three light gunboats up the Tennessee River the same evening after Fort Henry surrendered, and they penetrated to the Alabama line, wrecked the railroad bridge, destroyed many boats, captured a Confederate unfinished gunboat and a quantity of quartermaster and commissary stores.

On the 8th, instead of attacking Fort Donelson as he intended, he wrote from Fort Henry, saying: "At present we are perfectly locked in by high water and bad roads, and prevented from acting offensively as I should like to do. The banks are higher at the water's edge than farther back, leaving a wide margin of low land to bridge over before anything can be done inland. I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day with infantry and cavalry alone, but all my troops may be kept busily engaged in saving what we now have from the rapidly rising waters. Yesterday my cavalry penetrated to within a mile of Fort



PART OF GRANT'S ARMY UNDER GENERAL THAYER, ON ITS WAY FROM FORT HENRY TO FORT DONELSON, FEBRUARY, 1862.

Donelson. All the enemy's pickets were driven in."


At this time, to Grant's great delight, Brigadier-General Cullum, Halleck's chief of staff, was stationed at Cairo to forward troops and supplies and to be a more convenient medium between Halleck and Grant. Cullum was an agreeable man and a most energetic soldier. He admired General Grant's expeditious movements, and always had an encouraging word to send him.

On February 10th General Halleck

why not direct him on Clarksville? I can do no more for Grant at present. I must stop the transports at Cairo to observe Beauregard. We are certainly in peril."

To General Grant he sent a message on the same day, saying: "Strengthen the land side of Fort Henry, and transfer guns to resist a land attack. *Picks and shovels are sent.*" "Picks and shovels" were about the last thing Grant then contemplated using.

By this time Halleck had alarmed



MRS. CRISP'S HOUSE—GENERAL GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS DURING THE FIRST DAYS OF THE FORT DONELSON SIEGE, IN REAR OF SMITH'S DIVISION.
(From an old photo.)

became greatly alarmed, and telegraphed General McClellan:

"It is said that Beauregard is preparing to move from Columbus either on Paducah or Fort Henry. Do send me more troops. It is the crisis of the War in the West. An immense number of boats have been collected at Nashville, and the whole Bowling Green force can come down in a day, attack Grant in the rear, and return before Buell can get half way there. . . . If Buell *must* move by land,

the War Office at Washington, and on the 11th the Assistant Secretary of War telegraphed Halleck: "Is General Grant strong enough and quite ready for the Cumberland and Donelson movement? Position is said to be strong, and we should be strong enough to be very certain of success."

On the 12th Halleck telegraphed to Buell: "It is reported that 40,000 rebels are at Dover and Clarksville. If so, they have all come from Bowling Green."


While Halleck was excited, Grant (having on the 9th carried his material beyond danger of the rising flood), again turned his face towards Fort Donelson, and was impatient to be moving. He was not alarmed by the apprehended movement of Beauregard or the 40,000



CAPT. JOHN V. JOHNSTON,

Commander of the Veteran Naval Association of the United States. Was a playmate and a schoolmate of General Grant at the academy in Mayaville, Ky., when they were boys. Was executive officer on Foote's flagship *St. Louis* in the naval battle at Fort Donelson, and commanded the *St. Louis* after Grant was wounded, and in the second day's fight.

men Halleck saw at Donelson. He meant to march straight on Fort Donelson and "capture and destroy it" with whatever force his government saw fit to give him, making no complaints, and without hesitation or par-



GEN. C. F. SMITH,

Who led the assault and captured Confederate works.

ley. He wrote the following urgent letter to his friend, Commodore Foote:

FORT HENRY, February 10, 1862.

Flag-Officer Foote, Commanding Flotilla:

I have been waiting very patiently for the return of the gunboats under Commander Phelps, to go around on the Cumberland, whilst I marched my land forces across to make a simultaneous attack upon Fort Donelson. I feel that there should be no delay in this matter, and yet I do not feel justified in going without some of your gunboats to cooperate. Can you not send two boats immediately up the Cumberland? To expedite matters, any steamers at Cairo may be taken to tow them.

To his own army, on the same day, Grant issued his General Field Orders



From a photo by Anthony.

GEN. JOHN B. FLOYD, C S A.

No. 7, in which, without waiting longer for cooperation or assistance, he directed that:

The troops from Forts Henry and Heimen will hold themselves in readiness to move on Wednesday, the 12th instant, at as early an hour as practicable. Neither tents nor baggage will be taken, except such as the troops can carry. Brigade and regimental commanders will see that all their men are supplied with forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge boxes and two days' rations in their haversacks. Three days' additional rations may be put in wagons to follow the expedition, but will not impede the progress of the main column.

Two regiments of infantry will remain at Fort Henry, to be designated from the first division, and one brigade at Fort Heimen, Ky., to be designated by General Smith, commanding.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant,
JNO. A. RAWLINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

At this time the telegraph lines only extended to Cairo, hence all messages from Grant's force at Fort Henry had to be sent by boat to that point for transmission. There was a temporary line to Paducah, but it was generally out of order.

On February 11th, Grant wrote to Halleck: "Every effort will be put forth to have Clarksville within a few days." Flag-Officer Foote telegraphed Halleck from Cairo (where he was having his fleet repaired) on the same date, saying:

I am ready with three gunboats to proceed up the Cumberland River, and shall leave here for that purpose in two hours—8:30 P. M.
A. H. FOOTE,
Flag-Officer.

The reader will not grudge the time to peruse Grant's final orders to his little army before beginning his brave and fearless march on Donelson. It was in full, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO, }
FORT HENRY, February 11, 1862. }
GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 11. }

The troops designated in General Field Orders, No. 7, will move to-morrow as rapidly as possible in the following order:

One brigade of the First Division will move by the telegraph road directly upon Fort Donelson, halting for further orders at a distance of two miles from the fort.

The other brigades of the First Division will move by the Dover or ridge road, and halt at the same distance from the fort and throw out troops so as to form a continuous line between the two wings.


The two brigades of the Second Division now at Fort Henry will follow as rapidly as practicable by the Dover road, and will be followed by the troops from Fort Heimen as fast as they can be ferried across the river.

One brigade of the Second Division will be thrown into Dover to cut off all retreat by the river, if found practicable to do so.

The force of the enemy being so variously reported it is impossible to give exact details of attack, but the necessary orders will be given on the field.

By Order of Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant, Commanding,
JNO. A. RAWLINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

With this farewell salutation, and without flourish or other note, Grant



GENERAL BUCKNER'S HEADQUARTERS—THE SCENE OF THE SURRENDER

nce more, with 15,000 men disappeared from sight, and with confidence unshaken, moved through the forest, over hills and through valleys of mud and water to assault a fort of great strength and reputed to be occupied by a force very much greater than his own!

With Halleck's and Buell's information as to the strength of the enemy, was there another General in either army, north or south, who would have ventured such an attack?

As soon as he had again plunged into the forest, Halleck (date, February 12th) telegraphed General Buell, saying: "General Grant has invested Fort Donelson on the land side, but he cannot transport his siege artillery from Fort Henry. Half the country is under water." General Mc-

Clellan, on the evening of the 13th, telegraphed to Halleck: "Watch Fort Donelson. I am not too certain as to the result there."

On the same day Halleck made another appeal to Buell; he said: "The attack will be made on Fort Donelson to-day by the joint land and naval forces, or, if not to-day, certainly to-morrow. Would it not be possible to make a cavalry demonstration on Bowling Green? A mere feint might help. Why not come down and take immediate command of the Cumberland column yourself."

To which General Buell, with the



From an old picture. GEN. S. B. BUCKNER, C. S. A.,
Confederate leader at Fort Donelson.

calm and unmoved deliberation which no emergency seemed capable of changing, answered: "Your dispatches just received. I will move to the line of the Cumberland or Tennessee River, *but it will take ten days at least to effect the transfer of my troops.*"

Two days after the surrender of Fort Henry, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston (who was in chief command in the West) in writing to the Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of War, said:


The capture of Fort Henry gives the enemy the control of the navigation of the Tennessee River, and their gunboats are now ascending to Florence. Operations against

Fort Donelson are about to be commenced, and that work will soon be attacked.

General Floyd's command and the force from Hopkinsville is arriving at Clarksville, and can (if necessary) reach Donelson in four hours by steamers, which are there.

Should Fort Donelson be taken, it will open the route to the enemy to Nashville.

The occurrence of the misfortune of losing that fort will cut off General Hardee,—(who was at Bowling Green)—from the south bank of the Cumberland. To avoid the disastrous consequences of such an event I ordered General Hardee *yesterday* to make, as promptly as could be done, preparations to fall back to Nashville and cross the river.



From a photo by Cook.
GEN. GIDEON J. PILLOW, C. S. A.

Here we have the evidence that, as early as February 7th, *five days* before Grant began the investment of Fort Donelson, the Confederate forces commenced to evacuate Bowling Green, and throw their forces on Donelson and Nashville. And yet it was *not until eight days* thereafter (February 15th), that General Buell's forces ventured to approach Bowling Green! And it was ten days later (February 25th) when his forces reached the river opposite Nashville, a distance of sixty miles!

On February 13th, while Grant was

in front of Donelson, General Sherman was placed in command at Paducah, and charged with expediting reinforcements and material to Grant. It was at this important crisis that these two great commanders first came in coöperating touch in the war. Thenceforth Sherman's friendly, encouraging and sympathetic messages came to Grant at the front on nearly every boat.

With Halleck, on the 13th, planning to supersede Grant by begging Buell to "come down and take immediate command of the Cumberland column yourself," Buell replying, "I will move to the line of the Cumberland, but it will take *ten days at least* to effect the transfer of my troops,"—at the very time Grant was engaged in colling his little army more tightly around Donelson in his second day's desperate conflict there—let us dismiss those two chiefs at St. Louis and Louisville for the time, and look at the task before Grant. It is quite manifest that the work on the Cumberland will be done by swifter hands long before Buell gets ready to move.

DESPERATE FIGHTING BEFORE DONELSON.

In commencing the investment of the strongest fortified position of the enemy in the West with so meager a force (15,000), it should be stated that Grant entertained the hope that the gunboats would be able to reduce the water batteries and run past the fort, and thus he could assail the works from both sides. In this he was disappointed; but he was not disappointed in the fighting qualities of his own army.

When Grant threw his forces around Donelson its elaborate and skillfully constructed defenses were occupied by about 18,000 men and sixty cannon, seventeen of which were the heaviest and most effective then known to the service. The men, General Johnston

declared, were the best part of his army.

Its commanders were Generals Floyd, Pillow, Buckner and Bushrad R. Johnson. Colonels Forest, Heimen, Brown and other celebrities were also present and in active command. General Floyd did not arrive until the end of the second day of the investment; then the place was reinforced by about 3,000 men and Floyd, by virtue of his superior rank, assumed command. About the time of Floyd's arrival, the brigade under Colonel (afterward General) Thayer, which had been sent around by boat, reached Grant, increasing his force to nearly 20,000. Gen. Lew Wallace, who had remained near Fort Henry, was ordered forward and reached Grant

that night with nearly 3,000 men, thus increasing Grant's army to a total of about 23,000 and six field batteries. Heavy siege guns could not be transported across the country, and of these he had none.

We have, then, about 21,000 Confederates behind strong fortifications, and Grant's forces, about 23,000, confronting them.

Grant had under him Generals McClelland, Wallace and Smith; Colonels Logan, Thayer, W. H. L. Wallace, Morrison, Tuttle, Lauman and others who became noted as the war progressed.

Grant, Smith and McPherson (the latter then on Grant's staff as Chief of Engineers) were, I believe, the only professionally educated soldiers in the National force.

McClelland, Lew Wallace and Smith commanded the three divisions (from right to left in the order named) into which Grant's Army was divided.



GEN. JOHN A. LOGAN.

McClelland had about 9,000 and Wallace and Smith about 7,000 each. Of these about 3,000 were detailed to guard the train in the rear, the steamboat landing and the road from the transports to the rear of the army. There were, therefore, about 20,000 on the line of investment on the third day. But it will be borne in mind that the investment began and continued for nearly two days with about 15,000 men.

THE FORT AND THE GROUND.

The whole region around Donelson is the roughest imaginable. The hills rise to a height of seventy-five and one hundred feet; are very precipitous, and covered with an almost impenetrable thicket of oak and vines, great and small, to which the leaves partially cling through the winter.

The hills curve and zigzag about most confusedly, with narrow valleys separating their steeps. And this may

H. H. H. Army in the Field
 Camp near Sherman, Feb 10th 1862
 Gen. S. B. Johnston
 Confed. Army
 Sir,
 Yours of this date proposing
 cessation, and appointment of Commissioners
 to settle terms of Capitulation is just received.
 No terms except unconditional and immediate
 surrender can be accepted.
 I propose to move immediately upon
 your works.
 I am Sir, very respectfully,
 Yours obt. servt.
 U. S. Grant
 Brig. Gen.

be said to characterize the whole battle-
 field. Indeed, so rough was the
 country between Forts Donelson and
 Henry that General Pillow had written
 General Johnston, a few days before,
 that it would be impossible for Grant
 to move across with his army.

On the west bank of the Cumberland,
 and north of Dover, there was a hill,
 then a small stream cutting its way
 through it; then another hill, bolder
 and higher, terminating at Hickman
 Creek (a deep and boggy stream), at its
 precipitous northern base. The river
 curved to the west around this bold
 promontory, then straightened out for
 a mile and a half. It was in this com-
 manding position that the Confederate
 engineers had located their batteries
 of seventeen rifled and other heavy
 guns to defend the river passage. Na-
 ture had made it an admirable position,
 and the engineers had made it prac-
 tically impregnable on the river side.

General Pillow, in a report to Gen-

eral Johnston, on February 10th, said
 of it:

This position can be made stronger than
 Columbus by water. The narrowness of the
 channel necessitates the boats approaching
 in a straight line one and one-half miles, and
 no more than three boats can possibly bring
 their guns to bear on us at once.

On the summit of this hill the central
 fort was constructed; it was elaborate,
 and of great capacity and strength.

Outside of this, and from Hickman
 Creek (a stream too deep to be forded,
 near the river,) a line of entrenchments
 and formidable breastworks ran south-
 ward, curving and zigzagging with the
 crest of the hills and ridges, nearly a
 mile from the river, to another small
 run (also overflowed) outside and south
 of Dover, a distance of about two and
 one-half miles. Our map, constructed
 from the war rec rds, will make it more
 intelligible.

Outside of this irregular line of
 breastworks, on the hill-sides, were

*I propose to quote quite extensively from
 Confederate records in this campaign.

Head Quarters, Dover, Tenn.,
 Feby. 16. 1862.

To Brig. Gen. M. S. Grant, U. S. Army.

Sir,

The ~~evolution~~ distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of command, and the overwhelming force under your command compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

I am, Sir,
 Your very obt. servt.

J. P. Smithson.
 Brig. Gen. C. S.

rife-pits innumerable. The timber on the outer slopes had been felled, the tops downward, and the branches cut and sharpened, forming an abattis that seemed impenetrable by anything larger than a rabbit or a fox. To reach the entrenchments it was necessary for the attacking force to work its way through these obstructions and climb the steep hills fifty to one hundred feet high, in the face of a severe musketry fire from the enemy behind his works, and these works ablaze with artillery.

This, in brief, was the condition of the fortifications which Grant was investing, defended, too, by the flower of the Western Confederate army.

One naturally asks why the enemy did not remain inside and defend so admirable a position?

Nor will the inquiring mind be less amazed at the courage and audacity of

Grant and his brave officers and men in boldly marching up to, and assailing, in such a position, so large an army.

The general rule in attacking fortified positions is, that the assaulting force should be three or four to one.

General Pillow, who was in command at Donelson during the hot preliminary fighting on the 12th and 13th, while Grant was drawing his lines around him with 15,000 men, has been severely criticised for not attacking and driving Grant back on Fort Henry before he was reinforced. But it must be borne in mind that Pillow had come in collision with Grant at Belmont, and knew what Grant could do with an inferior army, if it equaled in mettle the attacking force in that first battle. Pillow had the very best of reasons for exercising caution. Then the very boldness and audacity of Grant's sudden

movements deceived and terrified them. They could not be persuaded that such an attack would be ventured with less than forty to fifty thousand men.

THE FIGHTING AT DONELSON.

On the 12th, a little after noon, the head of Grant's columns from Fort Henry came in collision with the Confederates in front of Donelson, and the afternoon was consumed in a hot contest between the skirmish lines of the two armies as the National forces were deployed into position. By nightfall the Confederates had retired within their fortifications, and General Grant's two divisions were in position along the line, 100 to 300 yards from the enemy's works. There were quite a number killed and wounded on both sides in these preliminary skirmishes.

In this position the army lay upon their arms during the night, without campfires, or other rations than those carried in their haversacks, ready for battle in the morning.

General Grant's headquarters were at Mrs. Crisp's farm-house on the Fort Henry road, in rear of General Smith's division.

On the morning of the 13th there began a furious cannonade on both sides, along the entire line, in which the Confederate practice was excellent, and

so was that of the National batteries. Under this brilliant duel between the artillery on the hill-tops, the infantry opened fire. The sharpshooters and skirmishers crept up under cover of every object that could shelter, and poured a continuous fire upon the works, answered by an equally vigorous fire from within.

About the center of the Confederate outworks there was a V-shaped hill, with a sharp ravine on the right and left. This hill projected out conspicuously in front of McClelland's division. Its top was covered by very strong works, and was occupied by Colonel Heimen's Confederate brigade of five regiments and a battery of artillery. An assaulting column would have to approach this formidable position through open space, and exposed to the terrible fire of its defenders.

But General McClelland, who knew no fear, and was al-

ways eager to move on the enemy, felt the importance of the capture of this pivotal position, and ordered Colonels Morrison, W. H. L. Wallace and Hayne to assault it.

They had an appalling and impossible task before them. It was necessary to descend a hill entangled for two hundred yards with underbrush and vines, climb an opposite ascent partly shorn of timber, make way through an abattis of



COMMODORE FOOTE, U. S. N.

Under whose directions the celebrated ironclad fleet of gunboats was built at St. Louis and Mound City, 1861-2, and who commanded the fleet in the capture of Fort Henry, the attack on Fort Donelson, and at Vicksburg. Captain Foote was a loyal friend of, and a cordial co-operator with, General Grant in all his Mississippi River campaigns, and a fearless fighter. The photo was sent the author by Major Morrison of the War Department.

tree-tops, every foot of the distance under the guns of three batteries,—at direct line of fire doubly crossed.

Three times did these brave regiments climb nearly to the top, shoot down the artillerymen, and seemed about to sweep over the works, but the line of breastworks crackled and turned into flame, and their thinned ranks recoiled and retired. Colonel Morrison was knocked from his horse by a ball, and was carried to the rear, severely wounded. All along the lines for two miles the fire was kept up with great fury during the day, ending substantially where it began in early morning, with the National forces coiled around the beleagured fortress a little more closely than when the conflict began.

General Grant, with McPherson, his chief engineer, had been busy along the lines during the entire day, viewing the enemy's position from every prominent point, pointing out positions for his artillery, making encouraging suggestions to his officers, studying the field and planning further aggressive work.

As evening came on and Grant was sitting on his horse viewing a prominent point on the enemy's lines, two soldiers from the assaulting column came limping along past him. One had his left arm shattered, and the other had one leg disabled, and they were helping each other to a surgeon's tent. They recognized Grant and stopped to cheer him. They clung to their guns. He turned and said to the brave fellows:

"Men, you seem disfigured. Been hunting bear?" The men forgot their pains, laughed and answered, "We've got 'em treed, General, we'll bring 'em down to-morrow."

Then the one with the disabled left arm, who was a sharp-shooter, continued: "You see, General, I couldn't load



CAPTAIN PORTER, U. S. N.,


Under whose directions the first three gunboats, Lexington, Canestoga and Tyler, were fitted out and armed at Cincinnati in 1861, and by him run down to Cairo. He co-operated with Grant at the battle of Belmont and until Captain Foote appeared in 1862 with his new fleet of ironclads. Published by courtesy of the War Department.

my gun, but I could shoot with my right hand, and so Jack and me we got behind a big stump below them cannon over on the point of that ere hill, and he loaded both guns and I kept a shootin'. Every time a reb would start to load the cannon I'd shoot and the feller'd drop, and I kept them cannon cool all the afternoon."

Grant answered: "You didn't hurt any one, did you?"

The man seemed a little confused, and hesitated a moment, but he saw Rawlins smile, and he caught the General's humor and replied: "Why, General, I dunno; reckon I just scared 'em and they fainted!"

The brave fellows forgot their suffering and wounds for the moment, but at



From a photo presented the author by the General.
GEN. LEW WALLACE IN 1862.

Grant's suggestion, one of his aids showed the men the nearest way to the surgeon's tent.

Thus far Grant had received no reinforcements. His force of 15,000 was not adequate to extend his lines so far as the river bank south of Dover, and he did not mean to assault the works until he could completely close his lines and cut off all possibility of the enemy escaping; for it was Grant's primary object to capture the entire force to whose defense the place was entrusted.

It was an anxious night for Grant. Neither gunboats nor transports with Thayer's Brigade and the supplies he had sent around by water had yet made their appearance on the river! He sent a messenger across to Fort Henry to order Gen. Lew Wallace to hasten over with his small force.


The three days' rations which the men carried in their haversacks from Fort Henry on the 11th were exhausted. The men had been day and night on the strain, without shelter, and yet they exhibited no diminution of energy or enthusiasm.

BIVOUAC AMID SLEET,
ICE AND SNOW.

Thus the light of the second day of investment went out and night threw its mantle of repose and partial silence over the two armies.

The weather during Grant's approach to Donelson from Fort Henry was so balmy and spring-like that many of his men, forgetful that it was yet winter, either carelessly left or threw

away their blankets or overcoats as articles which they would no longer need while campaigning in the "Sunny South." But they had only fairly settled in their dark and dreary bivouac this night when there came a sudden change from the temperature of a May day to that of January in all its fierce intensity. And with the bitter cold, came a violent storm of sleet and snow, covering the men in their silent vigils along the lines around Donelson fort. They were wet through; then the sleet and snow froze to their clothing, and on their guns and other accoutrements. Some actually perished, and all were stupefied and benumbed. Icicles hung from the hats and caps and coats of sentinels and others. Ice-pendants hung from every branch and twig of tree and shrub, and the snow clung to these in



MAP SHOWING FORTS AND BATTLEFIELD, DONELSON.

festoons, giving to the scene, as day dawned on the 14th, a weird, gloomy and cheerless aspect.

Ice and snow covered the earth. In the early morning, before the battle was renewed, a courier, who had been stationed three miles below the fort on the river bank, came galloping up to headquarters with the welcome intelligence that a boat was just arriving, and a thick cloud of smoke announced that the rest of the fleet of gunboats and transports were approaching.

The troops and artillery of the third division were soon landed, with provisions and supplies for the whole army. A road was cut around the overflowed creek to their rear, and the hungry and shivering men were soon made glad by

plenty to eat and abundant ammunition. They were also cheered by the arrival of General Wallace and the garrison from Fort Henry. The third division was thus reunited under Wallace, and added 8,000 fresh troops to Grant's army, making him about 23,000 strong, with forty-eight guns. But the enemy was also cheered by General Floyd's arrival at Donelson with his brigade. Others followed from Clarksville, making his entire force about 21,000. On the afternoon of the 14th General Grant wrote Halleck: "Floyd arrived at Donelson to-day with 4,000 men. Generals Floyd, Buckner, Johnson and Pillow are here."

GUNBOATS ATTACK WATER BATTERIES.

Flag Officer Foote arrived with his fleet of iron-clads early on the 14th, and

soon the four most powerful vessels steamed toward the Fort and opened fire, steadily moving nearer and nearer the enemy's works. The four boats covered the stream, and because of the strong current they could only fight bows up stream, hence only the three bow guns on each boat could be used—twelve guns in all—while the fire of all the heavy guns of the Fort was concentrated upon them. Some of the latter were in elevated batteries and sent plunging shot through the boats.

Under a terrific fire, such as few fleets have ever been exposed to, Foote moved forward in a deadly struggle. His boats finally came within 300 yards of the Fort, pouring forth huge missiles from his great guns with all the unremitting rapidity possible for human effort. The shot and shell from the boats rained upon the batteries for more than two hours, and the guns in the upper battery were about silenced. It seemed as if the boats would soon be able to run past the batteries and paralyze and destroy them, when suddenly Foote was obliged to fall back. The cross and plunging fire from the batteries had disabled two of the boats so far as to make them unmanageable in the rapid stream. A shot had cut away the rudder-chains of the Louisville and she drifted helplessly down the stream. The flag-ship, *St. Louis*, had her steering-wheel shot away, the pilot was killed, and Foote, who was standing at his side at the time, was wounded.

The flag was also shot away, and Lieutenant-Commander J. V. Johnston fastened it to his arm, walked the deck and gave the signals. The additional steering apparatus which Foote had provided for his vessel was also destroyed, and this ship also drifted out of action.

The flag-ship received fifty-nine shots; the Louisville, thirty-five; the Carondelet, twenty-six, and the Pittsburg, twenty-one. Thus it was that when victory seemed to be just within his

grasp, the gallant Commodore was obliged to make signal for all to withdraw, having lost fifty-four men in killed and wounded.

The vessels remained in the river out of range of the enemy's guns, and the steering apparatus was repaired during the night for temporary use.

The Confederate gunners must have credit for bravery, skillful service of their batteries; also, great courage and perseverance. Several of their guns were disabled, their embrasures torn, and their works filled with shot and shell, sand bags and general wreckage.

THE ARMY DURING GUNBOAT ACTION.

While the fleet was attacking the water batteries, Grant's army was not idle. The arrival of Wallace's division enabled him to move McClernand's division to the right and extend his lines nearer the river at Dover, and thus cover all the enemy's avenues of escape.

This was done under cover of heavy fire all along the lines.

The day, in fact, was occupied by a magnificent artillery duel at intervals from early morning, with unremitting fire between pickets, sharpshooters and skirmishers. There was no direct assault in force at any point, but the fighting was everywhere sharp and severe. Grant was holding his army for an assault on the lines should the gunboats capture the water batteries.

It was, however, during the afternoon, when the iron-clad fleet was in the climax of action, that the combat rose into splendid and terrible intensity. All the great guns the fleet could bring to bear in its contracted position; all the equally heavy guns of the enemy in the Fort and on the river front—in short, all the sixty guns that armed the enemy's works, and the forty-eight guns of Grant's, were pouring forth streams of shot and shell, grape and cannister, filling the air with exploding missiles, tearing down the forest, and scattering falling branches and

shivered and splintered fragments of trees.

Shifting blue smoke enveloped the scene, and, looked upon from an elevation, a hundred incipient earthquakes and volcanoes would seem to be in awful activity. The deep-toned and ponderous booming of the great guns of the fleet floated upon the water, then resounded and echoed out over the land and through the forests, and inspired the gunners of the field batteries to efforts in harmony with the mighty forces at play in this opening conflict for the mastery of the rivers of Tennessee.

The lines, too, were ablaze with musketry. As night approached the thunders grew less violent and the firing slackened along the lines. The gloom of a dismal evening and darkness settled around and separated the weary combatants; then came the benediction of silence and rest.

Capt. John V. Johnston, who stood on the deck of the *St. Louis* during the action, with flag in hand, described to the author the commotion produced on his ship by the rapid firing of great guns below and the constant crash of heavy shot and shell from the enemy falling upon the metal armor, as something appalling to weak nerves, and never before heard in battle. The working of the ponderous machinery, the explosions of guns and the concussion of heavy missiles against its armor made the huge ship tremble in every timber, and the bedlam of sounds was confusing and deafening.


The result of this day's operations was, the fleet was repulsed and considerably damaged.

Grant held his position everywhere, and drew his lines more closely around the enemy's works. He also inspected the lines during the day, to see there was no road left open for the enemy to escape towards the southwest. He wished to capture the opposing army, not merely the naked position.

In this posture of affairs, Grant gave

no sign of any discouragement or fear as to final victory. When the fighting for the day was over, he wrote to Halleck saying: "Appearances now are that we shall have a protracted siege here. . . . I fear the result of an attempt to carry the place by storm with new troops. I feel great confidence, however, of ultimately reducing the place."

Of this day's naval fight, General Pil-



GEN. J. M. TUTTLE.
Who led the Second Iowa Infantry at Donelson.

low sent a dispatch to General Johnston, after the boats were repulsed, saying: "We have just had the fiercest fight on record, between our guns and six gunboats, which lasted two hours. They came within two hundred yards of our batteries. We drove them back and damaged three of them very badly."

AN AMUSING STRATEGEM ATTEMPTED.

Over at Grant's headquarters that night there occurred a bit of by-play, which has been more or less common

among warriors, to mislead opposing commanders. It was told the writer some time after its occurrence, by a member of Grant's staff.

Two or three hours after dark one of the guards at headquarters sent in a lank, bright-eyed confederate soldier, covered with mud, and he reported to Captain Rawlins that he had deserted from Pillow, and crawled through the lines; that he had overheard a private conversation about dark at Confederate headquarters, to the effect that General Polk, with 20,000 men would attack Grant's rear next day, and that General Johnston would be there with 20,000 more men from Nashville, and would attack McClernand at Dover, and surround and crush Grant. He was tired of the war, he said, and wanted to get out and go to Illinois, and he thought it a good time to leave, and give away this valuable secret so Grant could get away in time if he wanted to!

Rawlins was a keen lawyer and instantly made up his mind that the fellow had been sent by Floyd or Pillow to frighten Grant and induce him to withdraw.

Rawlins let him tell his story to Grant, who listened, then turned to his writing, and said not a word.

Rawlins and Webster, after a little consultation, concluded they would arrange to let the fellow escape, "loaded," as they termed it, for Floyd's benefit.

They felt sure that he would escape during the night and return to Donelson, if he had an opportunity. To give him additional incentive to go, Rawlins took him into an adjoining room and put a guard over him, telling him he was under arrest as a spy. The door between the rooms was left open, so that conversation could be heard by him, and pretty soon Rawlins read a pretended dispatch loud enough for the man to hear,—though in a manner to indicate secrecy,—to the effect that Columbus had been captured by Sherman with all Polk's army, and they all set up a jubilation. About half an hour later, an-

other pretended message was read to the effect that 25,000 of Buell's army would reach Grant immediately, and 15,000 more from St. Louis and Cairo! There was another scene of rejoicing. The fellow was nervous and wide awake to all that was going on.

A little later Webster told the guard he would have to take his prisoner outside and build a camp-fire, as they needed the room. They knew the fellow had overheard their "*news*," and, an hour or two later, Rawlins went to the door and on some feigned pretext called the guard to the house and detained him inside a few minutes, telling him that if his prisoner was gone when he returned he should fire a couple of shots as if in pursuit, but let him escape. Needless to say, the fellow was not "*thereabouts*" when the guard returned to his post. That he reached Floyd and Pillow as soon as he could steal through the lines in the dense darkness, and communicated the "*secrets*" he had overheard, is probable; and if it did not produce consternation, it may have had some influence upon the hasty deliberations of the council of war which the officers of the Confederate army held during the night.

Webster was at this time Grant's chief of staff. Grant knew what his subordinates were doing, but as he believed Floyd and Pillow had tried the deception on him, he did not interfere.

A WEIRD SITUATION.

Thus far the Confederates, with stubborn and persistent bravery, had repelled all assaults on their works; but the energy with which Grant's army tightened its coil around them foreboded disaster unless it could be shaken off.

Darkness brooded over the smoky and gloomy battlefield, and amid intense and biting cold, a furious storm of sleet and snow again came upon them, and the sufferings of the night before were renewed. The officers and men along that long and dreary line of investment

lay exhausted upon the the ice-covered earth, or sat up or leaned against trees, with outer clothing frozen and stiff upon them. Four days and nights had these men been thus exposed, marching and fighting, and yet without a murmur.

Inside the lines some of the enemy were under shelter, but they, too, suffered greatly.

During the evening Grant reported further to Halleck, saying: "We will soon want ammunition for our ten and twenty-pound Parrott guns. I have directed my ordnance officer to keep a constant watch upon the supply of ammunition, and to take steps in time to avoid a deficiency."

A FATEFUL CONFEDERATE COUNCIL.

While Grant had thus settled down to what seemed the inevitable,—wait for the repaired gunboats,—a fateful scene was transpiring at Confederate headquarters. Floyd had called a council of war, and his subordinate generals assembled. They were alarmed at the situation, and all agreed that they could not maintain their position; that the only plan left them was to attack and drive back that portion of Grant's forces which covered the road running southward from Dover toward Nashville, and retreat in that direction.

This bold and brilliant move having been determined upon, 5:30 on the morning of the 15th was fixed upon for the attack upon the National lines. Three days' rations were put in haversacks for the intended march south, and all things were made ready for the onset.

Innocent of all this, Grant and his army rested, or rather suffered, in the storm.

At the very time the Confederate officers were quietly concentrating their forces in front of McClernand, preparatory to the early attack, a messenger was making his way from the wounded Commodore Foote, through the darkness and storm, and over rough, frozen mud, toward Grant's headquarters, with the following message:

FLAG-SHIP ST. LOUIS, February 14, 1862.
General Grant, Commanding United States Forces:

DEAR GENERAL—You will do me the favor to come on board at your earliest convenience, as I am disabled from walking by a contusion, and cannot possibly get to see you about the disposition of these vessels, all of which are more or less disabled.

A. S. FOOTE,
Flag-officer.

The distance to be traveled around the overflowed creek was six or eight miles, and the road was so cut up and the mud so frozen as to be almost impassable.

Before starting, Grant directed Rawlins to notify each of his division commanders of his absence, and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they should receive further orders, but to *hold their positions*.

It was nearly dawn when Grant reached the fleet. Foote explained the condition of the fleet and his own injury, and suggested that Grant should entrench and await repairs to the injured vessels. The whole situation was talked over. Grant examined the boats and saw the necessity of some of them going into "hospital." Only those badly injured need retire for repairs; the others would remain and assist in the siege.

THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK; THE TERRIBLE BATTLE OF THE FIFTEENTH.

When the interview ended, Grant went ashore, mounted his horse and started on his return.

He had not gone far when he met Captain Hillyer, of his staff, in the utmost apprehension lest the army would be destroyed. He informed his chief that the enemy had come out of their works in full force and attacked McClernand's division, and thrown it back!

Grant had to travel nearly ten miles to reach McClernand's division, and he rode with the greatest possible speed. As he passed General Smith, that veteran soldier explained the situation briefly, and Grant went galloping on toward the point of the reported disaster. He saw that all was in good order

in Smith's and Wallace's divisions, but as he advanced he found McClernand's division had been forced back and partly turned, much of it retiring in some confusion. Many of the men were out of ammunition, and in that condition had slowly but stubbornly retired some distance from the ground held in the morning. No braver men ever shouldered muskets, but they could not fight without ammunition.

The program agreed upon by the Confederate officers during the previous night had thus far been well executed. Leaving about 3,000 men in the works in front of Smith, they moved out at dawn of day with the other 18,000, and concentrating fully 14,000 of them under Pillow and Bushrad R. Johnson, attacked McClernand's division, less than 8,000 in line, in a desperate attempt to hurl it back and clear the roads to Nashville. Four thousand under Buckner were massed on the center to hold Lew Wallace in check, and also attack McClernand's left.

McClernand, fearless as a lion, courageous and full of expedients, fought his division with ability. For hours he maintained his position, receding but little, though attacked by nearly double numbers. It was not until several regiments had expended their ammunition that the enemy made any advance, and McClernand's force began to show any signs of confusion. Then the retirement was very slow, every man who had any cartridges remaining in the ranks with brave and stubborn persistency. Oglesby commanded the brigade on the extreme right, near Dover, and he held his position until nearly cut off from the rest of the division. His right was flanked and turned, and Forest's cavalry was on his rear. By 10 o'clock he was fighting with cartridges taken from his dead and wounded soldiers.

Through the smoke Logan rode in a gallop behind his line, and above the roar of crackling musketry and "Rebel yells," his voice was heard appealing to his "boys" to stand firm; and they

stood there until they were without a cartridge, then they retired in search of ammunition.

General Wallace, on being appealed to by McClernand, sent Colonel Craft with two regiments to support McClernand's right, but in passing around the rear to the position designated, his guide misled him, and he was too late. The result of these movements was that the right of McClernand's division was forced back at right angles with the right of Wallace's division, and there the retrograde movement ended. The enemy here came in collision with the right of Wallace, and was met by so fierce a fire that, after a long struggle, they in turn were forced to withdraw.

It is doubtful if there is another instance in all the previous history of war with firearms, where a fresh volunteer army stood up in the open and fought fiercely and continuously for seven hours, and the last two hours many of them without ammunition. Nor must we hesitate to acknowledge the bravery and the daring intrepidity of the "volunteers" on the other side. It suffices to say, on both sides they were *Americans*.

Buckner attacked Wallace's right wing early in the day, but he was so vigorously repulsed that his force retired. It will be noted that up to this time the divisions of Smith and of Wallace (except a small portion of the latter) had not been generally engaged. Nearly the whole Confederate army had been thrown upon the one division of McClernand. He had been forced back, it is true, and his losses had been heavy, but his men were again full of fight so soon as they refilled their cartridge boxes.

While matters stood thus, Pillow, who ranked Buckner, rode over to the latter and berated him for his inactivity. He pointed out to Buckner a road leading up a gorge to the front of Wallace, and told him that was his way and bade him attack in force.

Buckner could only obey. He had

been holding his force in reserve to protect the rear of the army on its intended retreat toward Nashville; but now it was ordered into action and there might be little of it left for that service. He moved up the valley, and when the head of his column was discovered, Thayer's brigade came into position on the double-quick, and his battery came on the run; the guns were unlimbered and wheeled into position at the head of the gorge, and the enemy deployed and opened fire. The woods rang with the fire of musketry and the crash of artillery. The underbrush was mowed away with bullets, and treetops came raining down upon the heads of the combatants. Soon the valley was filled with the pale blue smoke of battle. The contest did not last long, and Buckner's force this time retreated precipitately into his intrenchments.

At this juncture Grant rode up to where McClernand and Wallace were conversing. He held in his hand the urgent message which McClernand had sent some time before. When he learned that the disaster to McClernand's command had left the road south open to the retreat of the enemy, he betrayed no excitement or mental disturbance or confusion of thought. He crushed the paper in his hand and said:

"Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken."

This was said with a decision and emphasis which left nothing to inference or for explanation.

The men of the disorganized regiments stood around in groups, and the cool and unperturbed appearance of Grant was an encouragement and an inspiration to both officers and men. Then came marching up a couple of fresh regiments (the 8th Missouri and the 11th Indiana) from Smith's division, not before engaged, and as they marched into position further south, the men in groups began to brighten, look at each other, and repeat Grant's

words. "The position on the right must be retaken."

In passing General Smith's division on his approach, in a sudden inspiration which marks the military genius, Grant had told that officer to prepare to assault the works as soon as he should receive orders.

Here was the crisis in a terrible drama of war. Most Generals, at this juncture of affairs, would have been glad to allow the enemy to escape, content with the capture of the works. Not so with Grant. The capture of the Confederate army was his ambition and his purpose.

GRANT'S STRATEGY ON THE BATTLE-FIELD.

What further passed in the next few minutes after Grant met Wallace and McClernand, is best described by General Grant himself. He says in his memoirs:

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. No officer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had their guns, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out as long as his provisions held out. I turned to Col. J. D. Webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "Some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back; the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." I determined to make the assault at once on our left. It was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left, before the enemy could redistribute his forces along his works, we would find but little opposition except from intervening abattis.

I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: "Fill your cartridge boxes quick and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." This acted like a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. We rode rapidly to Smith's headquarters, when I explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division. The General was off in an incredibly short time.

While Grant was thus busy with plans destined to work the quick ruin of the enemy, General Pillow, excited and filled with the idea that he had defeated Grant's whole army (whereas he

had only been in collision with McClermand's 8,000), sent off a courier with a dispatch to the nearest telegraph station, assuring General Johnston at Nashville, "On the honor of a soldier, the day is ours."

Unfortunately for Pillow and the rest of them, the day was not yet ended.

Leaving General Smith again, Grant returned to Wallace and McClermand, to see that they were ready to press forward the moment Smith's attack should begin on his left.

The hopeful and confident words Grant had spoken were taken up by the men and passed along the lines from group to group, and as the news sped from regiment to regiment, cheers burst forth from men who until then had been fearful of disaster, and from others who had left the ranks from the terrors and shock of battle in the morning.

PREPARING TO RENEW THE BATTLE.

Ammunition without limit was distributed, and cartridge-boxes were refilled; haversacks, too, were made receptacles, and some of the men crowded extra cartridges into their boot-tops, swearing, in words more forceful than pious, that "they'd be blanked if they'd be out of ammunition again when the Confeds were around so handy to shoot at."

It was asserted by Pillow, in his boastful style, and has been reiterated by other writers since, that Grant's right wing was completely routed, and that all resistance to Pillow's force had ceased, when the latter *voluntarily* withdrew.

Col. J. F. Gilmer, Chief Engineer of Confederate Western Department, who was present during the entire conflict, in his official report made a few days after, says:

The enemy being now pressed in front of his center by this advance, and on his right flank by the pursuing forces of General Pillow's division, retreated rapidly for some distance towards his left wing; but, receiving heavy reinforcements, the pursuit was checked, and finally the retreating foe made a firm stand, opening from a field battery strongly supported by masses of infantry.

Thus it is seen that grape and canister and Minie balls forced Pillow's army back, and that it was *not* a "voluntary" withdrawal.

A lull in the conflict gave the men a little time to eat a bite from their haversacks, the first morsel they had tasted since the evening before.

Meantime those who had fled from the ranks to the rear during the battle of the forenoon, heard the cheers, heard the words that came from their commander: "The enemy are trying desperately to escape;" and the officers who were sent to rally them exclaimed: "Fall in, men, fall in; we're going to take 'em all in now; fall in! rally round the flag, boys!" And these men came by the hundred, the timid and the slightly wounded, inspired with new courage, and determined to redeem themselves from the appearance of cowardice. Companies and regiments reformed, and as they fell into line, that old forest, gleaming with ice and snow above, gleaming with polished bayonets and unsheathed sabers beneath, echoed with cheers that told in tones of terror to the enemy, that the onset of that enthusiastic force meant to them defeat.

THE BATTLE RENEWED WITH TERRIBLE FIERCENESS.

The lines then rested briefly, awaiting the signal-guns of Smith's attack far away to the north. When his batteries opened, the rapidity of their fire told Wallace and McClermand that the moment had arrived for their forces to attack.

Grant was waiting and was impatient at every moment's delay. He wished, if possible, to again speedily close every avenue of escape.

He had sent a message to Foote asking him to move up the fleet and join in the assault, if only for the encouraging and moral effect it would have, and he knew that the great guns would soon be again heard.

McClermand, always active and ready

to fight, and Wallace, enthusiastic and vigilant, were ready.

"Forward!" And from left to right the word passed, and in a moment the long lines of the two divisions, curving and bending over ridges and through ravines, moved to the onset.

The scattering fire of the skirmish lines rang out; then, as the enemy's line was approached and the skirmishers retired into their respective commands, the batteries of artillery at full gallop were wheeled into position, and from both lines poured forth a fire, terrible and destructive.

Evening was approaching, and all on the Union side were imbued with the determination that the enemy must be beaten. They had faith in the assertion of Grant that the army first attacking would be victorious, and they pressed on with energy. Soon the enemy, began to waver; one point after another gave way; a battery here and there ceased firing and withdrew to new positions in the rear. Forward the National forces pressed and cheered. The ground thickly strewn with the dead and wounded of the morning's struggle was passed over, and if some bodies were crushed with on-rushing artillery and with charging battalions through the forest, it were sad, but only too true.

Wounded Union soldiers who were left on the lost ground of the morning were seen to throw up their hats and cheer their old comrades as they now charged over them in pursuit of the enemy.

Up and down the lines the gleaming sabers of McClernand, Wallace, Logan, Thayer, and other intrepid heroes, were branished, with words of command, cheer and encouragement. Amidst the sharp crash of musketry, the roar and ring of field artillery, came up and out from the river below the fort the deep-toned and ponderous reverberations of the great guns of the fleet again attacking; and the explosion of their huge shells over the works was heard in ter-

rible distinctness above all the crash of battle.

GENERAL SMITH'S BRILLIANT ASSAULT.

Let us now turn our attention to General Smith's division and see what he was doing in his front.

He had waited for orders to attack the works of the enemy which looked down in menacing mien upon him. All day the enemy's guns along these crests had been vomiting forth fire and smoke, shot and shell, in tones of daring defiance. They had been answered by Smith's artillery from the elevations on the National lines, and thus an artillery duel had progressed, while only desultory skirmish firing had occurred in the valley between and far below the two lines of artillery fire.

When Grant gave Smith the order to assault and capture the works, the order was in his usual confident tone. The works were not merely to be assaulted, but they were to be captured.

The brave and intrepid Smith with alacrity wheeled Lauman's brigade and moved into the valley between and beneath the two lines of artillery fire, and, forming the force into a front of five companies, each column or rank fifteen to twenty paces apart, took his own position between the front ranks.

Colonel Tuttle's Second Iowa had the lead. The other brigades were to take position and follow in support. The artillery was sending its missiles from hill-top to hill-top over the heads of the assaulting columns forming in the valley between, and the music of these shrieking shells exploding above their heads, and the ceaseless, stinging "zips" of Minie balls was the martial music to which these assaulting columns marched bravely on.

The grey-haired veteran Smith raised his cap on the point of his sword and led his men forward. With encouraging words he bade them "forward," then, when the rush was too rapid, came the caution, "Steady, men, steady." Cheers

came from the men as obstruction after obstruction was passed and the skirmish line of the enemy was routed from cover and captured or driven in.

Onward and upward Smith and his men moved, climbing the steep hill covered with ice and snow.

Everywhere the determined enemy was pouring down upon them, and across the valley, a fierce storm of lead and iron. Sharpened branches of fallen tree-tops were evaded, torn aside or crawled through; piles of logs were scaled, ditches were leaped. Onward and still upward they climbed, until, nearing the crest, with the artillery missiles from the Union lines flying thickly above their heads, aimed at the enemy in his works, they halted a moment to close ranks, load empty guns and take a breath. Then, at a signal, Smith's artillery became silent, and instantly his waiting men sprang to their feet and with wild cheers charged over the enemy's works, capturing prisoners, and, following the fleeing adversary, drove him out of his works on this part of his lines.

Immediately after the works were captured Smith's artillery was ordered to follow. The herculean task of clearing the way and hauling the guns and caissons up the precipitous hillside and placing them in position demonstrated what desperate men may do under such inspiration.

In a short time Smith's division, with his artillery, the Confederate guns captured in the works being turned, was in a position to command the citadel and control the Confederate works. But he was not destined to hold this captured position without another struggle.

Buckner, who was in command of these works, pursuant to their plan of attack agreed upon the previous night, had drawn out several of his best regiments to aid Pillow in the attack on McClernand and Wallace, and when he had been forced back within his lines further south, it turned out precisely as Grant had foreseen, that Buckner had

not time as yet to redistribute his men along his works. But he was moving in that direction when Smith stormed and carried his lines. Immediately Buckner threw all his force on Smith in a desperate attempt to drive him out and recover the captured position. There ensued a battle royal,—one of the most stubborn conflicts in the series of battles of the siege. But Buckner, after assaulting Smith until he could no longer induce his men to attack, was driven off, and when darkness closed the sanguinary struggle, Smith was so securely entrenched as to defy dislodgement.

Thus the battle, or battles, raged along the lines from early dawn, and when darkness brought the conflict to a close, the enemy found themselves forced back within part, and dislodged from the rest of the works from which they emerged in the morning a brave, confident, and well organized army.

THE BATTLEFIELD AND INCIDENTS OF THE AWFUL STRUGGLE.

There were between four and five thousand men killed and wounded during the day; the losses on each side being nearly equal.

The battles of this dismal Saturday had swept back and forth through miles of forest, through ravines and over ridges, up and down steep and gentle slopes, and on plateaus; and over it all were scattered the dead, the wounded, and the dying of both armies. Some were torn and lacerated with shells and cannon balls; some were killed or held prisoners by falling trees torn and shattered into fragments by exploding shells; but most of the fatal injury was the work of the deadly Minie ball.

The snow and ice, tramped by contending, advancing, and retreating armies, were stained thickly with blood.

As the Union army on this dreary Saturday night rested in bivouac, close in front of the enemy's works, the moans of the wounded could be heard, and here and there in the rear, flickering

lights moved through the forest on errands of mercy. Darkness and silence fell like a benediction upon both armies. The men slept, or tried to sleep, with snow and ice beneath them, and the silent stars above them, ready, perchance, to renew the conflict on the morrow.

In caring for the wounded Grant directed that no distinction be made between friend or foe.

Late in the afternoon Grant and staff were riding near where the forces of McClellan and Wallace were fighting their way back over the ground of the morning, and he stopped on a prominent point to observe. He dismounted and scanned the position.

When he was about to remount his attention was called to a number of dead lying about, and to two badly wounded men quite near. One was a Union artillery lieutenant, the other a Confederate private. The lieutenant was trying to give the Confederate a drink of water from his canteen. Both were covered with blood. One had a leg shot away and a wound in the head; the other had an arm shattered and both feet lacerated. The poor fellows were suffering all the pangs of death. Grant was instantly touched by the spectacle. Having no flask, he asked Colonel Webster if he had one. Neither he nor Rawlins had any, but one of the other staff officers produced a small flask of brandy and Grant walked to the suffering soldiers and gave each a swallow. The Confederate was able to look in his benefactor's face and gratefully say: "Thank you, General," and then lay his head against a tree. The lieutenant was unable to speak, but he raised his eyes in thankful recognition of the kind act, and his hand in salutation. Grant said to Rawlins: "Send for stretchers, send for stretchers at once for these men." An aid galloped off and in a few minutes several stretchers were there. Grant had remounted and was again observing, but his quick eye noticed that the men started off first with the

Union officer, and the others seemed to hesitate whether they were to take the Confederate or look for other Union wounded. But Grant said: "Take this Confederate too; take both of them together; the war is now over between them." And the wounded Confederate was carried away and treated as the other.

A little later, Grant and staff were riding quite rapidly along the right wing of his army where it had again swept over and regained the lost ground of the most desperate part of the battle of the morning, and the dead were scattered so thickly through the forest that the horses were kept constantly "shying" to avoid the bodies.

Presently Grant said to Colonel Webster: "Let us get away from this dreadful place; I suppose this work is a part of the devil that is left in us all."

As they passed out on more open ground, and through scattering wounded and limping men, hobbling and crawling towards the rear as best they could, Grant seemed more than ever affected by the suffering around him, and said to Webster and Rawlins that the sight of suffering always depressed him. After a moment's silence, he repeated Burns's couplet as they rode on — though he very rarely quoted poetry:

Man's inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn.

While the battle was in progress, Grant's active mind did not forget other duties. He sat composedly upon his horse and wrote an order directing the officer at Fort Henry to "send a company of cavalry on one of the transports up the Tennessee River, to destroy the railroad bridges, the position of which will be indicated by Captain Gwin of the gunboat Tyler."

Since long before light on the morning of that memorable Saturday, when he started from his headquarters, over the rough and frozen mud, to visit the wounded Commodore Foote on the fleet, until all was again quiet and safe along his well-adjusted lines, late in the night

Grant had not tasted food, except a hasty breakfast on the gunboat while consulting with Foote.

He had not been off his horse an hour during that day of days with him and his army. From the time he came galloping back into the midst of the battlefield, until darkness brought the conflict to a close, Grant was everywhere along the lines, with Smith, with Wallace, with McClernand; advising, suggesting, ordering; and he moved swiftly; was always cool, betraying no excitement; always confident, and, in some mysterious way, inspiring officers and men with a courage and confidence which always turned them into heroes in his presence, capable of the most daring deeds.

The student of psychology finds in Grant a remarkable study. That an officer who is brave, daring, demonstrative and ablaze with enthusiasm in battle should inspire his men to brave deeds, one can understand; but by what mysterious influence so quiet and undemonstrative a general as Grant, who never spoke above a conversational tone, never threw up his hat, never cheered, but was always methodical, calculating and deliberate—how such a man influenced every officer with whom he came in touch, to act with a swiftness and an energy that carried him to the performance of deeds bordering on the miraculous—this is the mystery!

Grant's confidence in success was at no time shaken. In every word and action he betrayed an invincible and inflexible resolution to fight it out to a successful issue.

In the afternoon, when the conflict was raging in all its terrible ferocity, two chaplains came where Grant and his staff were sitting on their horses, observing the movements of the armies. The good men were hunting for and helping the wounded and comforting them, but they were alarmed at this their first baptism of fire, and one of them ventured to ask Grant what provision he had made for retreat in case of defeat.

Grant replied, "There are the transports."

"Yes," replied the alarmed chaplain, "but they will not carry 10,000, and you have more than 20,000."

"But," answered Grant, "*when* we retreat, there will not be 10,000 of us left alive!"

THE SURRENDER.

The night was spent in a council of war by nearly all the Confederate field officers, and the conclusion was reached that there was nothing left for them but surrender or annihilation. Consternation, like that at Belshazzar's feast, seems to have suddenly seized Floyd and Pillow; it was one of the most remarkable scenes during the war.

Buckner, who was the only educated soldier, and whose force was in front of Smith, declared that he could not maintain his position half an hour in the morning. Floyd and Pillow were mere politicians, and had few soldierly qualities.

Floyd had been Secretary of War in Buchanan's cabinet and was charged with having betrayed his trust by unnecessarily removing arms and war material from Northern to Southern arsenals; and with having continued to hold the position long after he had conspired to establish an independent confederacy within the territory of the United States. Evidently he was in great trepidation as to what might be his fate if he fell into the hands of the National authorities.

In the report of the disaster made by Floyd ten days later, he said:

I had a right, *individually*, to determine that I would not survive a surrender there. . . . I agreed to hand over the command to Brigadier-General Buckner through Brigadier-General Pillow, and to make an effort for my own extrication by any and every means that might present themselves to me.

Col. John C. Burch, an aid on General Pillow's staff, in his report made March 15th, *under oath*, tells us:

General Floyd said that he would suffer any fate before he would surrender or fall into the hands of the enemy alive. At the

suggestion of someone present, he said that personal considerations influenced him in coming to this determination, and further stated that such considerations should never govern a general officer.

Major Haynes, Commissary-General under Floyd, in his report made on March 13, 1862, says:

General Buckner said that to attempt to cut a way through the enemy's lines, and retreat, would cost a sacrifice of three-fourths of the command, and no commander had a right to make such a sacrifice. General Floyd, concurring, remarked: "We will have to capitulate; but, gentlemen, I cannot surrender; you know my position with the Federals; it wouldn't do; it wouldn't do." Whereupon, General Pillow, addressing General Floyd, said: "I will not surrender myself nor the command; will die first." "Then I suppose, gentlemen," said General Buckner, "the surrender will devolve upon me." "Then, sir," said General Floyd, "I surrender the command;" and General Pillow, who was next in command, very quickly exclaimed: "I will not accept it; I will never surrender;" and while speaking, turned to General Buckner, who remarked: "I will accept and share the fate of my command," and called for pen, ink, paper and a bugler.

We have here, I think, a more picturesque and graphic view of this great historic event, written by Confederate officers in their official reports at the time, than anything Union writers or historians have ever produced.

The act of Floyd and Pillow in deserting their army in its hour of disaster and seeking their own personal safety has been justly execrated by all soldiers in both armies, and was strikingly rebuked by President Jefferson Davis, who immediately wrote his secretary of war, saying:

The reports of Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Pillow of the defense and fall of Fort Donelson are unsatisfactory. . . . You will order Gen. A. S. Johnston to relieve both of those officers from command.

Morning was approaching, and Buckner knew, with the instincts of the soldier, and from his knowledge of Grant's energetic habits of fighting, that his works would be assaulted at the dawn of day. As he began to use his ink and paper, Floyd and Pillow made their exit, and hastened to their boats.

Floyd hastily embarked his brigade, and amid the execrations of those left behind, departed for Nashville.

Colonel Forest, also escaped with about 1,200 cavalry, by wading and

swimming through a submerged slough. General Buckner immediately wrote and sent off the following note, under flag of truce, with an officer whose bugler sounded a parley in front of General Smith's lines:

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, }
February 16, 1862. }

SIR—In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in this view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day. I am, sir,

Your obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER,
Brigadier-General C. S. A.

The letter was immediately carried to Grant, who had spent the night at a cabin in rear of the lines, near and ready for any emergency that could arise.

Without a moment's hesitation he wrote and returned the following answer, probably one of the finest specimens of energetic war literature in military history:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD, }
CAMP NEAR DONELSON, February 16, 1862. }

To General S. B. Buckner, Confederate Army:

Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General U. S. A., Commanding.

This very emphatic answer being returned to general Buckner, that officer realized that if he would avoid Grant's threatened "immediate" movement "upon his works," it was necessary for him to "immediately" submit. He promptly returned the following *ungracious*, if not "ungenerous," reply:

February 16, 1862.
To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, U. S. A.:

SIR—The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. I am, sir,

Your very obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER,
Brigadier-General C. S. A.

White flags were hoisted along Buckner's lines as day dawned, and the two

armies rose up from the snow and ice on which they had rested during the night, and at first looked in silence at each other across the narrow intervening space; then, when Grant's army comprehended that the bugle-notes and white flags meant surrender, wild shouts of joy and loud cheers arose—first, in Smith's division, which occupied that portion of the works where the white flag first appeared—then the shout of the armed host swept southward along the lines of Wallace, then swelled out into a mighty uproar as they passed along the ranks of McClelland's heroes in their circle round to Dover on the river bank, and died away in echoes over the waters.



THE SUICIDE.

A WILD, weird night it was, the sharp, curved moon—
 A shining sabre hurled across the sky—
 Cut through a ragged cloud; beneath each tree
 Were shadows madly dancing to the high
 Shrill piping of the wind, and to the beat
 Of barren limbs that ever writhed and swayed
 Above the frosty earth, above the form
 Of her who hastened onward, undismayed;
 Who stood upon the cliff's huge brow of stone
 With floating hair, a raven banner blown.

Loud roared the sea below, and fierce he strove
 To scale that crag, and climbed and surged and blew
 From hoarsely laughing lips great flakes of foam,
 Then in his awful rage reached up and drew
 Her close against his breast; the deep caves rang,
 The billows rose like mighty wings and seemed
 To fan the very stars so brightly did
 They burn; the whole vast ocean shone and gleamed
 With phosphorescent light; the firs upon
 The hill raised rugged arms and prayed for dawn!

Herbert Bashford.